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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis examines the strategic and potentially legitimising nature of voluntary 
environmental reporting.  First, the thesis examines the relationship between emission levels 
on the National Pollutant Inventory and the quantity of total voluntary environmental 
disclosures, voluntary emission disclosures and positive voluntary environmental disclosures 
in annual reports.  Second, an examination of changes in the quantity of disclosures 
discussing compliance with the National Pollutant Inventory and/or disclosures concerning 
pollution emissions is undertaken.   
 
Taking into consideration the findings relating to the strategic nature of voluntary disclosures, 
the thesis then examines the potential of such disclosures to impact upon the usefulness of 
mandatory annual report disclosure requirements.   This is undertaken by investigating 
whether significant differences exist between environmental disclosure practices in the 
voluntary sections of annual reports for corporations reporting non-compliance, and those not 
reporting non-compliance, in the directors’ report pursuant with the requirements of s. 
299(1)(f) of the Corporations Law. 
 
The findings suggest that, for the sample corporations, a change in environmental regulation 
may have been an impetus for changes in voluntary environmental disclosure practices in 
annual reports.  Disclosures are identified as being discretionary, and potentially reactive to 
changes in environmental regulation, with a significant increase in the quantity of voluntary 
disclosures relating to the National Pollutant Inventory and in the number of corporations 
making voluntary emission disclosures during the period.  Hence, voluntary disclosures, 
although discretionary, may provide some indication of the corporation’s actual 
environmental activities and provides some support for industry arguments to maintain a 
voluntary environmental disclosure system. 
 
A comparison of the quantity and nature of voluntary disclosures for corporations required to 
report non-compliance with, and those reporting no non-compliance with, environmental 
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regulations in the directors’ report found no significant differences in disclosure practices 
between the two groups; that is, in contrast to the findings of previous research, those 
reporting non-compliance had no higher propensity for either greater quantities of voluntary 
environmental disclosures or positive voluntary environmental disclosures.  The findings 
suggest that the limitations faced by s. 299(1)(f) in its early years may have resulted in it not 
being perceived as a legitimacy threat by the sample corporations or as a lesser threat than 
others such as the NPI.   
 
Therefore, questions remain as to whether the section is able to produce the outcomes 
proposed at its inception.   Overall, taking into consideration the discretionary nature of 
voluntary environmental disclosures, and the limitations of s. 299(1)(f), concern remains as to 
the quality of the Australian annual report environmental reporting system and the potential 
for the existence of voluntary environmental disclosures in the annual report to reduce the 
usefulness of a mandatory disclosure system to users.  These findings suggest a need for 
further research into the effect of both mandatory and voluntary environmental disclosures on 
users’ perceptions of corporate environmental performance. 
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Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background to the Research 
 
The past four decades has seen an evolution in community and investor attitudes towards the 
environment in Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2004; Ethical Investment 
Association 2004; Lothian 1994).  This change has corresponded with an increase in 
environmental legislation within Australia and internationally (Australian Government 2006; 
Welford 1999; Bates 1995).  The emergence, continuation and/or growth of environmental 
groups such as Greenpeace, the Australian Conservation Foundation and WWF during the last 
forty years have also provided a continuing emphasis on the importance of the environment.  
Such increases in community, investor and lobby group interest have resulted in increased 
pressure on corporations to improve environmental performance (Ethical Investment 
Association 2004; Wilmshurst & Frost 2000; Patten 1992). 
 
Increased interest in corporate environmental performance has arguably led to an increase in 
the expected accountability of organisations to provide information about their environmental 
performance to a variety of stakeholder groups (Ethical Investment Association 2004; Tilt 
1994; Welford 1994; Patten 1992).  While social reporting by corporations has been noted 
over the past century (Guthrie & Parker 1989; Hogner 1982), environmental reporting in 
annual reports has generally been noted since the 1960’s (Deegan & Gordon 1996; Guthrie & 
Parker 1989; Kelly 1981; Trotman & Bradley 1981).  During this period there has been an 
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increase in the number of corporations disclosing and in the quantity of disclosures made by 
those corporations (Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005; KPMG 1999; Gray, 
Kouhy & Lavers 1995b; Trotman & Bradley 1981).   
 
While an increase in environmental reporting in Australia has occurred (Department of the 
Environment and Heritage 2005; KPMG 1999; Deegan & Gordon 1996; Guthrie & Parker 
1989; Kelly 1981; Trotman & Bradley 1981), the reporting system remains predominantly 
voluntary.  Consequently, corporations can alter their reporting policies across time and, 
possibly, as a result of specific threats and opportunities.  For example, corporations that have 
experienced a negative environmental event or unfavourable publicity concerning 
environmental performance have been found to provide higher quantities of disclosures in 
annual reports (Deegan & Rankin 1996).  Increases in disclosures often occur following 
environmental or social disasters receiving adverse media attention (Deegan, Rankin & Voght 
2000).  Voluntary environmental disclosures tend to be predominantly positive in nature with 
little negative information included (Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 2002; Deegan, Rankin & 
Voght 2000; Deegan & Rankin 1996).   
 
Previous research has argued that the use of environmental disclosures in annual reports may 
be economically beneficial to corporations particularly following a negative environmental 
event (Freedman & Patten 2004; Blacconiere & Northcutt 1997; Blacconiere & Patten 1994).  
While this may be favourable to the corporation, the quality of such disclosures has been 
questioned regarding issues such as credibility (Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 
1996), usefulness (Hughes, Anderson & Golden 2001; Tilt 1994) and the potential to mislead 
(Deegan & Rankin 1996; Rockness 1985).  Although improvements in some areas of 
disclosure practices have been noted in recent years, it is still suggested that voluntary 
disclosures do not necessarily provide an accurate account of actual environmental 
performance (Australian Consumers Association, Australian Conservation Foundation & 
Oxfam Community Aid Abroad 2004).  Criticisms of the information provided by 
corporations on the environment led to requests for mandatory annual report disclosure 
requirements by researchers (Gray, Owen & Maunders 1987) and pressure groups (Tilt 1994).   
 
As a possible consequence of increased community concern in relation to the environment 
and/or concerns relating to the quality of environmental reporting within a voluntary reporting 
regime (Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; Deegan & Rankin 1996) two mandatory 
environmental reporting requirements were introduced into the Australian corporate landscape 
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in 1998.  The National Pollutant Inventory was developed by Environment Australia1 to 
provide the community with a publicly available database of the pollution emissions of 
entities exceeding the specified emission thresholds.  In addition, in 1998 the Australian 
Corporations Law (Cth) was amended to include section 299(1)(f) which requires disclosing 
corporations to include in the directors’ report information regarding compliance with 
relevant state or Commonwealth environmental regulations.  Many large corporations and 
various industry groups resisted both requirements maintaining that implementation would 
result in reduced competitive advantage and increased compliance costs (Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Securities 1999; National Environment Protection Council 
1998).  Furthermore, voluntary reporting was espoused as the preferred method on the basis 
that market forces would prompt improvements in this area (Parliamentary Joint Statutory 
Committee 1999).  Both disclosure requirements remain in place at this time. 
 
In Australian corporate history there has been a notable absence of mandated, publicly 
disclosed environmental performance information (such as pollution emission details) and 
mandatory environmental reporting requirements (such as mandated annual report 
disclosures).  Much of the previous Australian research has examined the discretionary nature 
of voluntary environmental disclosures through changes in the quantity of environmental 
disclosures and/or the nature of such disclosures. There is, however, little research that has 
examined whether the introduction of an environmental regulation – in this case the 
introduction of the National Pollutant Inventory – acts as an impetus to changes in the content 
of annual report voluntary disclosures.  Furthermore, due to a prior absence of legislated 
annual report environmental disclosure requirements, a comparative examination of annual 
report voluntary environmental disclosure practices for corporations compelled to disclose 
non-compliance, and those disclosing compliance, with environmental regulations has not 
been undertaken.   A detailed review of the literature in the research area is provided in 
chapter 2.  
 
1.2 Theoretical Perspective and Research Objectives 
 
Legitimacy theory has been used extensively as an explanatory theory in the voluntary 
disclosure literature (Hedberg & Von Malmborg 2003; O’Dwyer 2003; Patten 2002b; Brown 
& Deegan 1998; O’Donovan 1999; Neu, Warsame & Pedwell 1998; Deegan & Gordon 
                                                
1 Now the Department of Environment and Heritage. 
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1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996; Patten 1991).  Underlying legitimacy theory is the notion of 
the ‘social contract’ which exists between an organisation and the society in which that 
organisation exists and operates (Shocker & Sethi 1974).  Organisational legitimacy is 
conferred by parties external to the organisation (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990; Dowling & Pfeffer 
1975).  If the norms and values of the organisation differ from the norms and values of the 
society in which that organisation operates, organisational legitimacy may be threatened 
(Lindblom 1994; Dowling & Pfeffer 1975) and a legitimacy gap may occur (Wartick & 
Mahon 1994).  Under such circumstances the organisation may undertake activities in order 
to gain, maintain or repair legitimacy (O’Donovan 2002). While there are several strategies 
an organisation may adopt, the organisation must communicate its legitimating strategies to 
society (Dowling & Pfeffer 1975).  It has been suggested that this has been achieved via 
voluntary disclosures in the corporation’s annual report (Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; 
Brown & Deegan 1998; Li, Richardson & Thornton 1997; Blacconiere & Patten 1994; Patten 
1992).   
 
It may be argued that two potential or actual legitimacy threats to Australian corporations 
were introduced in 1998 – the National Pollutant Inventory (NPI) and s. 299(1)(f) of the 
Corporations Law (now the Corporations Act 2001).  The NPI was established to improve 
public right-to-know regarding polluting activities of entities operating within Australia. The 
NPI was opposed by industry at its inception but is now well established as an annual 
reporting requirement.  The amendment to include section 299(1)(f) in the Corporations Law 
was the subject of similar opposition and states that a company’s directors’ report for the 
financial year must: 
 
‘if the entity’s operations are subject to any particular and significant environmental 
regulation under a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory – give details of 
the entity’s performance in relation to environmental regulation’. 
 
Prior to the introduction of s. 299 (1)(f) annual report environmental disclosures were 
predominantly voluntary.  The section compels corporations to disclose aspects of 
environmental performance information which may be negative in the directors’ report of the 
company annual report.  Therefore, in considering the potentially legitimising nature of the 
NPI and s. 299(1)(f), three principal research objectives are addressed in this thesis.   
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The first objectives of this research relate to the NPI and examine the potentially legitimising 
(and discretionary) nature of voluntary environmental disclosures by determining whether: 
 
1. a change in environmental regulation acts as an impetus to changes in voluntary 
environmental disclosure practices in annual reports of Australian companies.  
 
And, for comparison with previous research, principally that undertaken by Patten (2002b), 
if: 
 
2. there is a relationship between the quantity of published pollution emissions on 
the NPI and the quantity of voluntary environmental disclosure in annual 
reports of Australian corporations. 
 
The final research objective of this thesis relates to s. 299(1)(f) of the Corporations Act and 
examines whether: 
 
3. there are significant differences between environmental disclosure practices in 
the voluntary sections of Australian corporate annual reports for corporations 
reporting non-compliance, and those not reporting non-compliance, with 
environmental regulations in the directors’ report pursuant to the requirements 
of section 299(1)(f). 
 
Objective 1 stems from the existing literature which provides evidence of the strategic and 
discretionary nature of voluntary environmental disclosures through a consideration of timing, 
quantity and nature of disclosures (Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 2002; Deegan, Rankin & Voght 
2000; Brown & Deegan 1998; Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996).  There is 
limited evidence, however, which investigates the impact of a particular event, such as the 
introduction of a new environmental regulation, on the content of voluntary annual report 
disclosures. 
 
Objective 2 stems from the findings from a number of researchers who identified a propensity 
for corporations with what is deemed “poor” environmental performance to provide greater 
quantities of voluntary environmental disclosures (Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen & Hughes II 
2004; Li, Richardson & Thornton 1997; Deegan & Rankin 1996).  In particular, objective 2 
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provides a comparison with the research undertaken by Patten (2002b) who identified a 
positive relationship between levels of emission disclosures on the US Toxic Release 
Inventory and the quantity of environmental disclosures in 10k reports. 
 
Objectives 1 and 2 will be addressed through the following five propositions: 
 
P1a. Corporations with greater quantities of published pollution emissions, adjusted by size 
of corporation, on the National Pollutant Inventory have greater quantities of total voluntary 
environmental disclosures in annual reports. 
P1b.  Corporations with greater quantities of published pollution emissions, adjusted by size 
of corporation, on the National Pollutant Inventory have greater quantities of positive 
voluntary environmental disclosures in annual reports. 
P1c.  Corporations with greater quantities of published pollution emissions, adjusted by size 
of corporation, on the National Pollutant Inventory have greater quantities of voluntary 
emission disclosures in annual reports. 
P2a. There is an increase in the quantity of voluntary environmental disclosures discussing 
compliance with the NPI in annual reports during the NPI implementation period by 
corporations required to publish emission information on the NPI. 
P2b. There is an increase in the number of corporations providing voluntary environmental 
disclosures concerning pollution/emissions in annual reports during the implementation 
period of the NPI by corporations required to publish emission information on the NPI . 
 
Objective 3 stems from questions regarding the quality of annual report voluntary 
environmental disclosures as mentioned in section 1.1.  Concerns regarding the quality of 
voluntary environmental reporting led, to some extent, to the amendment of the Corporations 
Law to include s. 299(1)(f), a mandatory annual report environmental disclosure requirement.  
While the amendment has been considered a positive step to improving disclosures of 
environmental information in annual reports (Frost 2001; Deegan 2000a), this thesis questions 
the potential for the mandatory disclosures to be overshadowed or counteracted by voluntary 
disclosures appearing in the annual report. 
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Objective 3 is addressed through the following two propositions: 
 
P3a.  Australian listed corporations reporting non-compliance in accordance with the 
requirements of s. 299(1)(f) provide greater quantities of environmental disclosures in the 
voluntary section of the annual report than companies reporting no non-compliance. 
 
P3b. Australian listed corporations reporting non-compliance in accordance with the 
requirements of s. 299(1)(f) provide greater quantities of positive environmental disclosures 
in the voluntary section of the annual report than companies reporting no non-compliance. 
 
A detailed discussion on the theoretical perspectives utilised in the research area and this 
research is presented in chapter 3.  The research objectives and propositions are established in 
detail in chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis. 
 
1.3 Justification for the Research 
 
This research is justified for a number of reasons.  First, a greater understanding of the 
strategic nature of voluntary environmental disclosures is necessitated due to such disclosures 
being: 
 
• identified as a strategic tool for altering the perceptions of users regarding the 
environmental performance of an entity (O’Donovan 1999); 
• of value to users for environmental performance information (Collison, Lorraine & 
Power 2003; Epstein & Freedman 1994);   
• criticised by previous authors, as mentioned in section 1.1, regarding the quality of 
such disclosures (Hughes, Anderson & Golden 2001; Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan 
& Rankin 1996; Tilt 1994); 
• supported by industry on the grounds that there is no evidence that voluntary reporting 
has not been successful in providing environmental performance information to users 
(Australian Industry Group 1999);   
• presented in the annual report alongside mandatory disclosures required by the 
Corporations Act 2001; 
• identified as preferable to mandatory disclosures in recent recommendations 
considering sustainability reporting for Australian companies during an enquiry into 
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corporate responsibility (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services 2006). 
 
Second, prior to the introduction of s.299(1)(f) annual report environmental disclosure 
research has been limited to voluntary environmental disclosures.  The introduction of the 
section provides an opportunity to examine whether mandatory disclosures are considered as 
possible threats to legitimacy by corporations required to disclose negative information in the 
annual report.  It is also posited in chapters 2 and 3 that the strategic nature of voluntary 
disclosures and the limited scope of the section may limit the usefulness of mandatory 
disclosures when such disclosures appear in the same document.   
 
Finally, as briefly stated in section 1.2, the method of content analyses adopted in previous 
Australian studies has focussed on the use of quantity of voluntary disclosures in annual 
reports as the sole indicator of the importance of an issue to a corporation.  Limited research 
has examined changes in the content of voluntary disclosures.    
  
1.4 Research Method 
 
This research utilises content analysis to operationalise the mandatory and voluntary 
environmental disclosure variables tested in the propositions stated in section 1.2 of this 
chapter.  Content analysis is ‘a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences 
from data’ (Krippendorff 1980, p. 21) and has been utilised extensively in Australian and 
international social and environmental disclosure literature (Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 2002; 
Patten 2002b; Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 
1996; Hackston & Milne 1996; Gray, Kouhy & Lavers 1995b; Zeghal & Ahmed 1990; 
Guthrie & Parker 1989; Cowen, Ferreri & Parker 1987; Freedman & Jaggi 1982; Wiseman 
1982; Trotman & Bradley 1981; Ingram & Frazier 1980).   
 
Annual reports are used as the disclosure medium in this research in order to address the 
objectives relating to the mandatory disclosure of environmental information as required by s. 
299(1)(f).  Furthermore, the use of the annual report allows comparisons with previous 
environmental disclosure literature, particularly Australian research (Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 
2002; Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996; Gibson & Guthrie 1995; Guthrie & 
Parker 1989).   A detailed discussion of the disclosure medium utilised in this and previous 
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Both indexing and unitising content analysis procedures are adopted with the latter using 
sentences as the recording unit and words as the measurement unit.  The selection of the 
recording and measurement unit has been the subject of much debate (Unerman 2000; Milne 
& Adler 1999; Hackston & Milne 1996; Gray, Kouhy & Lavers 1995b) and justification for 
the units used in this research is addressed in detail in section 4.4.2. 
 
Mandatory and voluntary environmental disclosures are defined pursuant to the requirements 
of s. 299(1)(f) of the Corporations Act 2001.  Voluntary environmental disclosures are further 
sub-categorised to represent emission disclosures and disclosures relating to the National 
Pollutant Inventory.  The nature of disclosures is classified in accordance with previous 
Australian research (see section 4.4.5).   
 
Statistical analyses used to test the research propositions are non-parametric.  This is due to 
the limited sample size and violations of the assumptions of normality for the majority of 
variables used in the research.  Justification for the method used in this research is detailed in 
chapter 4. 
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into six chapters.  Chapter 2 provides a summary of literature in the 
environmental disclosure area including an overview of (a) the history of corporate 
environmental reporting; (b) empirical research examining environmental disclosure 
behaviours of corporations and; (c) the introduction of the National Pollutant Inventory and s. 
299 (1)(f) of the Corporations Law.  Chapter 3 introduces a summary of theoretical 
perspectives utilised in previous research in the area and a detailed summary of the literature 
relating to legitimacy theory, the perspective used in this thesis.  The research objectives and 
propositions are also developed in chapter 3.  The research method utilised in this research is 
discussed and justified in chapter 4.  Particular emphasis is given to the selection of the 
medium for disclosure and the content analysis process used.  Chapter 5 provides the data 
analysis and results of the propositions outlined in chapter 3.  A discussion of the findings is 
also included in chapter 5.  The conclusion is presented in chapter 6 and includes a review of 
the objectives of the study, an overview of the findings of the research, the limitations of the 
research, and implications for future research in the area. 
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1.6 Definitions 
 
The definitions below specify the meanings of the terms used in this thesis. 
 
Annual report:  document which includes annual financial report prepared under Chapter 2M 
of the Corporations Act 2001, ASX Listing Rule disclosure requirements and additional 
voluntary information determined by management. 
 
Environmental disclosure:  provision of information whether voluntary, mandatory, or by the 
company or a third party, pertaining to an aspect of environmental performance. 
 
Environmental performance:  the company’s interactions with, and affects upon, the physical 
environment.  Physical environment is defined in the Protection of the Environment 
Administration Act 1991 (NSW) section 3(1) as: 
 
Components of the earth, including a) land, air and water; b) any layer of the 
atmosphere; c) any organic or inorganic matter and living organism; and d) human-made 
or modified structures and areas, and includes interacting natural ecosystems 
 
Mandatory disclosure:  disclosure required under authoritative and regulatory bodies and 
includes those disclosures under government regulations and law, accounting standards, and 
the ASX. 
 
Voluntary disclosure:  disclosures made by an entity that are ‘the revelation of information 
above and beyond that required by formal accounting and regulatory standards’ (Devinney & 
Kabanoff 1999, p. 60). 
 
1.7 Delimitations of scope 
 
This research examines only a single environmental regulation, the NPI, on the voluntary 
environmental disclosure practices of the sample companies.  As stated in chapter 3, 
Australian firms are subject to a number of environmental regulations at the local, state and 
national level.  Although environmental regulation for the purposes of this research is 
restricted to the NPI emission-related disclosures, such disclosures may have been influenced 
by other environmental regulations or variables not identified in this research. 
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Mandatory annual report disclosures are limited to those required by s. 299(1)(f) of the 
Corporations Act 2001.  Companies are also subject to mandatory reporting disclosures as a 
result of requirements of other authoritative bodies such as the Australian Stock Exchange and 
accounting standards.  The latter, however, are a component of the financial reporting 
environment, which has been commonly criticised for ignoring issues relating to social and 
environmental performance activities (Deegan 2006). 
 
This research utilises the annual report as the sole disclosure medium.  The use of the annual 
report alone ignores voluntary disclosures utilised in other media such as company websites, 
stand-alone environmental reports, and promotional media.  The annual report is justified in 
this instance, however, for comparisons with previous research and as the required document 
for including disclosures pursuant to the requirements of s. 299(1)(f) of the Corporations Act. 
 
Care should be exercised in applying the results of this research to the broader population of 
Australian firms subject to the requirements of the NPI and s. 299(1)(f).  As discussed in 
chapters 4 and 6, this research was limited by the sample size.  Caution should also be 
exercised in applying the findings of this research to firms outside Australia as environmental 
regulations and annual report disclosure requirements differ across countries.  
 
1.8 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter provided an introduction to the research outlined in this thesis.  The chapter 
introduced the field of research, the research objectives and propositions.  The research was 
justified, definitions were presented and the method briefly outlined, and the delimitations 
were identified.  The review of relevant literature in the research area is now presented in 
chapter 2. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a review of literature relating to annual report environmental disclosure 
practices in Australia, and to a lesser extent, internationally.  The first section of the literature 
review is a synopsis of the emergence of environmental concern within the Australian 
community.  This is followed by a review of empirical research that examines relationships 
between environmental performance and environmental disclosure.  The potential economic 
benefits of environmental disclosures to the corporation are also examined.  The final sections 
of the chapter examine literature relating to the content and quality of annual report 
environmental disclosures and the introduction of the National Pollutant Inventory and section 
299(1)(f) of the Corporations Law.   
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2.2 Changing Attitudes toward Environmental Disclosures 
 
Since the 1960’s there has been an increase in government environmental legislation and 
program development internationally (Welford 1999).  A similar trend has been experienced 
in Australia (Australian Government 2006; Bates 1995; Lothian 1994).  This increase has 
occurred in parallel to, and may be considered a consequence of, the increased concern of the 
Australian community regarding environmental issues and, in particular, business 
environmental performance (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2004; Lothian 1994).   
 
In surveys conducted between 1975 and 1994, the community exhibited a constant level of 
concern (average of 33 per cent of those surveyed) for environmental issues during 1975-1986 
(Lothian 1994, p. 82), and (average of 58 per cent) during 1990-19942 (p. 83).  The results for 
environmental concern remained relatively stable when compared with alternative issues 
including unemployment, taxation, inflation and interest rates (Lothian 1994).  Specifically, 
the environmental issues of greatest concern to most respondents were pollution and waste, 
followed by fauna and flora, natural resource use, global issues and urban issues (Lothian 
1994).   Similar results have been identified in recent years with 57 per cent of adult 
Australians stating they were concerned about environmental problems in 2004 (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 2004)3. 
 
General community attitudes have also been reflected in the establishment of special interest 
groups which have been a stimulating force behind the changing legislative climate in which 
Australian corporations operate.  The last forty years has seen the introduction of several 
environmental groups in Australia including The Wilderness Society, the Australian 
Conservation Foundation, Greenpeace Australia, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Total 
Environment Centre, and the National Toxics Network4.  The focus of these groups is 
protection of the environment and the education of society or sections of society on 
environmental issues.  In order to achieve their objectives ‘pressure groups are engaged in 
lobbying either the companies directly, or through government bodies’ (Tilt 1994, p. 59).   
                                                
2 The results between the 1975-1986 and 1990-1994 periods are ‘not strictly comparable’ as questions differed in 
the two periods (Lothian 1994, p. 83).  No similar surveys were undertaken between 1986 and 1990. 
3 No details were provided as to how “concern” was measured. 
4 See Appendix A for further information on these groups. 
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During the past thirty to forty years the objectives of the community and corporations were 
often misaligned (Welford 1999).  Both environmental groups and the community have been 
instrumental in placing increased pressure on governments internationally to legislate for 
improved environmental performance by companies (Patten 1992).  While the community and 
environmental groups were embracing the “environmental movement” in the 1960’s and 
1970’s the reaction by companies internationally was quite different.  During the 1970’s, 
companies regarded environmental management with ‘indifference and even hostility’ 
(Welford 1999, p. 14).  The corporate resistance approach corresponded with the 
confrontational approach adopted by many environmental groups who took a rigid attitude to 
issues of environmental concern.  Companies appeared to ignore the shift in environmental 
focus occurring within society, perhaps hoping that it was a fad that would soon pass; 
however, a shift towards reduced environmental awareness and concern within the 
community was not to be forthcoming (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2004; Lothian 1994).   
 
Recognising the change in community values and acknowledging the increased, and 
unwavering, focus on the environment, many companies have adopted environmental 
management as a strategic tool to improve competitive advantage (Welford 1999).  Welford 
(1999) proposes that a company’s environmental performance approach may be identified on 
a continuum ranging from resistance to transcendence.  This framework is commonly known 
as the ROAST scale.  It is not only applicable to the identification of a particular entity’s 
environmental performance approach at a particular point in time, but is also representative of 
changes to the culture of corporations collectively over a period of time.  The ROAST scale is 
displayed in Table 1 below. 
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Table 1:  The ROAST scale 
 
R Stage 1 — Resistance Total resistance to environmental values and rules.  Organisations 
would be absolutely unresponsive and reactive to environmental 
initiatives 
O Stage 2 — Observe and 
Comply 
The organisation observes environmental laws but actions reflect an 
unwilling attitude or lack of ability to comply.  Actions are being 
enforced through legislation or court decisions. 
A Stage 3 — 
Accommodate 
Organisation begins to adapt to change.  Early indications of 
proactive and responsive behaviors.  Actions are no longer based 
entirely on complying with environmental legislation the 
organisation begins to exhibit voluntary behavior. 
S Stage 4 — Seize and 
Pre-empt 
The organisation voluntarily seizes and pre-empts its actions with 
environmental concerns.  It proactively engages in setting the 
agenda.  It is responsive to the many external stakeholders.  The 
latter phases would display the attributes of sustainable development. 
T Stage 5 — Transcend The organisation’s environmental values, attitudes, beliefs and 
culture exhibit a total support for the environment.  The organisation 
would proactively support and be responsive to all living things.  It 
would act in a way which is fully consistent with sustainable 
development. 
 (Source: Welford 1999, p. 22) 
 
 
Welford (1999) suggests that a major motivation for a company to move upward from one 
category of the ROAST scale to the next is competitive advantage.  Competitive advantage is 
comprised of many components including but not limited to, favourable relationships with 
pressure groups, positive media coverage, and better community relationships (Welford & 
Gouldson 1993).  In particular, Australian companies suggest that the most frequent benefits 
are those such as enhancement of company reputation, confidence of insurers, investors and 
finance providers, and improvements in company operation and management (Department of 
Environment and Heritage 2004).  More specifically, the Business Council of Australia (2005, 
p. 14) states that the economic drivers of corporate social responsibility are ‘employee 
recruitment, motivation and retention; learning and innovation; reputation management; risk 
profile and risk management; competitiveness and market positioning; operational efficiency; 
investor relations and access to capital; and licence [sic] to operate’. 
 
A useful example of corporate positioning on the ROAST scale is provided by Boral Green 
Shareholders, an ethical investment group5.  Boral Limited has been involved in the wood 
                                                
5 Hummels and Timmer (2004, p.74) describe ethical investors as those investors who ‘do not solely or even 
primarily focus on the financial implications of unethical or unsustainable behaviour or activities of the 
companies they invest in.  Their prime focus is the (undesirable) character of the behaviour or activities itself’.  It 
is estimated that the value of socially responsible investment (SRI) assets in Australia was $21.5 billion in 2004 
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chipping of Australian native forests. The Boral Green Shareholders group (2001a) has 
described Boral as being ‘currently perceived as an old economy, industrial-age company, 
selling commodities and tolerating its environmental responsibilities through a commitment to 
compliance: hardly a world beater’. 
 
The shareholders have been actively campaigning for changes in Boral’s approach to 
environmental issues.  If the above description of Boral’s current approach to environmental 
management is accurate, Boral would only be situated at stage 2 of the ROAST scale – 
observe and comply.  This positioning does not meet the expectations of the group which 
argues ‘that a truly committed company aims to do more than just comply’ (Boral Green 
Shareholders 2001b).  Consequently the group had previously nominated a candidate for 
director in both 2000 and 2001.  The group believed that the nomination of an 
environmentally sensitive director to a predominantly financially-focused board would: 
 
…help Boral make the transition to a new economy, 21st century information and service 
driven company…providing the company is prepared to make a real commitment to 
sustainability to review its extraction, production, transportation and consumption 
patterns. 
(Boral Green Shareholders 2000) 
 
The group argues that Boral needs to evolve from a follower mentality to that of leader and 
that failure to move upward to more proactive strategies:  
 
…will see Boral’s fortunes continue to founder.  The train of sustainable development is 
leaving the station globally.  Will Boral be on it and remain competitive?  Or will it be 
left at the station? 
(Boral Green Shareholders 2000) 
 
As noted above community (including shareholder) concerns relating to the environment 
resulted in a focus on corporate environmental performance.  These concerns have also 
coincided with another phenomenon – environmental reporting and disclosure.  Several 
researchers have noted changes in corporate environmental (and social) reporting6 practices 
                                                                                                                                                   
(Ethical Investment Association 2004, p. 1).  This represents a 1020% increase in SRI since 2000 (Ethical 
Investment Association 2004, p. 9) 
6 Environmental reporting is often used as a sub-category of social reporting. 
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over the period (see for example Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 2002; Guthrie & Parker 1989; 
Hogner 1982; Trotman 1979).   
 
Hogner (1982) investigated social disclosures in the corporate annual reports of US Steel from 
the reporting period 1901 to 1980.  The principal purpose of the study was to examine how a 
long-standing company responded to changing societal demands as documented in the annual 
report.  During the period several social issues were prominent in the annual reports including 
the status of women, human resources, workplace health and safety, and the environment.  
Other issues, excepting worker safety which was regularly reported from 1915 to 1980, were 
covered for particular reporting periods.  For example, the proportion of women in the 
workforce was an issue between 1943 and 1957 but was not reported after that period.  
Similarly, even though there was evidence of pollution abatement expenditure in previous 
reporting periods, disclosures regarding the company’s pollution abatement attempts did not 
begin until 1966 and continued through to the last year examined.  Hogner (1982, p. 249) 
attributed these changes in disclosure issues as ‘a concentration on the reporting of activities 
that society is perceived as valuing most at the time’ explaining the phenomena of social 
reporting as ‘an indicator of the changing institutional structure of business in response to 
changing societal demands’ (1982, pp. 244–245). 
 
In a similar study Guthrie and Parker (1989) investigated corporate social reporting by the 
Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited (BHP) for the period 1885 to 1985. Using content 
analysis and page measurement, the authors recorded social disclosures across the themes of 
environment, energy, human resources, products, community involvement and others.  In all, 
there was evidence of both high and low levels of social disclosure with peak disclosure 
periods occurring between 1890 and 1910, and mid 1970’s and mid 1980’s (1989, p. 346).  
Human resources were again the most frequently reported issues, followed by community 
involvement, energy and, finally, the environment.   In fact, apart from a brief reporting 
period in the 1950’s, environmental disclosures were not included but reappeared in the early 
1970’s and again in the early 1980’s.  The company’s environmental disclosure practices 
appear to have been a response to public pressure in the later years (Guthrie & Parker 1989). 
 
Deegan, Rankin and Tobin (2002) updated the work of Guthrie and Parker (1989) through an 
examination of BHP’s social and environmental disclosures in annual reports for the period 
1983–1997.   The authors measured “community concern” using quantities of articles in the 
print media referring to the company’s social and environmental activities or performance.  
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Similar to Guthrie and Parker (1989), the quantity of disclosures increased over the period and 
a significant relationship was identified between the level of media attention given to BHP 
and the quantity of annual report disclosures for the themes of environment and human 
resources (Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 2002).  It was also found that although the majority of 
media articles portrayed the company’s impact on society and the environment unfavourably, 
significant quantities of the annual report disclosures were positive in nature. 
 
Even though these studies only investigated the social and environmental disclosure practices 
of firms operating in two different countries, the evidence so far suggests that modern 
environmental disclosure practices (along with community concern regarding the 
environment) commenced around the 1960’s.    Trotman (1979) examined the annual reports 
of the 100 largest listed Australian companies within the years 1967 and 1977.  Twenty-six 
per cent of the sample companies made social disclosures in 1967 (Trotman 1979, p. 25); 
however, the quantity of disclosures on social and environmental issues increased to 48 per 
cent in 1972 and 69 per cent percent in 1977 (Trotman 1979, p. 25).   The phenomenon of 
environmental disclosure was also being noted internationally in the United States and the 
United Kingdom (Gray, Owen & Maunders 1987; Anderson & Frankle 1980; Spicer 1978; 
Belkaoui 1976).  More recent research has investigated disclosures in Canada (Al-Tuwaijri, 
Christensen & Hughes II 2004; Li, Richardson & Thornton 1997; Zeghal & Ahmed 1990), 
Denmark (Bebbington 1999), mainland Europe (Roberts 1991), New Zealand (Hackston & 
Milne 1996), Singapore (Newson & Deegan 2002; Perry & Sheng 1999), Hong Kong (Gao, 
Heravi & Xiao 2005), Thailand (Kuasirikun & Sherer 2004) and South Korea (Newson & 
Deegan 2002; Choi 1999).  
 
As discussed in this section, the change in environmental (and social) disclosure practices 
coincided with a change in community values and an increase in concern about the 
environment in general.  There has been a well-documented increase in disclosure practices 
since the 1960’s.  So, the question now to be addressed is ‘who’ is disclosing?  Based on the 
preceding discussion, which appears to provide a general association between increasing 
community concern and increasing corporate voluntary environmental disclosure, it could be 
speculated that those companies which create most community concern over environmental 
issues would also be those making the most disclosure.  Therefore, previous research 
examining the association between corporate environmental performance and voluntary 
environmental disclosure practices is now discussed. 
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2.3 Environmental Performance and Environmental Disclosure 
 
In many of the early empirical studies concerning the association between environmental 
performance and corporate environmental disclosures, the Council on Economic Priorities 
(CEP) ratings7 were used as the measure of environmental performance (Freedman & Wasley 
1990; Freedman & Jaggi 1982; Wiseman 1982; Ingram & Frazier 1980). These studies found 
no significant associations across the samples examined; although interesting observations 
were identified in some of the studies. 
 
For example, Rockness (1985) used CEP ratings to measure environmental performance and 
measured environmental disclosure by having non-investor subjects assess annual reports.  No 
significant association was found between the environmental performance and voluntary 
environmental disclosure of the entire twenty-six firms in the sample. There was, however, a 
significant negative association for large corporations that received less favourable ratings for 
environmental performance.    
 
In a later study, Li, Richardson and Thornton (1997) investigated the effect that the risk of 
incurring proprietary costs had on the corporate decision to disclose8. They suggest that costs 
of disclosure of previously unpublished environmental information may occur from several 
factors.  These include government agencies who may initiate investigations resulting in 
compliance costs, victims of environmental incidents who may undertake legal action, 
financiers who may raise concerns regarding potential future liabilities, competitors who may 
use the information for green marketing to consumers, and environmental groups who may 
initiate actions against the company and/or lobby for further restricting legislation (Li, 
Richardson & Thornton 1997). Pollution related events were measured according to the 
issuance of administrative orders, environmental prosecutions and pollution spills from the 
Canadian Ministry of Environment and Energy in Ontario. These events were then compared 
to disclosures by listed companies in a variety of documents including annual reports, 
information forms, management discussion and analysis, quarterly reports and press releases.  
The study found a significant positive association between the pollution-proneness of the firm 
and the level of disclosure.  
 
                                                
7 The Council on Economic Priorities was founded in 1969 and is a non-profit organisation that rates firms on 
their environmental performance. 
8 As is the case with several other studies the authors did not make a distinction between voluntary and mandated 
environmental disclosures in the article. 
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Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen and Hughes II (2004) sampled 198 firms from the Standard & 
Poor’s 500 index. The authors included environmental concern as a measure of management 
strategy and pollution data as a measure of environmental performance. Environmental 
disclosures were measured according to the occurrence of environmental events and the 
quality of the disclosure of those events in the firm’s annual reports and 10K’s9. The 
theoretical model was tested using simultaneous equation modelling.  Using different proxies 
and statistical analysis techniques to those of previous researchers, a significant negative 
association was found between environmental performance and environmental disclosure10.  
 
Firms that have experienced a serious environmental event or are in a related industry to a 
firm that has experienced such an event increase their environmental disclosures in 
subsequent periods (Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; Deegan & Rankin 1996; Patten 1992).  
In 1989, the Exxon Valdez tanker hit Bligh Reef in the Prince William Sound off Alaska’s 
southern coast.  As a result approximately forty million litres of crude oil was spilled causing 
the United States worst oil spill.  Exxon spent approximately US$ 2 billion on subsequent 
clean up costs.  Patten (1992) examined the annual reports of twenty-one listed companies in 
the petroleum industry of the Fortune 500 in 1989.  Environmental disclosures in annual 
reports for 1988 (the preceding year to the spill) and 1989 (the subsequent year to the spill) 
were examined.  The study identified a significant increase in environmental disclosures over 
the two years examined (Patten 1992).  Considered separately from the sample, Exxon 
increased coverage of environmental issues from 0.6 pages of environmental disclosures in 
the 1988 annual report to 6 pages of environmental issues in 1989, including 3.5 pages on 
Exxon Valdez (Patten 1992, p. 472).  
 
Australian corporations have also been found to increase the level of disclosures following the 
occurrence of Environmental Protection Agency fines or prosecutions (Deegan & Rankin 
1996) and following adverse media attention (Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 2002; Brown & 
Deegan 1998).  Deegan and Rankin (1996) undertook an investigation of the disclosures of 
twenty companies that had been successfully prosecuted by the New South Wales or 
Victorian Environmental Protection Authorities for offences relating to the environment.  
Annual reports of twenty companies from the same industries that had not been prosecuted 
                                                
9 Regulated environmental reports to be provided with annual reports filed with the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission.   
10 The authors do not distinguish between voluntary and mandated disclosures within the study. 
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were also analysed to identify whether differences existed between the two groups’ disclosure 
levels. The authors used content analysis with number of words as the unit of measurement 
and disclosures were classified as either positive or negative.  There was a significantly higher 
level of total environmental disclosures for the prosecuted firms in the years of prosecution 
than in the years when no prosecution occurred.  
 
The results of studies, both internationally and within Australia, have identified a significant 
relationship between the environmental performance and environmental disclosure of 
corporations.  In general, corporations with environmental performance which may be 
considered “poor” have provided higher levels of environmental disclosures than other 
corporations.  In an attempt to explain these results many researchers have explained the 
increased levels of environmental disclosures as a legitimising tactic (see for example Deegan, 
Rankin & Tobin 2002; Milne & Patten 2001; Brown & Deegan 1998; O’Donovan 1999; 
Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996; Lindblom 1994; Patten 1992; Hogner 
1982).  Briefly, legitimacy theory ‘is based on the idea that in order to continue operating 
successfully, corporations must act within the bounds of what society identifies as socially 
acceptable behaviour’ (O’Donovan 2002, p. 344)11.  As argued by Ullmann (1985, pp. 541-
542): 
 
Obviously, companies disclosing social responsibility information on a voluntary basis 
are convinced that the value of this information is not zero…a firm making social 
disclosures assumes that the recipient’s evaluation of the information will benefit the 
firm. 
 
Therefore, if companies are using environmental disclosures in annual reports as a 
legitimising tactic it may be suggested that (1) they believe users find information on 
corporate environmental performance of relevance; and (2) that such disclosures are in some 
way beneficial to the company (Ullmann 1985).  These issues are now discussed in the 
following two sections. 
 
 
 
                                                
11 Legitimacy theory will be discussed further in chapter 3.   
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2.4 Externally Published Environmental Disclosures, Corporate 
Environmental Disclosures and Information Usefulness to Investors 
 
Many early US studies examining environmental disclosures by companies focused on the 
relationship between disclosure and economic performance (Rockness, Schlachter & 
Rockness 1986; Shane & Spicer 1983; Anderson & Frankle 1980; Spicer 1978; Belkaoui 
1976).  While the studies in this section are based on a single stakeholder, the investor, 
differing views exist in relation to who is a stakeholder of a corporation.  These will be 
examined in greater detail in chapter 3.  At this point it is the author’s intention to identify 
whether the decision to disclose, or not to disclose, may provide benefits to the corporation.  
Before proceeding, however, some clarifications of the approach adopted in the earlier studies 
must be outlined.  
 
The use of capital market research to determine the effect of voluntary disclosures on firm 
performance has been criticised.  Deegan (2004) outlines several limitations of research which 
uses changes in market prices as the sole indicator of the effects of disclosure.  He argues that 
much of the capital market research either does not outline clearly the assumptions made, or 
utilises assumptions (such as market efficiency) which in themselves have been questioned.  
In particular, Deegan (2004, p. 87) is critical of the ‘shareholder-primacy focus’ adopted by 
capital market researchers.  Such criticisms cannot be ignored in light of the base of 
environmental disclosure literature which has acknowledged a broader consideration of 
organisational stakeholders, particularly in the Australian context (see for example Deegan, 
Rankin and Voght 2000; Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996; Tilt 1994).  
Unfortunately, it remains that the majority of empirical research in relation to benefits of 
environmental disclosure has focused on the economic benefits, or otherwise, of disclosure to 
the entity and/or the investor.  Hence the focus of this section is, by necessity, based on the 
investor as a potential user of environmental information. 
 
Market-based variables have often been used as measures of economic performance because 
of the importance of investors as corporate resource providers. Milne and Patten (2002, p. 
373) even suggest that ‘annual reports (and their environmental disclosures) are intended 
primarily for financial stakeholders’12.  Several studies have shown that environmental 
                                                
12 This approach appears consistent with much of the literature from US studies. 
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performance information has an information value to investors (Blacconiere & Northcutt 
1997; Blacconiere & Patten 1994; Shane & Spicer 1983; Anderson & Frankle 1980). 
 
Ullmann (1985) argues that the relationship between social performance and corresponding 
annual report disclosures by corporations, and the impact on corporate economic performance 
may be affected by the importance the investor placed on economic and/or social 
performance.  As such, Ullmann (1985, p. 549) suggests that ‘Friedman-style’ investors13, or 
those with an essentially economic perspective on corporate success, would react to 
expenditure and disclosures regarding corporate social performance by placing ‘a negative 
premium on companies apparently involved in what they consider wasteful voluntary social 
responsibility activities’.  He argues that in contrast ‘the “ethical” investors may be willing to 
pay a premium price for shares of a socially responsive firm, causing the price to go up’ and 
that ‘social disclosures also may improve a security’s risk associated with expensive social 
performance improvement programs, potential fines, or social sanctions’ (Ullmann 1985, p. 
549).  Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether such disclosures are of interest to users. 
 
Empirical research has shown that many investors are interested in corporate environmental 
performance. Epstein and Freedman (1994) surveyed individual investors to determine their 
preferences for corporate social expenditure and the information they thought should be 
disclosed.  Respondents rated ‘clean up their plants and stop environmental pollution’ as the 
most important item for corporate social investment (1994, p. 104).  The category ‘pay higher 
dividends’ rated only third, indicating that investors either (1) possessed an environmental 
conscience, (2) were aware of the potential liabilities from poor environmental performance 
or, (3) expected a loss of competitive advantage from failing to improve environmental 
performance.  Over 82 per cent of the respondents wanted information on environmental 
activities included in the annual report. This was second in importance only to product quality 
(1994, p. 106).  
 
Managers also believe that environmental information is important to stakeholders. Collison, 
Lorraine and Power (2003) surveyed UK firms from polluting industries14 to determine 
                                                
13 Milton Friedman (1970) argues that companies have no social responsibility beyond that required by law and 
the maximisation of profits.   According to Mulligan (1986, p. 266) Friedman is suggesting that corporate 
executives engaging the company in social and environmental activities are ‘a sort of Lone Ranger’ who is 
‘imposing something on those other stakeholders – unfairly, undemocratically, unwisely, and in violation of a 
trust’. 
14 Including the power, water, minerals, construction, chemicals, food and brewing industries. 
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managers’ attitudes to environmental information.  Respondents were asked to identify 
whether they perceived disclosures of environmental information to be important to 
stakeholder groups including shareholders, the community, regulators, pressure groups and 
customers.  The authors found that the majority of respondents believed environmental 
disclosures to be important to all groups.  As may be expected, 87.9 per cent believe the 
disclosures are important to regulators, 75.9 per cent to the community, 65.6 per cent to 
pressure groups and 57 per cent to customers (Collison, Lorraine & Power 2003, p. 204).  
While only 43.1 per cent of managers believed environmental disclosures were important to 
shareholders, only 17 per cent suggested they were of no importance, the remainder giving no 
opinion. 
 
Indicative of changes in Australian investor expectations has been the emergence of ethical 
and environmentally focused shareholder groups in Australia over the past decade particularly 
for corporations operating within environmentally sensitive industries such as mining and 
timber.  Several of these groups emerged during the 1990s and 2000s including the Boral 
Green Shareholders, BHP Shareholders for Social Responsibility (established 1994), Amcor 
Green Shareholders which is now generally Paperlinx Green Shareholders (established 
1997)15, North Ethical Shareholders (established 1999) and Gunns Ethical Shareholders 
(established late 2000).  Several of these groups have taken active roles in the development of 
resolutions and participation at annual general meetings.  Groups such as the Boral Green 
Shareholders are well-organised with extensive websites, regular newsletters and nominating 
candidates with environmental and social backgrounds for director positions.  In 2000 the 
Boral Green Shareholder director candidate, Christine Milne, obtained almost 13 per cent of 
shareholder votes (Boral Green Shareholders 2001a). 
 
Considering the argument proposed by Ullmann (1985) and the results of Epstein and 
Freedman (1994), the public release of negative environmental information about a 
corporation may have an impact on its economic bottom line.  Limited research has 
investigated the effect of external environmental disclosures on the economic performance of 
firms. Shane and Spicer (1983) investigated the existence of an association between the 
release of environmental performance ratings by the CEP and subsequent changes in the 
securities market.  The study found that firms receiving low ratings on pollution control 
experienced greater negative security returns subsequent to the release of the ratings than 
those firms that obtained higher ratings. This suggests that the release of environmental 
                                                
15 Following the de-merger of Paperlinx from Amcor in 2000. 
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information by an external source may be of information value to the market.  Of greater 
concern to the corporation, is that publication of environmental information that is negatively 
perceived may have a negative impact on the economic performance of polluting firms. 
 
While the firm may have little control over publications made by external sources, the impact 
of those publications may be minimised by strategic increases in internally generated 
disclosures by the firm. Following the Union Carbide disaster, investors appeared to make 
investment decisions based on the level of environmental disclosures provided by firms in 
related industries.  Studying the reaction of the US securities market to the chemical leak at 
Union Carbide in India in 1984, Blacconiere and Patten (1994) found that a significant 
negative reaction occurred in the market for firms within the chemical industry.  Of additional 
importance was the reduced impact of the event on firms that had greater levels of 
environmental disclosure in their annual reports prior to the leak.   
 
In a later study Blacconiere and Northcutt (1997) investigated the market reaction of US 
chemical industry firms following the release of information relating to changes in 
Superfund16 legislation. They also studied the effect of disclosures on that market reaction.  
Negative market reactions occurred for those firms that were expected to have high levels of 
future superfund costs.  A less negative reaction was experienced again for firms with greater 
voluntary and mandatory environmental disclosures in the annual report.  
 
Similarly, Freedman and Patten (2004) investigated if companies with higher levels of 
emissions, as published on the US Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), had greater negative 
market returns and if the extent of environmental disclosures in annual reports had an effect 
upon the level of market reaction.  They found that the greater the level of emissions 
published on the TRI, the greater the negative market reaction.  They also found, however, 
that the negative market reaction was reduced for firms with higher levels of environmental 
disclosures in 10-K reports. 
 
The similar market results of these studies suggest that investors may have been surprised by 
the negative impact on the environment itself and/or the expectation of litigation for poor 
environmental performance; however, they favoured firms that showed greater levels of 
                                                
16 The US Superfund was created in 1980 when the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act was enacted by Congress.  The Act resulted in a tax on the chemical and petroleum industries.  
Superfund is controlled by the US EPA and identifies, evaluates and arranges cleanup of sites affected by toxic 
waste (United States Environmental Protection Agency 2006).  
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upfront reporting.  Investors appear to believe that companies with more disclosures provide 
more decision-useful material in their reports and/or favour corporate strategies that include 
environmental management.  Overall, these results suggest that the use of environmental 
disclosures in annual reports may be economically beneficial to the corporation. 
 
Previous research has found that the community, including investors, is interested in the 
environmental performance of companies (Collison, Lorraine & Power 2003; Epstein & 
Freedman 1994; Lothian 1994).  Although there are many companies providing voluntary 
disclosure, do voluntary disclosures provide relevant and reliable information to users of 
annual reports?  Within a voluntary reporting framework the corporation is free to determine 
the information provided within those disclosures.  Previous research examining the content 
and quality of corporate environmental disclosures will now be discussed. 
 
2.5 Content and Quality of Environmental Disclosures 
 
O’Donovan (1999) identified a belief among Australian corporate executives that annual 
report disclosures were a useful tool in modifying both the media and public perception of 
the firm’s environmental performance.  In circumstances where negative environmental 
information has received media attention, the incentive to disclose is greater (O’Donovan 
1999).  Brown and Deegan (1998) provide further empirical support for this approach, 
identifying a positive relationship between the levels of media attention received and the 
quantities of annual report disclosures relating to the environment.  The use of environmental 
disclosures as a corporate strategy is not surprising given the results of previous studies 
indicating investor concern for the environment (Epstein & Freedman 1994) and the 
potential economic benefits from environmental disclosures (Blacconiere & Northcutt 1997; 
Blacconiere & Patten 1994); however, early studies found that annual report disclosures 
tended to be predominantly positive in nature containing little negative information as to 
environmental performance (Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996; Guthrie & 
Parker 1990).   
 
Deegan, Rankin and Voght (2000) investigated the effect of five corporate environmental and 
human disasters that received Australian media attention on the subsequent disclosures of 
organisations that were directly affected or in a related industry.  Using sentences as the unit 
of disclosure measurement, social and environmental disclosures were measured for two years 
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prior to and subsequent to the incident. Significantly greater levels of disclosures occurred in 
annual reports in the subsequent period of the related firms for four of the five disasters 
examined.  Specifically, the proportion of positive disclosures was significantly greater.  They 
stated (2000, p. 127): 
 
These results highlight the strategic nature of voluntary social disclosures and are 
consistent with a view that management considers that annual report social disclosures 
are a useful device to reduce the effects upon a corporation of events that are perceived 
to be unfavourable to a corporation’s image. 
 
Such findings are of some relevance to any call for mandatory social and environmental 
reporting requirements.  After considering the results of this study, as well as other 
related research, it would appear that in jurisdictions such as Australia (where there are 
limited mandatory requirements pertaining to the disclosure of social and environmental 
reporting), various stakeholders who read annual reports will be more likely to receive 
information when management perceive that organisational legitimacy is threatened. 
 
Although there are numerous instances of firms engaging in voluntary disclosure, there is 
little evidence to suggest that voluntary disclosures provide relevant17 and reliable information 
to users of annual reports.  Voluntary disclosures are ‘the revelation of information above and 
beyond that required by formal accounting and regulatory standards’ (Devinney & Kabanoff 
1999, p. 60).  Rockness (1985)18 tested the reliability of voluntary environmental disclosures 
provided in annual reports of twenty-six US firms in the oil, steel and pulp and paper 
industries.  Subjects were required to evaluate the corporations’ environmental performance 
(measured by CEP ratings) from the voluntary environmental disclosure information in the 
annual report. It was found that subjects assessing information provided in the annual reports 
mistakenly identified the worst environmental performers as the best and vice versa.   
 
In addition to issues relating to content and quality of voluntary disclosures, the timing of 
such disclosures has also been questioned.  Previous research has noted that many annual 
                                                
17 The AASB Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements (para. 26) defines 
relevance as ‘to be useful, information must be relevant to the decision-making needs of users’.  As stated in 
paragraph 29, ‘the relevance of information is affected by its nature and materiality’.  Paragraph 30 states that 
‘information is material if its omission or misstatement could influence the economic decisions of users’. 
18 Apart from the Rockness (1985) study, and those studies which have examined the economic impact of 
voluntary environmental disclosures, there is limited empirical research that has examined whether corporate 
disclosures have an impact in developing or changing public perceptions of corporate environmental 
performance.  
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report disclosures are a response to actual or expected community concerns and not to 
accountability19.  For example, Deegan, Rankin and Tobin (2002, p. 335) state: 
 
In jurisdictions such as Australia, where there are limited regulatory requirements to 
provide social and environmental information, management appear to provide 
information when they are coerced into doing so.  Conversely, where there is limited 
concern, there will be limited disclosures.  The evidence in this paper, and elsewhere, 
suggests that higher levels of disclosure will only occur when community concerns are 
aroused, or alternatively, until such time that specific regulation is introduced to 
eliminate managements’ disclosure discretion.   
 
Therefore, although previous research has found that companies are providing environmental 
information voluntarily in the annual report, many problems within that system have been 
identified.  As discussed by Deegan, Rankin and Tobin (2002) there must be an actual or 
perceived belief that community concern exists (or will exist at a future time) before 
environmental disclosures will occur.  Furthermore, previous research has shown that the 
information contained within the voluntary disclosures is generally positive in nature 
(Deegan, Rankin and Voght 2000; Deegan & Rankin 1996), and may lack credibility (Deegan 
& Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996), have questionable reliability (Berthelot, Cormier & 
Magnan 2003) and be of limited use to users (Hughes, Anderson & Golden 2001; Tilt 1994).  
It has also been suggested that the disclosures may be misleading to users of the annual 
reports (Deegan & Rankin 1996; Rockness 1985).  The findings of these empirical studies 
provided some support for requests for mandatory environmental disclosure legislation by 
researchers (Gray, Owen & Maunders 1987) and pressure groups (Tilt 1994). These requests 
suggested a belief that mandatory reporting requirements could improve the quality and 
content of environmental disclosures in annual reports.   
 
In 1998 two mandatory environmental disclosure systems were introduced into the Australian 
environmental disclosure landscape.  First was the establishment of the National Pollutant 
Inventory as a public database disclosing corporate pollution emissions on the Internet.  The 
second event was the amendment to the Australian Corporations Law20 to include s. 299 
(1)(f) which requires companies to include environmental information in the annual report.  
These mandatory reporting requirements will now be examined. 
                                                
19 Accountability is defined by Gray, Owens and Adams (1996, p. 38) as ‘the duty to provide an account (by no 
means necessarily a financial account) or reckoning of those actions for which one is held responsible’. 
20
 Now the Corporations Act 2001. 
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2.6 The National Pollutant Inventory21 
 
The National Pollutant Inventory (NPI) is the first National Environment Protection Measure 
(NEPM) to be established by the National Environment Protection Council (NEPC).  The 
NEPC is operated under the National Environment Protection Council Act 1994.  The 
establishment of the NEPC as a national body followed the signing of the Intergovernmental 
Agreement on the Environment in 1992 by all state and territory jurisdictions. Within 
Australia the environment is managed within several jurisdictions including the 
Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments. While all jurisdictions have worked 
cooperatively in the management of the environment for many decades, the establishment of 
the NEPC added a new dimension to the care of the environment within Australia.  The NEPC 
develops NEPM’s, which are then implemented by, and take effect in, each jurisdiction.   
 
In 1996, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
recommended that all member countries adopt a publicly available Pollutant Release and 
Transfer Register (PRTR) system.  The NPI is the Australian version of a PRTR system.  The 
NPI was first published in January 2000 and lists companies with pollution emission levels 
that exceed the inventory’s base threshold amounts.   
 
The goals and objectives of the NPI NEPM are outlined in sections 5, 6 and 7 of the NEPM.  
The NEPC (2002, p. 11) summarises these as being to: 
 
(a) provide information to enhance and facilitate policy formulation and decision making 
for environmental planning and management; 
(b) provide publicly accessible and available information, on a geographic basis about 
specified emissions to the environment, including those of a hazardous nature or 
involving significant impact; and 
(c) promote and assist with the facilitation of waste minimisation and cleaner production 
programs for industry, government and the community. 
 
The objective of the NPI was outlined by the Federal Environment Minister Senator Robert 
Hill in January 2000 when he stated: ‘Using the internet, the NPI allows all Australians to find 
out what large factories are discharging into the environment, as well as showing what actions 
                                                
21 The National Pollutant inventory is available at: 
http://www.environment.gov.au/epg/npi/database/database.html 
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a factory may be taking to reduce its emissions of pollution’ (Hill 2000).  In particular the NPI 
was described as being ‘designed to provide the community, industry and government with 
information on the types and amounts of chemicals discharged into the air, land and water’ 
[emphasis added] (Hill 2000).  Howes (2001, p. 529) explains: 
 
The Australian National Pollutant Inventory (NPI) is designed to generate political and 
economic incentives for industry to move towards cleaner production.  It enables 
community groups to put pressure on polluters and provides an opportunity for firms to 
identify inefficiencies.  The inventory is built upon several liberal-democratic premises 
regarding the power of knowledge, the right to know, the effectiveness of pressure 
groups, and the ability of government to correct market failures. 
 
The NPI is similar to, and based upon, the United States Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) 
(Howes 2001), and was implemented in 1996 by the NEPC through an NPI NEPM.  The 
original NEPM underwent a national consultation process to take into consideration 
comments by industry, environment and community groups, and individuals.  Notably, there 
was no representation by shareholder or investor groups.  Following consideration of the 
comments received the revised NEPM came into effect on the 1st July 1998.  Similar 
inventories operate in the United Kingdom (now the Pollutant Inventory) and Canada (the 
National Pollutant Release Inventory).  
 
Companies operating in Australia are required to estimate emissions22 exceeding the specified 
threshold amount and reporting for the inventory became mandatory for the period 1 July 
2000 to 30 June 2001. The inventory is published on the Internet for public viewing following 
the end of the reporting period. The NPI provides interested users with pollution emission 
details of companies including the company address and contact details, as well as the 
substance and quantity emitted.   
 
The implementation period comprised two voluntary reporting periods and a mandatory 
reporting period in which companies reported on thirty-six of the potential ninety reportable 
                                                
22
 The estimation of emission data was considered a major limitation of the NPI (Howes 2001; Streets & Di 
Carlo 1999).  Based on the allowance to estimate emissions, it was expected that only major facilities already 
required to monitor actual emission levels under other environmental licensing requirements would provide 
relatively accurate data (Streets & Di Carlo 1999).  Furthermore, priority was to be given to encouraging 
reporting on the NPI in its initial years with no enforcement for the first two years of operation (Streets & Di 
Carlo 1999; Sullivan 1999).  Subsequently, verification, enforcement and penalties would be the responsibility of 
the various State and Territory governments (Sullivan 1999).  
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substances23.  Entities were required to report on ninety substances commencing 1 July 2001 
to 30 June 2002.  Table 2 summarises the reporting period and the type of reporting required. 
 
Table 2:  Implementation program for the NPI 
 
Period Activity Number of substances
24
 
1 July 1998-30 June 1999 1st  Voluntary NPI year 36 
1 July 1999-30 June 2000 2nd Voluntary NPI year 36 
1 July 2000-30 June 2001 1st Mandatory NPI year 36 
1 July 2001-30 June 2002 2nd Mandatory NPI year 90 
 
 
A broad area of issues was covered through the submission process and the majority of 
submissions were received from industry with minimal representation from environmental 
groups25.  Initially there was dissatisfaction with the term ‘pollutant’ with industry suggesting 
it was emotive and conjured up negative impressions for readers. It was suggested that it be 
replaced with the term ‘emissions’ (submissions by Australian Petroleum Production & 
Exploration Association, Minerals Council of Australia ACT, Chamber of Commerce & 
Industry WA, SA Employers’ Chamber of Commerce & Industry/Engineers Employers 
Association of SA, Metal Trades Industry Association of Australia, Plastics and Chemicals 
Industry Association VIC, Chamber of Minerals & Energy of Western Australia Inc).  It was 
also argued that the identification of individual facilities could be a threat to commercial in-
confidence and facility security (submission by BOC Gases NSW).  Corporations also 
addressed comments made by Government on the usefulness of the NPI in placing public 
pressure on organisations to clean up their operations.  In particular, Queensland Alumina 
Limited stated that ‘making data available to the public to pressure for change is an abdication 
of responsibility by the government’ (National Environment Protection Council 1998, p. 21). 
 
                                                
23
 A list of the initial thirty-six reportable substances is included in Appendix B. 
24 Substances include those to air, land and water.  In contrast to the NPI, over 600 substances are reported on in 
the US. 
25 No explanation is provided as to why representation from environmental groups was minimal.  The level of 
representation was in contrast to an earlier discussion paper released by the Commonwealth Environment 
Protection Agency (initially responsible for the proposed NPI before handover to the NEPC) in 1994 in which 
representation from environment and community groups represented 27 per cent of all submissions (Ernst & 
Young 1995, p. 2).  It should be noted, however, that only 107 submissions were returned in the 1994 mail-out of 
4000 discussion papers (Ernst & Young 1995, p. 2).  Environmental groups have, since its inception, criticised 
the extent of the NPI regarding the number of reportable substances, lack of enforcement and minimal penalties 
(Howes 2001). 
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Various industry groups and companies expressed concern over the potential negative public 
reaction to the NPI’s emission information.  For example, submissions by Queensland 
Alumina, the Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association, the Australian 
Chamber of Manufacturers Victoria, and the Metal Trades Industry Association of Australia 
(MTIAA) suggested that ‘information and data must be presented in a clear, meaningful way, 
in its proper context and in [sic] way which is not misleading’ (National Environment 
Protection Council 1998, p. 52).  The extent of the concern over the public’s interpretation of 
the data was further evident with the MTIAA and Queensland Alumina Ltd further suggesting 
‘making data available in ‘plain language’ will not prevent some sections of the public from 
misusing or misconstruing the data’ (National Environment Protection Council 1998, p. 52).   
 
To address these issues a variety of organisations (including Rio Tinto, Australian Aluminium 
Council, Australian Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Association Victoria, and the 
Tasmanian Minerals Council Limited) indicated that contextual information should be 
included to ensure that the public was ‘fully informed and able to interpret the data’ (National 
Environment Protection Council 1998, p. 51).  In contrast, No-Lead26 South Australia 
expressed concern that the inclusion of contextual information ‘could be used to mislead and 
manipulate the public’ (National Environment Protection Council 1998, p. 54).  BHP Victoria 
indicated that descriptive or interpretive information relating to a facility’s emissions that may 
be included on the NPI (by Environment Australia) should be approved by the facility first.  
And finally, concern was expressed over the failure to provide an incentive which would 
distinguish good environmental performers in the NPI process (Healthy Cities Illawarra 
Incorporated NSW).   
 
Considering the economic impact, many organisations and industry groups expressed concern 
over the cost of compliance with the reporting requirements.  It was even suggested that ‘NPI 
costs will erode Australian firm’s international competitiveness’ (National Environment 
Protection Council 1998, p. 78) (submission by Huntsman Chemical Company Pty Ltd, 
Victoria); however, entities in the United States are required to report on over 600 substances 
compared to the ninety substances initially required by the NPI.   
 
It was estimated that NPI compliance costs would average approximately $2000 per site per 
annum although costs would vary according to the type and scale of production (Howes 2001, 
                                                
26 Non-profit community group working to reduce the incidence of lead poisoning within the community and the 
environment. 
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p. 533); however, corporations in the United States have experienced cost reductions through 
reductions in waste identified from reporting for the TRI (Howes 2001).  Furthermore, 
Environment Australia suggests that payback periods on expenditure in environmental 
improvement can be less than eighteen months (Environment Australia 2000). 
 
Clearly, from the submissions made in the development process of the NPI there was a 
general belief amongst industry organisations that the NPI would impose economic costs 
upon organisations through an increase in compliance and through an erosion of competitive 
advantage.  There was also a general concern that emission data should be supported by 
contextual information so that the public could read the data in its “true” context. 
 
The existing NPI provides a quantitative measure of estimated substances emitted and an 
explanation of the individual substances included in the database. Contextual issues have been 
addressed by the provision of a health hazard rating for each substance determined from its 
environmental and human health effect27.  Companies are also permitted to have “hot links”28 
to their own websites; however, in the Caveat to the database, Environment Australia does not 
claim any responsibility for the information provided on company websites: 
 
The hotlinks are provided to allow for additional information.  The views expressed in 
the material contained in the hotlinks are not the views of the Commonwealth.  The 
Commonwealth does not accept responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of the 
material contained on the hotlinks and shall not be liable for any loss or damage that 
may be occasioned directly or indirectly through the use of or reliance on the hotlinks. 
(Environment Australia 2000) 
 
Early results indicated that the NPI had proven to be a valuable information resource for some 
sections of the community.  A ‘Review of the National Environment Protection Measure for 
the National Pollutant Inventory’ was undertaken by Professor Ian Rae in 2000.  The review 
found that industry was generally aware of the database and its requirements.  Similar results 
were identified in a review of the NPI undertaken in 2005 which reported that ‘the NPI has 
delivered benefits to, and met the needs of a range of groups and provided information for a 
wide variety of purposes’ (Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, p. v).  
 
                                                
27
 However, as discussed in 4.5.4 the NPI is considered to be primarily a quantitative source of emission 
information (Sullivan 1999) with the quality of contextual information being questionable (Howes 2001). 
28 URL links to company-sponsored websites. 
  
(37) 
37
The 2005 review identified a variety of users of the NPI including government, industry, 
community organisations, financial institutions, research organisations and individuals; 
however, the 2000 review expressed some concern regarding the lack of knowledge regarding 
the NPI by the general community.  As a consequence, the review recommended additional 
expenditure on a public awareness campaign to increase use of the database to achieve the 
objectives of the NEPM.  Community knowledge of the database continues to remain of 
concern with the 2005 review again stating that ‘public awareness programs which promote 
use of the NPI to a wider audience and better serve the community right to know objective’ 
were an area for ‘priority attention’ (Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005, p. v).  
The possible reasons for limited community awareness include lack of expenditure on public 
awareness campaigns, mistrust of the data by lobby groups, the complexity of the information 
in its existing format, and a lack of contextual information to enable users to understand what 
the data means (Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005). 
 
While concerns remain regarding the extent of community knowledge of the database, early 
interest in the NPI is evidenced in the number of users accessing and downloading the 
database in the initial six months of its publication from February to July 2000 as displayed in 
Table 329. 
 
Table 3:  NPI access data in the first six months of publication 
 
Month (2000) Number of hits Number of reports 
requested 
Number of Excel files 
downloaded 
February 35364 11083 412 
March 20318 6309 114 
April 14608 4101 89 
May 20752 6180 151 
June 20419 13149 121 
July 10211 5412 101 
   (Source: National Environment Protection Council 2002, p. 15) 
 
 
                                                
29 Table 3 provides a summary of all “hits” on the database including return visits by users. 
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This level of interest has increased with the number of unique visits30 to the NPI Internet site 
increasing from 1794 in the 2001/2002 reporting year to 62 256 in the 2003/2004 reporting 
year (Department of Environment and Heritage 2005, p. 13). 
 
Initial reports suggested the NPI was achieving its goal of being ‘an impetus for cleaner 
production for industry’ (Environment Australia 2000)31.  Some facilities that reported in the 
first two consecutive years showed reductions in emissions even though no reduction in 
production levels had occurred (Hill 2001).  Similar results were noted in the 2000/2001 
reporting year.  In the first year of operation, 1998/1999, approximately 1200 entities reported 
on the database.  In the third year of operation 2356 facilities were reporting on the NPI 
covering seventy-eight industry sectors.  In 2003/2004 3618 facilities were reporting. 
 
As a part of the 2000 review undertaken by Professor Ian Rae, a small number of annual 
reports and stand-alone environmental reports were examined for disclosures regarding the 
NPI32.  The reports of WMC Ltd, Orica Ltd, Pasminco Ltd, Australian Vinyls Ltd and BASF 
Australia Ltd were examined from 1999 and 2000. WMC Ltd reported information on the NPI 
in both its annual report and its stand-alone environmental reports.  The other companies 
mentioned emissions, and in particular, improvements in performance and reductions in 
emissions, and to a lesser extent, the NPI in the stand-alone reports; however, based on the 
information provided in the report, the companies did not discuss these issues in the annual 
report.  The report concludes that, while it is difficult to claim a causal relationship, there 
‘seems no reason not to ascribe some of the credit to the Measure and the knowledge that NPI 
reporting requirements were imminent’ (National Environment Protection Council 2002, p. 
19). 
 
The introduction of the NPI represents a changing operating environment for polluting firms. 
The external publication of pollution emission information on a public medium such as the 
Internet provides interested users within the community with information that was previously 
difficult to obtain.  Previous empirical research investigating corporate annual report 
disclosure responses to the public release of (negative) environmental performance 
information have reported that the firm may respond by increasing environmental disclosures 
                                                
30 The Department of Environment and Heritage (2005, p. 13) defines a “unique visit” as ‘the first access to the 
web site by a computer.  Further access by the same computer is not counted’. 
31
 Although it is difficult to identify that such changes were directly attributable to the NPI. 
32 No details are given on the actual sample size; however, only the reports of five companies are discussed being 
WMC Ltd, Orica, Pasminco Ltd, Australian Vinyls and BASF Australia. 
  
(39) 
39
in annual reports in order to legitimise its activities to the community in which it operates 
(Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; Deegan & Rankin 1996; Patten 1992).   
 
Patten (2002b) examined changes in environmental disclosures in 10K reports from 1985 to 
1990 for US firms with emissions disclosed on the 1988 TRI.  A significant increase in the 
quantity of environmental disclosures during the period was identified.  Furthermore, changes 
in quantities of disclosures were found to be significantly related to the level of emissions 
reported on the TRI.  More importantly, Patten argues that the changes in disclosures occurred 
even though information regarding the TRI was not well reported in the national media.  
Consequently, Patten (2002b, p. 168) argues ‘that substantial media exposure is not necessary 
to induce public policy pressure related changes in environmental disclosures’. Therefore, a 
contribution of this thesis will be to examine, in comparison with Patten (2002b), whether 
there is a relationship between the level of emissions on the NPI and the quantity of voluntary 
environmental disclosures in annual reports. 
 
Previous research undertaken in the field of environmental disclosures in annual reports has 
focussed on the quantity of disclosures, the relationships between disclosures and 
environmental events, and the positive/negative nature of environmental disclosures.  Limited 
research has examined how companies report on the occurrence of particular environmental 
events.  Consequently, the introduction of the NPI provides an opportunity to further 
investigate the discretionary nature of voluntary environmental disclosures in annual reports.  
This will be achieved by examining whether a change in environmental reporting regulation, 
which is not directly applicable to the annual report, acts as a driver for change in annual 
report voluntary environmental disclosure practices by companies.  This thesis will not only 
examine changes in the quantity of annual report disclosures during the introduction of the 
NPI but also, adopting a micro approach, the information content of disclosures relating to the 
NPI and pollution/emissions during its implementation period.   
 
2.7 Background to Mandatory Environmental Reporting in Australia 
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, Australian corporations have been disclosing social and 
environmental information in annual reports for several decades.  These voluntary 
disclosures, however, were criticised for being self-laudatory and lacking completeness 
particularly in regard to the negative aspects of a company’s environmental performance 
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(Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996).  These findings are of concern as, 
according to some organisations, the environmental performance of Australian corporations 
remains questionable.   
 
The Australian Conservation Foundation published an annual ‘Perception Report’ on the 
environmental performance of Australia’s top 100 companies.  The Age and Sydney Morning 
Herald used the results as part of the environmental section in the annual Good Reputation 
Index33.  The first Australian Conservation Foundation report published in 2000 (p. 2) 
identified the following perceptions of the performance of these companies: 
 
1. Corporate Australia in the main is currently failing to fulfil its environmental 
responsibilities; 
2. There are positive signs that corporate Australia’s poor environmental performance could 
be reversed in the coming years; 
3. Many companies, indeed entire corporate sectors, have failed to recognise and act on their 
environmental responsibilities; 
4. Many companies have failed to fully translate what on paper appear to be best practice 
environmental strategies to their “on the ground” environmental performance, and; 
5. Many Australian companies have failed to bring in the same standard of environmental 
strategies and initiatives as those used by their overseas parent companies.  This is 
symptomatic of a wider trend that sees corporate Australia lagging behind overseas 
corporations on a wide range of environmental issues. 
 
The ACF prepared a follow-up report in 2001 which used the perceptions listed above as a 
benchmark for the overall performance of the top 100 listed companies in 2001.  The ACF’s 
perceptions remained unchanged for all points excepting point 3 where it was noted that 
some improvement had occurred in the financial sector.  In a similar report addressing both 
the social and environmental performance of the top 50 listed companies it was again found 
that ‘improvements in corporate policy and sustainability reporting are frequently not 
reflected in on the ground performance’ (Australian Consumers Association, Australian 
Conservation Foundation & Oxfam Community Aid Abroad 2004, p. 34).  Coupled with the 
concerns expressed over the quality and content of annual report disclosures, the results of 
the ACF’s investigations over time suggests that calls for environmental disclosures to be 
                                                
33 The index is now managed by Reputex (see 
https://secure1.impactdata.com.au/reputex/public2/s_news_articles_DEC.asp?menu=5). 
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regulated could not be dismissed.  Consequently, the regulation of voluntary environmental 
disclosure practices remains an important issue.  
 
While much research during the past decade has focussed upon annual report environmental 
disclosures (O’Donovan 2002; Tilt 2001; Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; O’Donovan 1999; 
Deegan & Rankin 1997; Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996; Tilt 1994), there 
have been very few comparative studies of voluntary environmental disclosures within and 
without regulated disclosure requirements.  Guthrie and Parker (1990) examined corporate 
annual reports from the fifty largest listed companies in the US, the UK and Australia in 1983.  
Content analysis was used to examine social disclosures in categories including the 
environment, energy, human resources, products and community involvement.  These 
categories further covered the type of disclosure, that is, monetary, non-monetary, declarative 
or none, the amount of disclosures as measured by pages, and the location in the annual 
report.   
 
The underlying basis of the research was to undertake a comparison of the quantity and 
quality of the social disclosures between the three countries. Overall, the UK companies 
provided more social disclosures (98 per cent of reports), followed by the US (85 per cent of 
reports) and finally Australia (56 per cent of reports).  The US disclosures were distributed 
across many categories with human resources (75 per cent of companies making disclosures), 
community involvement (63 per cent of companies making disclosures) and the environment 
(53 per cent of companies making disclosures) being the most frequently discussed.  United 
Kingdom disclosures were concentrated on human resources (98 per cent of companies 
making disclosures) and community involvement (96 per cent of companies making 
disclosures), while many Australian disclosures were in the human resources category (93 per 
cent of companies making disclosures).  Only 14 per cent of UK companies made disclosures 
on the environment with 21 per cent of Australian companies disclosing on this issue (Guthrie 
& Parker 1990, p. 164). 
 
Focussing on the nature of environmental disclosures, the US sample companies provided the 
highest level of negative disclosures on the environment being 22 per cent of annual reports.  
When compared to the UK with only two per cent and Australia with less than one per cent, a 
significant difference between environmental reporting practices of the three countries is 
apparent (Guthrie & Parker 1990, p. 169).  Guthrie and Parker (1990, p. 170) attributed this to 
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the higher level of regulations in the United States pertaining to environmental and social 
disclosure requirements in annual reports: 
 
The congruence of apparent importance attached to human resource, community, and 
environmental impact information across the three countries’ reports suggests a response 
to consistent demands for such information by decision makers.  A significant proportion 
of U.K. and U.S. corporate ‘bad news’ disclosures appear to be made at the instigation of 
government or private (accounting profession) regulation.  Such disclosures represent a 
direct response to imposed social priorities. 
 
The companies not only were disclosing greater levels of “good news” in the annual reports 
but were also disclosing the majority of the “bad news” in the audited sections of the reports.  
Good news was mainly reported in the voluntary sections and was perceived to be an attempt 
by companies to inform users of the reports that the companies were minimising the negative 
impact on the environment, the employee, or the community by its operations.  Guthrie and 
Parker (1990, p. 171) suggest that the high levels of voluntary social disclosures may be an 
indication that such disclosures ‘may delay, avoid, or indeed set the agenda for the 
imposition of regulated social disclosures’.  If a corporation does not succeed in its attempts 
to legitimise through disclosures the risk of government intervention may be increased 
(Wilmshurst & Frost 2000).   
 
Internationally, legislation particularly relating to mandatory environmental disclosure is 
increasing.  In 1995, the Danish Parliament adopted the Green Accounts Act in response to 
an increase in community and public concern over environmental issues in Denmark during 
the 1980’s and 1990’s.   
 
With increasing environmental awareness and more focus and pressure on enterprises 
causing high levels of pollution, it was natural to introduce annual green accounts which 
reflect their environmental performance.  The basic idea was that annual environmental 
accounts made available to the public would, in itself, motivate enterprises to make 
continuous environmental improvements. 
(Danish Environmental Protection Agency 2000, p. 2) 
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From its inception, the Act required heavily polluting enterprises to publish green accounts.  
The green accounts are required to discuss: 
 
§ the primary and significant secondary activities of the entity; 
§ the most important environmental permit to which the entity is subject; 
§ the authority under which the permit is supervised; 
§ a qualitative description of the resources and environmental parameters linked with 
the above-outlined activities of the entity; 
§ significant deviations from previous green accounts submitted; 
§ who amongst entity staff has prepared the green accounts; 
§ information on polluting substances used and potential risks of those substances. 
 
If the green accounts have been audited by an expert the entity must disclose a copy of the 
auditors’ opinion and the name of the auditor.  In addition, a statement must be included 
regarding: 
 
§ major consumption of water, raw materials and energy; 
§ significant types and volume of pollutants relating to the production process, 
products, waste or discharged by the enterprise. 
 (Danish Environmental Protection Agency 2000). 
 
The philosophy of the green accounts appears to allow some freedom to managers on the 
way the accounts are prepared.  The framework is described as being that:  
 
…an enterprise should be master of its own accounts – in other words, each enterprise 
should be free to decide how to present its environmental profile, and management 
should be free to formulate environmental priorities and goals. 
(Danish Environmental Protection Agency 2000, p. 1) 
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Mandatory environmental and social reporting is also required in France.  Listed companies 
are now required to publish information in annual reports regarding: 
 
§ resource and energy use and consumption;  
§ greenhouse gas emissions; 
§ efforts relating to the reduction of environmental risks; 
§ cooperation with communities, non-government organisations and trade unions; 
§ the company’s effect on biodiversity. 
 (Euractiv 2002) 
 
Other European countries also have reporting requirements, although less stringent than 
those required in Denmark and France.  Swedish firms that need an environmental permit 
must include some environmental information in the annual report (Kolk 1999).  In Norway, 
entities that have a significant environmental impact must mention how the environment is 
affected in the annual report34.  The entity is also required to discuss any measures 
undertaken in regard to that impact (Kolk 1999).   
 
The UK Government introduced legislation on mandatory environmental reporting effective 
from 22 March 2005.  The introduction of the requirement in the UK Companies Act 1985 to 
prepare a compulsory Operating and Financial Review (OFR) stated that from 01 April 2006 
(Schedule 7ZA 4 (1)) quoted companies ‘must include (a) information about environmental 
matters (including the impact of the business of the company on the environment)’.  
Information provided in accordance with the requirement would be audited according to s. 
236 (3A) of the Companies Act.  The requirement to produce the compulsory OFR was 
subsequently repealed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer effective from 12 January 2006.  
The basis for the repeal was that the requirements for the mandatory OFR were similar to 
(although more extensive than) the requirements of the Business Review, which included 
provisions of the EU Accounts Modernisation Directive requiring certain information to be 
included in the directors’ report (Accounting Standards Board 2006).  Consequently, the 
additional reporting requirements in the OFR were considered to be against the UK 
Governments ‘general policy not to impose regulatory requirements on UK businesses over 
                                                
34
 The Norwegian Accounting Standards Board outlines eight principal issues which should be reported upon 
including quantity of energy and raw materials, type and amount of waste and emissions, transportation 
emissions, accidents, and the impact of the company’s products through use and disposal (Nyquist 2003). 
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and above the relevant EU Directive requirements’ (Accounting Standards Board 2006, p. 4).  
Companies, excluding small and, in general medium companies, are now required to only 
include in the directors’ report the less stringent Business Review as per s. 234ZZB(3)(b) 
which: 
 
…must, to the extent necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or 
position of the business of the company, include – where appropriate, analysis using other key 
performance indicators, including information relating to environmental matters and 
employee matters. 
 
The Accounting Standards Board35 released a Reporting Statement upon repeal of the OFR 
requirements.  Although the reporting statement lacks mandatory status, it does recommend 
that companies continue to prepare a voluntary OFR and that the now-repealed requirements 
be considered an example of best-practice (Accounting Standards Board 2006).  The 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)(2005) also recommends that medium-sized 
companies exempted from the new requirements in s. 234ZZB(3) include the information in 
a voluntary OFR ‘in recognition of the benefits such disclosure brings to the operation of the 
business’. 
 
2.8 Section 299(1)(f) of the Corporations Law 
 
Within the Australian reporting environment there was a notable absence of legislation prior 
to 1998 pertaining to the disclosure of environmental information in corporate annual 
reports.  A Corporation and Securities Industry Bill was supported by the Australian 
Government House of Representatives in the 1970’s but was not processed through the lower 
house due to a change in Government (Trotman & Bradley 1981).  Legislation relating to 
non-financial corporate environmental disclosure was subsequently destined to remain out of 
the political landscape until the end of the 20th Century. 
 
Senator Andrew Murray of the Australian Democrats proposed amendment 37 to include s. 
299 (1)(f) in the Australian Corporations Law during the process of the Company Law 
Review Act 1998.  The section was not initially included in the review but a late amendment 
                                                
35 The Accounting Standards Board is an operating board of the Financial Reporting Council and had statutory 
power for the development of reporting standards for the OFR (Accounting Standards Board 2006). 
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was subsequently supported by the Australian Labor Party.  In expressing the Democrat’s 
motivation for including the amendment Senator Murray stated: 
 
The reason we [include the amendment] is not just our well-known attachment to 
environmental matters, but the fact that many companies are materially affected 
financially in terms of environmental situations.  I think we only have to recall some of 
BHP’s financial consequences for environmental matters to be well aware of that. 
(Senate Hansard 1998, p. 4014) 
 
In support of the amendment, Senator Murray referred the Senate’s attention to a progressive 
environmental progress report provided by Hugh Morgan, the Managing Director of WMC 
Ltd.  Attention was also drawn to a publication by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Australia: 
 
[the publication] is called Leadership.  It is a discussion paper which was issued in 
January 1998, so it is current. It talks about the impact of environmental matters on the 
accountancy profession… It says that more than two-thirds of users seek disclosure of 
environmental information in the annual report.  It says that less than 10 per cent of 
preparers see environmental reporting as a threat to their company – in other words, they 
are not concerned about it.  It says that 50 per cent of preparers do not support 
mandatory disclosure…however, 64 per cent of users would support an approach to have 
environmental matters included in annual reports. 
(Senate Hansard 1998, p. 4014) 
 
The section requires companies to disclose information on environmental performance in their 
annual reports from 1 July 1998. While many criticisms have been made of the section (Baird 
2000), its inclusion represented a new stage in corporate environmental reporting in 
Australia36. 
 
The section applies to public companies and large proprietary companies.  A public company 
means a company other than a proprietary company and:  
 
                                                
36 Section 1013D was also amended to the Corporations Act in 2001 requiring those regulated to provide 
financial product advice to provide clients with a Product Disclosure Statement and include (l) ‘if the product has 
an investment component – the extent to which labour standards or environmental, social or ethical 
considerations are taken into account in the selection, retention or realisation of the investment’.  
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(a)  in section 195 and Chapter 2E, includes a body corporate (other than a prescribed body 
corporate) that:  
(i)  is incorporated in a State or an internal Territory, but not under this Act; and  
(ii)  is included in the official list of a securities exchange; and  
(b)  in Chapter 2E does not include a company that does not have ‘Limited’ in its name 
because of section 150 or 151.  
 
Large proprietary companies are defined within the Corporations Act as those that meet at 
least two of the following criteria:  
 
• a gross operating revenue of AUD$10 million or more for the year; 
• gross assets of AUD$5 million or more at the end of the year;  
• fifty or more employees at the end of the year. 
 
According to s. 299 (1)(f) the company’s directors’ report for the financial year must: 
 
If the entity’s operations are subject to any particular and significant environmental 
regulation under a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory – give details of 
the entity’s performance in relation to environmental regulation. 
 
Following the amendment, there was some confusion due to the ambiguity of the 
requirements, particularly the meaning of the terms ‘particular’ and ‘significant’, and the 
failure to include the word ‘disclose’ prior to ‘details of the entity’s performance’ (Deegan 
1999)37.  These issues were particularly important in light of the penalty for non-compliance 
of the section.  Under ss. 344(1) and 1317G of the Corporations Law, a person in 
contravention of the requirements of s. 299 (1)(f) could result in penalties of up to $200 000.   
 
To provide guidance on the operation of s. 299(1)(f) the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (ASIC) issued Practice Notes 68 paragraphs 72 through 75.  Practice Note 68, 
paragraph 74 provides the following general guidelines for the environmental reporting 
requirements: 
 
                                                
37 The latter criticism was based on the wording of the original amendment.  The word ‘give’ has subsequently 
been included. 
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(a) Prima facie, the requirements would normally apply where an entity is licensed or 
otherwise subject to conditions for the purposes of environmental legislation or 
regulation; 
(b) The requirements are not related specifically to financial disclosures (eg. contingent 
liabilities and capital commitments) but relate to performance in relation to 
environmental regulation.  Hence, accounting concepts of materiality in financial 
statements are not applicable; 
(c) The information provided in the directors’ report cannot be reduced or eliminated 
because information has been provided to a regulatory authority for the purposes of 
any environmental legislation; 
(d) The information provided in the directors’ report would normally be more general and 
less technical than information which an entity is required to provide in compliance 
reports to an environmental regulator. 
 
Practice Note 68 paragraph 75 states that companies should comply ‘with the spirit as well as 
the terms of the law’.  This was consistent with a submission by ASIC to the subsequent 
Parliamentary Joint Statutory Committee on Corporations and Securities (Commonwealth of 
Australia) hearings38.  The submission expressed leniency in prosecutions for the early stages 
of the introduction of the section: 
 
ASIC would take what we called a rather light handed approach to the matter to begin 
with.  We thought it was important that people complied with the spirit of the provision 
and made a serious attempt to disclose something meaningful, but we would monitor 
what was disclosed. 
 
The Australian Industry Group opposed the section.  The AIG (1998) had previously 
expressed an opposition to mandatory environmental reporting in Australia39 and criticised the 
                                                
38 The general duties of the PJSC were set out in s. 243 of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
Act 1989 (now the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001).  In this case, the PJSC was 
asked to examine matters (including the proposed inclusion of s. 299(1)(f) in the Corporations Act) arising from 
the Company Law Review Act 1998 (Commonwealth of Australia 1999). 
39 The general attitude of business and industry organisations does not appear to have altered substantially.  For 
example, the Business Council of Australia (BCA) expressed opposition to mandatory corporate responsibility 
legislation in its submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (PJC) 
into corporate responsibility in 2005 arguing that market forces would determine the amount of social 
responsibility entities should undertake (BCA 2005).  The terms of reference of the PJC were to conduct an 
inquiry into Corporate Responsibility and Triple-Bottom-Line reporting for profit and non-profit incorporated 
entities in Australia (PJC 2006). 
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lack of consultation prior to the section’s introduction and the ambiguous nature of the 
wording of the section. In defending their stance against mandatory reporting the AIG argued 
‘mandatory reporting is being introduced despite there being no evidence the current 
voluntary reporting has been unsuccessful’ (AIG 1998). Regardless of this opposition, the 
AIG released guidelines on reporting under s. 299 (1)(f).  The AIG (1999, p. 2) recommend 
companies to limit the reporting to one to two pages and: 
 
§ voluntary and mandatory be kept separate in the annual report (1999, p. 3); 
§ providing excessive information may detract from the importance of other information 
required in the annual report (1999, p. 2); 
§ information required for s. 299 (1)(f) will be less detailed than the information which 
would appear in the detailed voluntary environmental report and should be limited to 
general information (1999, p. 3). 
 
Of interest in the recommendations by the AIG is the suggestion that companies adopt a 
minimalist reporting approach in the mandatory sections and provide greater levels of 
information in the voluntary sections.  Such an approach to mandatory requirements was 
predicted by Guthrie and Parker (1990, p. 172) who suggested that under a mandatory 
disclosure system corporations ‘may choose to disclose such information only to the 
minimum degree required to subdue the calls for further disclosure or regulation’.   
 
The AIG also addressed the issue of ‘significance’ by advising that companies should 
interpret the term in a broad sense and relate it to the extent of risk as determined by the 
company’s directors.  Apart form these points the AIG continued to promote its support and 
preference for the use of voluntary environmental reporting in annual reports to ‘identify 
environmental achievements and where future improvements are required’ (Australian 
Industry Group 1999). 
 
The amendment to the Corporations Law immediately attracted criticisms with the Australian 
Liberal National Coalition government expressing its opposition to the section.  On the 10th 
July 1998 the Treasurer, Peter Costello referred s. 299 (1)(f) to the PJSC along with several 
other matters.  It was one of three amendments during the proceedings of the Company Law 
Review Act 1998 opposed by the Government. Submissions to the PJSC relating to s. 299 
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(1)(f) were outlined in the Senate Committee Report.  Forty-six submissions were received 
with forty of those expressing opposition to the section.   
 
The arguments received in favour of the provision were discussed after those against.  These 
arguments were listed under the name of the organisations submitting the arguments.  
Greenpeace Australia suggested that the current voluntary system is inadequate and urged that 
the section be retained with additional guidance for compliance provided by ASIC.  
Greenpeace indicated that the additional pressure and the potential for penalties placed upon 
company directors will act as a stimulus for improvement in environmental performance and 
disclosure practices (Commonwealth of Australia 1999).  
 
The Environmental Defender’s Office Ltd (EDOL) also supported the general arguments 
against the success of the voluntary reporting system discussed by Greenpeace.  The EDOL 
focused on the information-usefulness to stakeholders including economically and/or 
environmentally motivated investors, environmental regulators, and the general public. 
 
After considering the submissions, which were heavily weighted against the retention of the 
section, the PJSC recommended that s. 299 (1)(f) be deleted from the Corporations Law. In 
justifying the decision to support the majority of submissions the PJSC stated that the 
environmental groups had ‘put different views to the above conclusions.  These views were 
not as persuasive as those from the business community’ (Commonwealth of Australia 1999). 
 
In making the recommendation the PJSC report outlines the following points: 
 
§ It is inappropriate for the Corporations Law to require inclusion in the annual 
directors’ report of details of performance in relation to environmental regulation 
(relating to submissions by R I Barrett, the Australian Society of Certified Practicing 
Accountants (ASCPA), the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (ICAA), 
and the Chartered Institute of Company Secretaries (CICS) W.A); 
§ Environmental reporting is not a matter which relates to the Corporations Law 
(relating to submissions from Freehill Hollingdale and Page (Perth), the AIG, the 
Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD), the National Association of Forest 
Industries (NAFI), J A Sutton, the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(ACCI), Blakiston and Crabb, T Walshaw, and Rio Tinto Limited); 
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§ Why should environmental performance be singled out as a worthwhile performance 
indicator? (relating to submissions from the Australian Law Reform Commission, 
Arnold Bloch Leibler, the AIG, Corrs Chambers Wesgarth, KPMG, ASCPA, ICAA, R 
I Barrett, T Walshaw, and Ernst and Young (Melbourne)); 
§ Mandatory reporting of environmental performance may be unproductive and 
voluntary reporting would encourage better companies to achieve best practice and the 
market would adversely deal with companies that lag (relating to submissions from the 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Blakiston and Crabb, the ASCPA, ICAA, and 
the CICS W.A, the Australian Listed Companies Association Incorporated, the 
Australian Institute of Petroleum, the Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration 
Association (APPEA), Rio Tinto Limited, the AIG, and the NAFI); 
§ The provision is vague and uncertain and lacks any safeguards (relating to submissions 
from Allen, Allen and Hemsley, the Henry Walker Group, the CICI, the AIP, Esso 
Australia Resources Limited, Ernst and Young (Sydney), the Australian Business 
Chamber, the Association of Mining and Exploration Companies Incorporated 
(AMEC), the AICD, Siddons Ramset Limited, and Freehill Hollingdale and Page 
(Perth); 
§ Companies already have to disclose material effects. Additional information provided 
by s. 299 (1)(f) is non-material and is being reported up to a year after the event 
(relating to submissions by Freehill, Hollingdale and Page W.A., Bristile Limited, the 
AMEC, and Blakiston and Crabb); 
§ The requirement only applies to operations in Australia, excludes overseas operations 
and focuses environmental reporting only upon those legal structures formed under the 
Corporations Law rather than all legal structures (Freehill Hollingdale and Page W.A., 
R I Barrett, the APPEA, Esso Australia Resources Limited, and Rio Tinto); 
§ Duplication of existing Commonwealth and State environmental reporting 
requirements add additional unnecessary costs (relating to submissions by I Cochrane, 
the Henry Walker Group, J Wilkin, the Australian Institute of Petroleum, the AIG, the 
Australian Business Chamber, the Victorian Minister for Fair Trading, T Walshaw, the 
AMEC, Gunns Limited, the ACCI, the AICD, and the APPEA). 
 
It was suggested that the quality of the information provided in the mandatory sections of the 
report would not be as good as that provided in the voluntary sections.  Considering the 
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international experience, this argument is questionable.  Bebbington (1999) investigated the 
effect of the introduction of mandatory environmental reporting in Denmark.  In the first year 
the quality of the information was questionable with only seventeen percent of companies 
providing information of a high quality, the remainder providing basic information 
(Bebbington 1999, p. 3).  It was noted that the quality of the reports increased between the 
first and second years.  Firms preparing green accounts were found to experience a positive 
economic, environmental or organisational benefit as a result of the environmental reporting 
process.  Of particular importance was the acknowledgement by several companies that 
mandatory reporting had acted as an impetus for improved or new environmental policies.  
 
Also submitted to the PJSC in October 1999 were the Minority Reports from the Australian 
Democrats and the Australian Labor Party.  The Democrat’s indicated that their motivation 
for inclusion of s. 299 (1)(f) was ‘not to promote greater social responsibility by Australian 
corporations, but was primarily directed to alerting shareholders to the financial risks that 
might attach to a company’s environmental practices’ (Senator Andrew Murray 1999).  The 
reference by the report to ‘identifying material financial risk’ is in contrast to Practice Note 68 
paragraph 74 which states that the information to be provided is not limited to that which is 
considered material under accounting conventions.  Still, the Democrat’s recommended that 
the section remain in the Corporations Law or alternatively, be amended to ‘ensure there is no 
doubt that disclosure is directed to exposing financial risk’ (Senator Andrew Murray 1999).  
The Australian Labor Party also supported retention of the section (Australian Labor Party 
1999). 
 
Despite the recommendation of the PJSC for its repeal the section remains in place.  Section 
299(1)(f) was proposed for repeal in the exposure draft of the Corporations Amendment Bill 
2002 which included amendments relating to the Report on Matters Arising from the 
Company Law Review Act 1998 of the PJSC (Commonwealth of Australia 1999).  The second 
draft of the Corporations Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2005, however, no longer repealed s. 
299(1)(f).  According to the explanatory memorandum to the subsequent Corporations 
Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2006 the amendment to repeal the section was withdrawn ‘following 
consideration of submissions received’. 
 
It has been expected that the inclusion of s. 299(1)(f) will result in companies that had 
previously not disclosed environmental information now doing so (Deegan 1999).  KPMG 
(1999) also argue that mandatory reporting requirements play an important role in increasing 
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corporate environmental disclosures.  The results of their survey show that environmental 
reporting in Denmark increased from eight per cent to 29 per cent between 1996 and 1999 
(KPMG 1999, p. 17). They attribute this increase to the introduction of reporting legislation in 
1996, although no clear distinction is made between what are voluntary and what are 
mandatory disclosures, nor the quality of such disclosures. The report also identified 
Australian companies as being slower to adopt new reporting techniques40.    
 
In an international comparison, Guthrie and Parker (1990) identified greater detail in 
environmental disclosures in countries where disclosure legislation exists.  Mandatory 
reporting legislation is a relatively new phenomenon in Australia, and limited research has 
been undertaken on its effect on the disclosure practices of corporations.  Deegan (2000a) 
undertook an ad hoc examination of annual reports following the introduction of the section 
and noted differences in the style of compliance in mandatory disclosures between companies 
and industries.   
 
In its early stages the section, as would be expected, was effective in increasing the number of 
companies disclosing environmental compliance information in the statutory section of the 
annual report. In an exploratory study, Frost (2001) examined annual reports of seventy-one 
companies to identify the number of companies reporting on compliance with environmental 
regulation, information regarding breaches of regulations and whether the disclosure was 
located in the voluntary or statutory section of the annual report. The total quantity (in words) 
of environmental disclosures, s. 299(1)(f) disclosures and negative environmental 
disclosures41 was also identified in order to determine whether the section had an incremental 
effect on environmental reporting overall.  Annual reports for the two pre-operative periods 
and the first two post-operative periods were examined.  An increase in the number of 
companies discussing requirements to comply with, and environmental performance with 
respect to, environmental regulations in the statutory section of the annual report was noted.  
An increase in the number of companies reporting the existence of breaches also occurred 
                                                
40 Such as the production of stand-alone environmental reports. 
41 Total environmental disclosures, s. 299(1)(f) disclosures and total negative environmental disclosures (in 
words) comprised both voluntary and mandatory disclosures.  Frost (2001) does not provide a differentiation of 
the quantity of disclosures appearing in the two sections of the annual report.  Although the section requires 
disclosure in the directors’ report, Frost argued that the AIG (1999) had stated that the information could be 
located in any part of the annual report provided that it was referred to in the directors’ report; however, Practice 
Note 68 paragraphs 72 through 75 refer only to disclosures being included within the directors’ report (ASIC 
1998).  The approach adopted by Frost is inconsistent with previous research which has examined voluntary 
and/or mandatory disclosures separately (Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 2002; Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; 
Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996; Guthrie & Parker 1990). 
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although the number of companies providing specific details on same was minimal.  The total 
quantity of environmental disclosures, s. 299(1)(f) disclosures and negative environmental 
disclosures (in words) also increased significantly from the first pre-operative period to the 
first post-operative period both for companies that had reported breaches, and those that did 
not report breaches, of environmental regulation.  Frost (2001, p. 17) acknowledges, however, 
that ‘most of the increased disclosure related to information interpreted as required by the 
provision’. Notwithstanding the proposed deletion of s. 299 (1)(f), many companies chose to 
comply.  Concluding that s. 299 (1)(f) had been ‘effective in increasing the level [sic] 
information disclosed on performance related to environmental regulations’, Frost (2001, p. 
15) also suggested that companies were still obviously confused about the reporting 
requirements. 
 
Section 299(1)(f) appears to have resulted in an increase in the number of companies 
disclosing information relating to requirements to comply with, and performance in regard to, 
environmental regulation in the statutory section of the annual report; however, previous 
research examining corporate voluntary environmental disclosures in annual reports has found 
that disclosures prior to s. 299(1)(f) were generally positive with little negative information 
provided, regardless of the nature of the issue being discussed42. Several researchers have 
suggested that the use of positive disclosures in this way is an attempt by the corporation to 
legitimise itself.  The introduction of mandatory disclosure requirements in the annual report 
could be seen as restricting the ability of the company to utilise self-puffery to stakeholders.  
Within the mandated directors’ report companies are required to be factual and it would be 
expected that opportunities for self-puffery would be restricted; however, the section is only 
operative in the statutory directors’ report.  Corporations are still able to report freely on 
environmental performance in the voluntary sections of the report that are not subject to audit 
or regulator scrutiny43.  As discussed earlier in this chapter, s. 299 (1)(f) was introduced, in 
part, following concerns regarding the quantity, quality and content of environmental 
                                                
42 While Frost (2001, p. 16) found an increase in the quantity of negative disclosures in annual reports following 
the implementation of the section, the average quantity of negative disclosures for companies that reported 
breaches pursuant with the requirements of the section was 79 words with average total environmental 
disclosures being 710 words.  Although Frost does not identify the nature of the remaining disclosures (that is 
neutral or positive disclosures), his findings do suggest that the proportion of negative disclosures to other 
disclosures remains minimal. 
43
 Section 298(1) of the Corporations Act requires companies to prepare a directors’ report each financial year.  
Section 301(1) requires the annual financial report of a company to be audited and an audit report obtained.  
There is no requirement in the Corporations Act for the s. 299 disclosures to be audited.  This is in contrast to the 
requirements in the UK Companies Act s. 235(3) which requires audit of the directors’ report.  Sections 314 and 
319 of the Corporations Act require the financial report, directors’ report and auditor’s report to be sent to 
members and lodged with ASIC.  The determination of compliance with s. 299(1)(f) is the responsibility of 
ASIC. 
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disclosures in annual reports.  It would seem that while there remains no restriction on the 
content of disclosures made elsewhere in the annual report, the reliability of environmental 
performance information provided in the annual report overall might remain questionable44.   
As discussed in this chapter, a principle motivation for the introduction of  s. 299(1)(f)  was to 
provide reliable information for the decision-making purposes of users of the annual report.  
While the section is a mandatory reporting requirement, disclosures pursuant to s. 299(1)(f) 
will be presented in the annual report which often also contains voluntary environmental 
disclosures.  Taking into consideration the discretionary nature of the voluntary disclosures, 
as evidenced from research prior and post the introduction of s. 299(1)(f), it may be 
speculated that the existing voluntary and mandatory annual report disclosure system could 
limit the usefulness of mandatory disclosures.  Therefore, the introduction of s. 299(1)(f) 
provides an opportunity to examine whether corporations required to disclose non-compliance 
with environmental regulations in the annual report have different voluntary disclosure 
practices (quantity and nature of disclosures) than those reporting compliance.     
 
2.9 Chapter Summary 
 
Continued community and government concern regarding environmental issues, and a focus 
on community right-to-know, contributed to the introduction of the NPI in 1998.  The NPI 
provides the Australian community with information on the pollution emissions of entities 
that exceed the thresholds outlined by the Inventory.  The NPI is an annual public disclosure 
of corporate environmental performance on the Internet.   
 
As discussed in this chapter, previous research has shown that corporations increase the 
quantity of voluntary environmental disclosures in annual reports following the external 
publication of environmental performance information which may be perceived to be negative 
(Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; Deegan & Rankin 1996).  In addition, a relationship has 
been identified between environmental performance and disclosure levels with poorer 
environmental performers often having greater quantities of voluntary environmental 
disclosures (Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen & Hughes 2004; Patten 2002b; Li, Richardson & 
                                                
44 It should also be noted that no indication has been provided by ASIC as to whether information provided in 
the voluntary sections of the annual report will satisfy the requirements of s. 299(1)(f).  This is also in contrast to 
what appears to be acceptable practice in the UK.  The UK Department of Trade and Industry (2005, p. 4) states 
that in its view ‘it is acceptable to cross refer in the Business Review section of the Directors’ Report to 
information in a voluntary OFR, provided that they are published together in such a way that users can easily 
refer to both documents’. 
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Thornton 1997; Patten 1992).   Several studies have identified that the content and quality of 
the environmental disclosures in annual reports has been questionable, with high levels of 
positive disclosures particularly for corporations that have experienced a negative 
environmental event or adverse publicity from environmental information that could be 
perceived as negative (Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; Deegan & Rankin 1996).  In 
particular, Patten (2002b) examined the relationship between levels of emissions on the US 
TRI and environmental disclosures in annual reports.  He found that corporations with greater 
levels of emission disclosures on the TRI had greater quantities of environmental disclosures 
in annual reports. 
 
There has been a notable absence of publicly disclosed environmental performance 
information within the Australian corporate landscape in the past.  During the implementation 
period of the NPI it was suggested that the public disclosure of emission information by a 
government body would act as a stimulus to improvements in processes and reductions in 
emissions.  Hence, publication was expected to increase community pressure on polluting 
entities which, in turn, would result in a response by those entities to implement change in 
environmental practices.  Previous research has identified that corporations react to negative 
media attention by increasing the quantity of voluntary disclosures in annual reports, and that 
such disclosures are mostly of a positive nature.  Therefore, it is possible to suggest that 
changes in environmental regulation may not only result in changes in environmental 
performance but also may result in changes in voluntary disclosure practice. That is, the 
introduction of new environmental regulation may act as a stimulus to changes in the quantity 
and/or content of annual report voluntary environmental disclosures.   
 
Also, in 1998 was the amendment to the Corporations Law to include a new mandatory 
annual report environmental disclosure requirement.  Section 299(1)(f) requires corporations 
to include in the directors’ report of the company annual report details as to their compliance 
with environmental regulations.  Industry and the existing Government were opposed to the 
section and it was subsequently recommended for repeal.  The opposing groups suggested the 
current voluntary approach was sufficient for environmental disclosure.  Furthermore, there 
was a perceived risk of negative impacts on the competitive advantage of Australian 
corporations; however, the section remains in the Corporations Act and companies are 
required to comply with its requirements.   
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A principal motivation for the introduction of the section was to provide users of annual 
reports with information on corporate environmental performance.  Prior to the introduction 
of the section the provision of environmental information in annual reports was 
predominantly voluntary.  The literature discussed in this chapter identified an increase in the 
quantity of voluntary environmental disclosures appearing in corporate annual reports since 
the 1960’s (Guthrie & Parker 1989; Kelly 1981; Trotman & Bradley 1981; Trotman 1979).  
This increase corresponded with changing community and societal values toward the 
environment and the importance placed on it by the Australian community (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics 2004; Lothian 1994).   
 
Research into the demand for environmental information provides evidence that it is of use to 
stakeholders (Collison, Lorraine & Power 2003; Epstein & Freedman 1994; Tilt 1994) and a 
useful tool for managers to communicate to stakeholders (O’Donovan 1999).  It has been 
found that corporations providing greater quantities of environmental disclosures experience 
less negative market reactions where there has been adverse attention following an 
environmental disaster or the release of negative environmental performance information 
(Freedman & Patten 2004; Blacconiere & Northcutt 1997; Blacconiere & Patten 1994).  
Hence the provision of voluntary environmental disclosures in annual reports has been 
identified as potentially beneficial to corporations. 
 
While an increase in quantity of voluntary environmental disclosures occurred, the quality and 
reliability of voluntary environmental disclosures in annual reports to users has, at times, been 
questionable.  Previous authors have suggested the disclosures lack credibility (Deegan & 
Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996), may be misleading (Deegan & Rankin 1996) and 
provide limited useful information to users (Hughes, Anderson & Golden 2001; Tilt 1994).  
These findings led to requests for mandatory reporting requirements in annual reports 
preceding s. 299(1)(f) (Tilt 1994; Gray, Owen & Maunders 1987). 
 
The introduction of s. 299(1)(f) to the Corporations Law was seen by some as a positive step 
to improvements in annual report environmental disclosure practices; however, disclosures 
pursuant to the section will be presented in the same document as voluntary environmental 
disclosures.  As already discussed, voluntary environmental disclosures are discretionary and 
have generally been favourable to the corporation.  It may be suggested, therefore, that the 
usefulness of a mandatory annual report disclosure requirement may be limited in providing a 
balanced view of environmental performance to users where voluntary disclosures may 
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counter-balance negative information required by s. 299(1)(f).  Consequently, it may be 
argued that the existence of voluntary disclosures in the current combined 
voluntary/mandatory system may make the mandatory disclosures required by s. 299(1)(f) 
impotent. 
 
The following chapter will present the theoretical framework and proposition development for 
this thesis.  Chapter 3 proceeds with an introduction to various theoretical perspectives 
utilised and discussed in the existing literature.  This is followed by a detailed discussion on 
the theoretical perspective adopted in this study.  Finally the research objectives are presented 
and propositions relating to the research objectives are stated. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, many researchers have investigated the occurrence of corporate 
social and environmental disclosures in annual reports.   In particular, the frequency and 
extent of environmental disclosures has increased substantially since the late 1960’s and are 
now relatively common (Gray, Kouhy & Lavers 1995b; Guthrie & Parker 1989; Tinker & 
Neimark 1987; Trotman & Bradley 1981; Trotman 1979).  While an increase in the disclosure 
of environmental performance information may appear useful, closer examination of the 
content of such disclosures has revealed a propensity for positive information (Deegan & 
Rankin 1996), with little negative information even when the corporation has experienced 
negative environmental events (Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000).   Of particular concern is the 
potential effect on users of voluntary environmental disclosures in annual reports.  Previous 
authors have suggested that such disclosures may lack credibility (Deegan & Gordon 1996; 
Deegan & Rankin 1996), be misleading (Deegan & Rankin 1996) and be of limited use to 
users (Hughes, Anderson & Golden 2001; Tilt 1994)45.   
 
                                                
45 However, limited research has examined the impact of voluntary environmental disclosures upon users. 
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In an attempt to explain the existence of, and motivation for, voluntary environmental 
disclosures in annual reports, several theoretical perspectives have been discussed within the 
existing literature.  A useful categorisation of theoretical perspectives for discussion purposes 
is provided by Gray, Kouhy and Lavers (1995b) who classify theoretical perspectives as 
decision-usefulness studies, economics-based theories, and political economy theories.  In 
view of the importance of social and environmental responsibility to the community, the use 
of economics-based theories within the disclosure literature has been criticised (Gray, Kouhy 
& Lavers 1995b).  It is argued that a focus on self-interest and wealth-maximisation is 
inappropriate and offensive (Gray, Kouhy & Lavers 1995b).  In contrast, political economy 
theories consider the political and social aspects of environmental disclosure behaviour along 
with the economic aspects (Deegan 2006).  Consequently, political economy perspectives 
including stakeholder theory and, to a greater extent, legitimacy theory have emerged as the 
dominant theoretical perspectives in the environmental disclosure literature (Milne & Patten 
2002; O’Donovan 2002; O’Dwyer 2002; Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 2002; Wilmshurst & Frost 
2000; Brown & Deegan 1998; Neu, Warsame & Pedwell 1998; Deegan & Rankin 1996; 
Lindblom 1994; Tilt 1994; Patten 1992; Roberts 1992).  At times, however, the failure to 
adopt a single theoretical framework for social and environmental disclosure behaviour has 
resulted in criticism (Ullmann 1985; Guthrie & Parker 1990).   
 
This chapter will proceed with a brief overview of the decision-usefulness and economics-
based theoretical perspectives as discussed in the existing social and environmental disclosure 
literature.  This will be followed by a discussion on the political economy perspective and 
stakeholder theory.   Next, legitimacy theory will be explained, followed by a discussion of 
techniques used to obtain legitimacy, corporate objectives for using legitimating techniques, 
and the legitimation strategies adopted by corporate management.   
 
The remainder of the chapter considers differences between corporate disclosure practices 
within voluntary and mandatory environmental disclosure systems. Prior to the introduction 
of s. 299(1)(f) environmental disclosures in Australian company annual reports were provided 
under a voluntary disclosure system.  Due to a general absence of mandatory disclosure 
requirements, limited research has examined environmental disclosure practices within 
voluntary and mandatory disclosure systems comparatively.  Studies undertaken by Wiseman 
(1982), Freedman and Jaggi (1982), Freedman and Wasley (1990) and Hughes, Anderson and 
Golden (2001) do, however, provide limited insight on this issue and are subsequently 
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discussed.  The limitations of these studies are then outlined with reference to the context of 
this research. Finally, the development of the research objectives and propositions is 
discussed. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Perspectives of Corporate Environmental 
Disclosures 
 
As discussed in 3.1, a number of theoretical perspectives have been utilised in an attempt to 
explain the existence of, and motivation for, voluntary environmental disclosures of company 
annual reports.  Gray, Kouhy and Lavers (1995b) categorise these attempts into three broad 
groups being decision-usefulness studies, economic theory studies and social and political 
theory studies.  Decision-usefulness studies in the environmental disclosure literature tend to 
fall into two broad categories (Gray, Kouhy & Lavers 1995b) being the decision-makers 
emphasis and the decision-models emphasis (Deegan 2006).  The decision-makers emphasis 
focuses upon what users want (Deegan 2006) and includes studies that ask participants to rank 
items in terms of their importance, such as asking investors to rank the type of information 
they would like included in the annual report in order of importance (Epstein & Freedman 
1994).  On the other hand, studies based on the decision-models emphasis attempt to 
determine whether social responsibility information has an information value to financial 
markets or participants (Blacconiere & Northcutt 1997; Blacconiere & Patten 1994; Shane & 
Spicer 1983; Anderson & Frankle 1980).    The focus, however, of many decision-usefulness 
studies on financial participants and financial behaviour has resulted in criticisms as it is 
argued that corporate social responsibility ‘is not motivated predominantly by a concern with 
the needs, wants and whims of financial participants’ (Gray, Kouhy & Lavers 1995b, p. 51).  
While Gray, Kouhy and Lavers (1995b, p. 51) do criticise decision-usefulness studies as 
being ‘mis-specified and under-theorized’ they do acknowledge that the associated literature 
has raised the level of importance of social responsibility reporting and led, in part, to the 
emergence of economic theories such as Positive Accounting Theory.  
 
Positive Accounting Theory (PAT) is a positive theory made popular by Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986).  Positive Accounting Theory is based on positive research which is an 
approach of analysing ‘what is’ as opposed to the normative theory approach which analyses 
‘what should be’ (Deegan 2006).  Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 7) define Positive 
Accounting Theory as: 
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…[being] concerned with explaining accounting practice.  It is designed to explain and 
predict which firms will and which firms will not use a particular method. 
 
Positive Accounting Theory is based on the wealth-maximisation and individual self-interest 
concepts underlying economic theory (Gray, Kouhy & Lavers 1995b).  As such it is 
consistent with the argument that the primary responsibility of the corporation is ‘to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits’ (Friedman 1962, p. 133)46.  
Hence, explaining the existence of social and environmental disclosure within the PAT 
framework provides a somewhat limited view of the phenomenon.  A typical utilisation of 
PAT explains movements towards socially or environmentally responsible behaviour and/or 
disclosure as being a result of market forces ‘that directs the self-interest of the entrepreneur 
into socially useful channels’ (Abbott & Monsen 1979, p. 511).   
 
While it would be unrealistic to ignore the presence of this behaviour, relying upon self-
interest and expectations of wealth-maximisation as the main or sole motivation for corporate 
environmental disclosures has been criticised as social and political factors also impact upon 
the corporation (Gray, Kouhy & Lavers 1995b).  Corporations operate within an environment 
of many constituents, often with conflicting aims and objectives (Oliver 1991). As evidenced 
in chapter 2, the sole responsibility of corporations is no longer perceived to be economic-
performance-based (Epstein & Freedman 1994; Patten 1992, 1991).  The community expects 
companies to act in a socially and environmentally responsible manner (Lothian 1994; Tinker 
& Neimark 1987).  Consequently, the application of many economic theories, including PAT 
in the discussion of corporate social and environmental behaviour and disclosure has been 
described as ‘not only empirically implausible but also highly offensive’ (Gray, Kouhy and 
Lavers 1995b, p. 52). 
 
The criticisms aimed at economics-based theories, including PAT have resulted in the 
increased popularity of political and social theories in the social and environmental disclosure 
literature (Gray, Kouhy and Lavers 1995b).  These theories have become increasingly 
                                                
46 While it seems that several entities do now take into consideration the needs of stakeholders other than 
shareholders, this is done so to the extent that it ultimately provides benefits to shareholders.  Comments made in 
the recent Business Council of Australia submission to the Inquiry into Corporate Responsibility included ‘the 
traditional view doesn’t appear to accord with the evolution of corporations or indeed with how modern 
corporations are actually acting.  There is increasing awareness that corporate success and maximising 
shareholder value are not based solely on a narrow set of considerations.  Broader considerations, such as the 
community and environment, are essential to contribute to and protect value in the long-term and accordingly the 
potential shareholder wealth that can be achieved over time’ (Business Council of Australia, p. 11).  
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established over recent years and include political economy theory (see for example Guthrie 
& Parker 1990), stakeholder theory (Tilt 1994; Roberts 1992; Ullmann 1985), and legitimacy 
theory (Cowan & Gadenne 2005; Cunningham & Gadenne 2003; Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 
2002; Patten 2002b; Wilmshurst & Frost 2000; O’Donovan 1999; Deegan & Gordon 1996; 
Deegan & Rankin 1996; Patten 1992; Guthrie & Parker 1989; Tinker & Neimark 1987; 
Hogner 1982). 
 
3.3 Political Economy Theory 
 
The usefulness of political economy theories is that they do not focus solely on the economic 
self-interest and wealth-maximisation of the individual or corporation.  Instead political 
economy theory (PET) considers ‘the political, social and institutional framework within 
which the economic takes place’ (Gray, Kouhy & Lavers 1995b, p. 52).  As discussed in 
chapter 2 several empirical studies have identified an increase in social and environmental 
annual report disclosures that correspond with periods where those issues peaked in 
importance politically and/or socially (Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 2002; Guthrie & Parker 
1989; Hogner 1982).  As such, political economy theories seem to better explain why 
‘corporations appear to respond to government or public pressure for information about their 
social impact’ (Guthrie and Parker 1990, p. 172).  
 
The usefulness of PET lies not only in its assessment of corporate disclosures as a reaction to 
the existing demands of stakeholders but in the way it ‘perceives accounting reports as social, 
political and economic documents’ (Guthrie & Parker 1990, p. 166).  Therefore, PET also 
recognises the use of social and environmental disclosures in annual reports as a strategic tool 
in achieving organisational goals, and in manipulating the attitudes of external stakeholders 
(Guthrie & Parker 1990).    
 
Gray, Owen and Adams (1996) usefully classify PET into ‘classical’ and ‘bourgeois’ streams.  
Classical PET is linked to the works of Karl Marx and the existence of class interest, power 
and conflict within society.  Deegan (2006, p. 274) describes classical PET as: 
 
…[tending] to perceive accounting reports and disclosures as a means of maintaining the 
favoured position of those who control scarce resources (capital), and as a means of 
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undermining the position of those without scarce capital.  It focuses on the structural 
conflicts within society. 
 
Tinker and Neimark (1987) use the classical political economy approach in an examination of 
the use of annual reports within a capitalist society.  They argue (1987, p. 72): 
 
…corporate reports are not passive describers of an “objective reality”, but play a part in 
forming the world-view or social ideology that fashions and legitimises …the company’s 
annual reports were deployed as ideological weapons aimed at influencing the 
distribution of income and wealth, in order to ensure the company’s continued 
profitability and growth. 
 
In contrast, the ‘bourgeois’ political economy approach generally ignores ‘sectional (class) 
interests, structural inequity, conflict and the role of the State’ and ‘is content to perceive the 
world as essentially pluralistic’ (Gray, Kouhy & Lavers 1995b, p. 53).  The pluralistic view 
adopted by the ‘bourgeois’ PET ignores the existence of particularly powerful groups in 
society but tends to focus on the group interactions within ‘society’ as a whole (Gray, Owen 
& Adams 1996). The application of stakeholder and legitimacy theory in the accounting and 
social and environmental disclosure literature has been described as generally being within a 
‘bourgeois’ political economy perspective (Deegan 2006; Gray, Kouhy & Lavers 1995b).   
 
Bourgeois political economy theories, particularly legitimacy theory, have been discussed 
frequently in the social and environmental disclosure literature.  The following discussion on 
stakeholder theory has been included to provide a useful insight of the relationship between a 
corporation and its stakeholders.  Stakeholder theory, and in particular Ullmann’s (1985) 
discussion in this area, provides a grounding for the discussion on legitimacy theory which 
follows.  Legitimacy theory is adopted as the theoretical perspective of this thesis.  
 
3.4 Stakeholder Theory 
 
The definition of ‘stakeholder’ has altered substantially over the past four decades.  At one 
end of the spectrum the shareholder was considered the sole or principal stakeholder.  This 
definition was based on arguments proposed by Friedman (1962) that the corporation’s 
foremost objective is to maximise the wealth of its owners. Freeman and Reed (1983), 
however, expand the definition of stakeholder to include a broader selection of constituents 
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including adversarial groups such as interest groups and regulators.  Both the narrow 
(shareholder) and the expanded (shareholder plus other groups) definition of stakeholders 
have been adopted in the development of mandatory environmental disclosure regulations for 
corporations.  The Australian Democrats focussed on the interests of shareholders in 
amending the Corporations Law to include s. 299(1)(f).  In proposing the amendment Senator 
Murray stated: 
 
…many companies are materially affected financially in terms of environmental 
situations.  I think we only have to recall some of BHP’s financial consequences for 
environmental matters to be well aware of that…all those points I have laid out there 
will improve the nature of reporting which materially affects the value of shareholders’ 
interest in companies… 
(Senate Hansard, 24th June 1998, p. 4013) 
 
In contrast, the Danish Parliament, the Folketing, adopted the broader definition of 
stakeholders for its Green Accounts Act.  The Danish Environmental Protection Agency, 
which is responsible for supervision of the Green Accounts Act, includes as stakeholders 
customers, suppliers, local communities (and neighbours), professionals and the public, 
employees, the press, authorities, interest groups and investors (Danish Environmental 
Protection Agency 2000, pp. 3–5).  Interestingly, it would appear that disparities of views 
regarding who is a stakeholder within other sectors such as government are also reflected in 
disparities in the research literature. 
 
Many early empirical studies examining the relationships between social performance, social 
disclosure and economic performance obtained inconsistent results.  Ullmann (1985) analysed 
several early empirical studies that examined these relationships in an attempt to develop a 
previously obscure theoretical framework.  Ullmann (1985) argued that the failure of previous 
research to identify a theoretical framework was based on several factors.  These included: 
 
• Problems in the methods used to conceptualise and operationalise key terms; 
• A lack of consistency between researchers, thus resulting in a lack of comparability 
between studies; 
• A failure to recognise the strategic posture adopted by management in the analysis. 
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While the first two issues relate to the methodological approach used by the researchers, the 
discussion on strategic posture added a new dimension to the literature at that time.  
Stakeholder theory comprises an ethical (moral) branch and a managerial branch (Deegan 
2006).  At the basis of Ullmann’s managerial branch of the framework is the concept of 
“stakeholder power”.  In contrast, Freeman (1984, p. 46), incorporating the ethical branch, 
defines a stakeholder as ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the firm’s objectives’.  This definition is expanded by Clarkson (1995, p. 106) 
in which stakeholders are: 
 
…persons or groups that have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation 
and its activities, past, present, or future.  Such claimed rights or interests are the result 
of transactions with, or actions taken by, the corporation, and may be legal or moral, 
individual or collective.  Stakeholders with similar interests, claims, or rights can be 
classified as belonging to the same group: employees, shareholders, customers, and so 
on. 
 
The ethical branch of stakeholder theory addresses why an organisation should consider the 
interests of stakeholders even where those stakeholders may not provide benefits to the 
organisation (Gibson 2000).  Within this branch, Donaldson and Preston (1995, p. 67) explain 
that: 
 
Stakeholders are persons or groups with legitimate interests in procedural and/or 
substantive aspects of corporate activity.  Stakeholders are identified by their interests in 
the corporation, whether the corporation has any corresponding functional interest in 
them. 
 
As a consequence of this view, it is argued that all stakeholders should be considered as 
important to the organisation and that ‘each group of stakeholders merits consideration for its 
own sake and not merely because of its ability to further the interests of some other group, 
such as shareholders’ (Donaldson & Preston 2000, p. 67)47.  Therefore the ethical branch 
suggests that an organisation has an obligation to treat all stakeholders equally (Gibson 2000). 
 
In contrast to the ethical branch, the managerial branch acknowledges that stakeholders 
control or have the ability to affect (directly or indirectly) control of resources required by the 
                                                
47 An example of considering the interests of other stakeholders in order to increase shareholder wealth is 
provided in section 3.2 earlier in this chapter. 
  
(67) 
67
corporation.  Thus, stakeholder power is determined by the level of control they have over the 
resources. The stakeholder-corporation power relationship is not generic across corporations 
(Deegan 2006).  Power may take the form of ‘command of limited resources (finance, labour), 
access to influential media, ability to legislate against the company, or ability to influence the 
consumption of the organisation’s goods and services’ (Deegan 2006, p. 299).  Thus, ‘when 
stakeholders control resources critical to the organisation, the company is likely to respond in 
a way that satisfies the demands of the stakeholders’ (Ullmann 1985, p. 552).  Ullmann 
(1985) argues that organisations select the stakeholders that they want/need to consider, and 
the actions that they will take to achieve the desired relationship with those stakeholders48.   
 
Therefore, the managerial branch of stakeholder theory is generally concerned with the way 
that an ‘organisation manages its stakeholders’ (Gray et al 1997, p. 333).  As a result, 
Ullmann (1985) argues that the power of stakeholders is related to the strategic posture 
adopted by the corporation.  According to Ullmann (1985, p. 552), an organisation’s strategic 
posture ‘describes the mode of response of an organization’s key decision makers towards 
social demands’.  Therefore, the managerial branch of stakeholder theory sees the world from 
the perspective of management (Gray, Kouhy & Lavers 1995b) and asserts that:   
 
…the corporation’s continued existence requires the support of the stakeholders and 
their approval must be sought and the activities of the corporation adjusted to gain that 
approval.  The more powerful the stakeholders, the more the company must adapt.  
Social disclosure is thus seen as part of the dialogue between the company and its 
stakeholders… 
(Gray, Kouhy & Lavers 1995b, p. 53) 
 
The way a corporation manages its stakeholders is dependent upon the strategic posture 
adopted by the corporation (Ullmann 1985).  Ullmann (1985) argues that organisations may 
adopt an ‘active’ or ‘passive’ strategic posture. Corporations that adopt an ‘active’ posture 
‘seek to influence [emphasis added] their organization’s relationship with important 
[emphasis added] stakeholders’ (Ullmann 1985, p. 552).  This reference to the ‘important’ 
stakeholders reinforces the fact that companies with an active posture not only identify 
stakeholders but must also determine those stakeholders with the greatest ability to influence 
                                                
48 As the managerial perspective provides a narrower determination of who is a stakeholder, it would also result 
in a narrower level of perceived responsibilities and accountabilities.  This would subsequently result in a 
narrower extent of voluntary reporting. 
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the provision of resources to the corporation (Ullmann 1985).  In contrast, the corporation 
with a ‘passive’ posture is ‘neither involved in continuous monitoring activities [of 
stakeholders] nor deliberately searching for an optimal stakeholder strategy’ (Ullmann 1985, 
pp. 552-553).   The lack of stakeholder engagement inherent in a ‘passive’ strategic posture is 
expected to result in ‘low levels of social disclosure’ and ‘low levels of social performance’ 
(Ullmann 1985, p. 554). 
 
Essentially, the basis of Ullmann’s theoretical framework is that a corporation manages 
dependence relationships, that is, those with its stakeholders, through the use of social 
performance or disclosure.  Ullmann suggests that where stakeholder power is high, and when 
economic performance is good, a corporation with an active strategic posture will have high 
levels of both voluntary and (where regulatory requirements exist) mandatory social 
disclosures.  Ullmann argues that if economic performance is poor, the corporation will have 
low levels of voluntary social disclosure due to the priority of economic matters over social 
matters while maintaining high levels of mandatory disclosures.  In this way a corporation 
may be seen by stakeholders as bound by government regulations and, as such, spending on 
social matters is not a voluntary or frivolous activity of management in times where economic 
prosperity is absent (Ullmann 1985). 
 
Despite an extension beyond the economic and an acknowledgement of power relationships 
between the corporation and its stakeholders, Gray et al. (1997) argue that stakeholder theory 
is flawed.  As discussed above, the managerial branch of stakeholder theory focuses on the 
way the corporation manages its stakeholders.  The corporation identifies the stakeholders 
that it will consider, and the level of attention it will give to each is based on how those 
stakeholders can benefit the organisation.  They suggest that stakeholder theory is essentially 
a ‘market forces’ approach in which resources and the provision/withdrawal of those 
resources determines the type of voluntary social disclosures at a given point in time (Gray et 
al. 1997).   They argue that the ‘organization-centred legitimacy’ of which stakeholder theory 
is reliant ignores important influences of society as a whole on the organisation’s provision of 
information.  These include the existence of statute law and regulations developed by 
government and statutory bodies which contain requirements for information disclosure. 
 
An understanding of the role of stakeholders as an influence on corporate environmental 
disclosure practices is important.  As discussed in chapter 2, a diverse range of stakeholders, 
other than shareholders, were discussed and/or involved in the development of the NPI and in 
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submissions to the PJSC enquiry into s. 299(1)(f) of the Corporations Law.   During the 
introduction of the NPI Senator Hill identified a far broader group of stakeholders than 
shareholders when he referred to the NPI as satisfying a “community right-to-know”.  
Furthermore, although the Democrats directly mentioned only the needs of shareholders and 
those with financial interests in the entity as those who would benefit from the introduction of 
s. 299(1)(f), the subsequent enquiry received submissions from a range of business, industry, 
environmental, social and community groups49.   
 
Another political economy theory, institutional theory, is beginning to emerge in the social 
and environmental disclosure literature (Cormier, Magnan & Van Velthoven 2005).  In 
contrast to the managerial branch of stakeholder theory in which organisations have some 
control over external influences, institutional theory suggests that the organisation is defined 
by external institutions and culture (Suchman 1995).  Institutional theory ‘concerns the 
development of the taken for granted assumptions and beliefs and values underlying 
organizational characteristics and practices’ (Dillard, Rigsby & Goodman 2004, p. 507).  
Institutional theory considers how an organisation interacts with its institutional environment, 
how societal expectations impact the organisation, and how these expectations are reflected in 
its practices. Therefore, environmental disclosures may be practices that have become 
institutionalised over time and symbolise both stakeholder concern and the environmentally 
conscious organisation (Scott 1995).  Dillard, Rigsby and Goodman (2004) explain that such 
practices are motivated by a need to be considered legitimate by society; legitimacy itself 
being determined by societal norms and values.  While stakeholder theory and institutional 
theory have been used as the theoretical perspective in several empirical studies (Deegan & 
Blomquist 2006; Cormier, Magnan & Van Velthoven 2005; Scott 1995; Tilt 1994; Roberts 
1992), the dominant explanatory theory in the social and environmental disclosure literature 
has been legitimacy theory.   
 
                                                
49 The ASX Corporate Governance Council has also extended the definition of who is a stakeholder of an entity.  
The Council also provides best practice guidelines to ‘companies and other listed entities’ (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council 2003, p. 7).  Ten corporate governance principles are required to be reported upon in 
accordance with Listing Rule 4.10.  In particular Principle 10 requires reporting entities to recognise the interests 
of stakeholders including shareholders, the financial community, customers, suppliers, employees, individuals 
and the community (ASX Corporate Governance Council 2003).  Recommendation 10.1 states that ‘consultation 
with the governments and communities in whose territory business is conducted is important.  Public or social 
accountability by corporations is generally based on notions of legitimacy, fairness and ethics’ (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council 2003, p. 59). 
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3.5 Legitimacy Theory 
 
Many authors have discussed corporate environmental and social disclosure practices within 
the theoretical framework of legitimacy theory (see for example Cowan & Gadenne 2005; 
Cunningham & Gadenne 2003; Deegan 2002; Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 2002; Milne & Patten 
2002; O’Donovan 2002; O’Dwyer 2002; Patten 2002a; Wilmshurst & Frost 2000; 
O’Donovan 1999; Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996; Tilt 1994; Patten 1992; 
Patten 1991; Guthrie & Parker 1989; Tinker & Neimark 1987; Hogner 1982).  Dowling and 
Pfeffer (1975, p. 131) suggest that legitimacy theory is useful in analysing corporate 
behaviour: 
 
…because legitimacy is important to organizations, constraints imposed by social norms 
and values and reactions to such constraints provide a focus for analysing organizational 
behaviors taken with respect to the environment.  
 
Gray, Kouhy and Lavers (1995b) argue that legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory should 
be seen as overlapping, as opposed to competing, theories.  They explain that both 
perspectives are set within the framework of political economy theory.  As the influence of 
society as a whole can affect the provision of financial and other resources to the firm, the 
firm utilises environmental performance and disclosure to justify or legitimise its activities to 
society.  Unlike the managerial branch of stakeholder theory which suggests that the 
corporation and its management acts and reports in accordance to the needs and power of its 
separate stakeholder groups (Ullmann 1985), legitimacy theory focuses on the firm’s 
interactions with society.  Dowling and Pfeffer (1975, p. 122) provide a useful explanation of 
organisational legitimacy: 
 
Organizations seek to establish congruence between the social values associated with or implied 
by their activities and the norms of acceptable behavior in the larger social system of which they 
are a part.  Insofar as these two value systems are congruent we can speak of organizational 
legitimacy.  When an actual or potential disparity exists between the two value systems, there 
will exist a threat to organizational legitimacy. 
 
Underlying legitimacy theory is the ‘social contract’ that exists between the firm and the 
society within which that firm operates and consumes resources. Shocker and Sethi (1974, p. 
67) provide a regularly quoted explanation of the concept of ‘social contract’: 
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Any social institution – and business is no exception – operates in society via a social 
contract, expressed or implied, whereby its survival and growth are based on: 
 
1) The delivery of some social desirable ends to society in general, and 
2) The distribution of economic, social, or political benefits of groups from which 
it derives its power.  
 
In a dynamic society, neither the sources of institutional power nor the needs for its 
services are permanent.  Therefore, an institution must constantly meet the twin tests of 
legitimacy and relevance by demonstrating that society requires its services and that the 
groups benefiting from its rewards have society’s approval. 
 
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975, p. 124) argue that legitimacy cannot be ‘defined solely by what is 
legal or illegal’.  Society’s expectations of corporate behaviour are both ‘implicit’ and 
‘explicit’ (Deegan 2006, p. 278).  Deegan (2006, p. 278) describes the explicit terms of the 
social contract as legal requirements, whereas the implicit terms are ‘non-legislated societal 
expectations’.  The reason for the imperfect correlation between the law and societal norms 
and values is threefold (Dowling & Pfeffer 1975).  Even though the law is often reflective of 
societal norms and values, the legal system may be slow in adapting to changes in norms and 
values in society.  Furthermore, the legal system is based on consistency whereas norms may 
be contradictory.  And finally, it is suggested that society may tolerate certain behaviours but 
not be willing to codify those behaviours in the legal system (Dowling & Pfeffer 1975). 
 
Organisational legitimacy is something that is both conferred upon the corporation by society 
and something that is desired or sought by the corporation from society.  As such, it has been 
argued that legitimacy may be seen as a potential benefit or resource to the organisation 
(O’Donovan 2002; Dowling & Pfeffer 1975).   
 
Parties external to the entity confer legitimacy (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990; Dowling & Pfeffer 
1975).  Where a difference exists between the values of the corporation, and the values of the 
community, corporate legitimacy is threatened (Lindblom 1994; Dowling & Pfeffer 1975).  
This disparity between the entity’s values and those of society is referred to as the “legitimacy 
gap” and may affect the corporation’s ability to continue its operations (Dowling & Pfeffer 
1975).  Legitimacy gaps may occur when: 
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• There is a change in corporate performance but society’s expectations of corporate 
performance remains unchanged; 
• Corporate performance is unchanged, but society’s expectations of corporate 
performance have changed; 
• Corporate performance and society’s expectations change in different directions, or in 
the same direction but with differing momentum. 
 (Wartick & Mahon 1994) 
 
It may be argued that the existence of and size of the legitimacy gap may not always be easy 
to determine.  As discussed in the previous chapter, a primary objective of the NPI was to 
provide the community with information on the pollution performance of entities.  It was 
expected that community awareness would result in community pressure upon the corporation 
to improve its environmental performance.  Howes (2001, p. 530) argues that: 
 
Inventories like the TRI and NPI aim to fulfil several functions.  First, they inform the 
public – particularly plant workers and communities near these facilities – about their 
exposure to toxic chemicals.  Second, they get business to conduct audits, find out what 
they are releasing, and bring this to the attention of senior executives.  Third, they 
generate the incentive for change through a combination of public pressure and a new 
corporate awareness.  Firms may legally use and release these chemicals and there is no 
legal or financial incentive (in terms of fines) not to emit as long as other relevant 
regulations are obeyed.  The only sanction available under such programs is the adverse 
reaction of the public. 
 
Furthermore, Fayers (1998) argues that corporations that demonstrate compliance with the 
NPI, and subsequently improve environmental performance through a reduction in emissions, 
may improve legitimacy and be considered favourably by ethical investment funds.  A report 
by the NEPC (2002) has expressed concern at the lack of knowledge of the NPI’s existence, 
purpose and content among the general community.  This suggests that from a corporation’s 
perspective, it may be difficult to determine whether society is aware of the availability of 
information provided by the NPI concerning the corporation’s pollution emissions.   
Therefore, determining the existence of, or potential size of a legitimacy gap resulting from 
the NPI may be problematic for the corporation.  
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O’Donovan (2002) suggests that where a disparity exists between the expectations of the 
corporation and those of its relevant publics the corporation will need to evaluate its social 
values and then align them with those held by the society in which it operates.  Alternatively, 
the corporation may attempt to alter the existing social values or perceptions of the 
corporation as a legitimation tactic. In order to close the legitimacy gap, the entity must 
identify those activities that are within its control, and identify the relevant publics that have 
the power to provide the entity with legitimacy (Neu, Warsame & Pedwell 1998). 
 
3.5.1 Legitimacy techniques 
 
A corporation may use a variety of legitimating techniques to execute its chosen strategy. 
Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) provide two general, but large, categories of legitimating 
techniques that a corporation may adopt – substantive and symbolic management techniques.  
The use of substantive management techniques ‘involves real, material change in 
organizational goals, structures, and processes or socially institutionalised practices’ 
(Ashforth & Gibbs 1990, p. 178).  There are several different substantive management 
techniques that corporations may utilise.  For example, corporations may simply perform in 
accordance with societal expectations.  Alternatively, the corporation may change its relevant 
publics, or the level of degree to which it is dependent on those publics’ resources.  At the 
other end of the spectrum the corporation may adopt techniques to actively align the values of 
society to those of the corporation (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990).  Regardless of the approach 
adopted, substantive management techniques involve a real change in the behaviour of the 
corporation. 
 
In contrast, symbolic management techniques of legitimation involve the portrayal of 
corporate behaviour in a manner to ‘appear consistent with social values and expectations’ 
(Ashforth & Gibbs 1990, p. 180).  Companies may publish policies on various issues 
including the environment, but may not enforce or set in place mechanisms for the full 
adoption of such policies.  Other techniques may include offering excuses for behaviour or 
apologies (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990).  Finally, corporations might adopt techniques that 
involve little or no action whatsoever.   
 
It is not necessary to use either substantive or symbolic management techniques exclusively. 
Corporations may adopt a mix of substantive and/or symbolic legitimating techniques and 
may apply these with varying levels of intensity (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990); however, the 
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intention of all legitimating techniques is basically to ‘foster the belief among constituents 
that the organization’s activities and ends are congruent with the expectations, values, and 
norms of constituents’ (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990, p. 182).  In addition, the legitimating 
techniques chosen will depend on the legitimacy objectives or purpose being sought by the 
corporation (O’Donovan 2002; Oliver 1991; Ashforth & Gibbs 1990).  For instance, is the 
corporation attempting to extend or gain legitimacy, maintain, or repair or defend legitimacy 
(O’Donovan 2002; Ashforth & Gibbs 1990)? 
 
3.5.2 Objectives for using legitimacy techniques 
 
A corporation facing a potential or actual legitimacy threat may seek to extend or gain 
legitimacy when the corporation is becoming established or moving into a new field or 
process (O’Donovan 2002).  Ashforth and Gibbs (1990, p. 182) describe the need to extend 
legitimacy as a ‘liability of newness’. Tactics adopted for extending legitimacy tend to be 
proactive and intense.  Consequently, management will prefer to adopt symbolic techniques 
as these preserve resources and maintain flexibility (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990).  Where 
symbolic legitimising tactics are not effective in extending legitimacy, the relevant publics of 
these corporations will prefer substantive techniques resulting in conflict between corporate 
management and the corporation’s relevant publics.  Under these circumstances, the greater 
the power of the relevant publics, or the more significant the resource to the corporation, the 
greater the probability of substantive measures being given by management (Oliver 1991). 
 
Where a corporation has already gained approval or legitimation from its relevant publics, it 
will need to adopt techniques that maintain legitimacy (O’Donovan 2002; Ashforth & Gibbs 
1990).  According to Ashforth and Gibbs (1990, p. 183), the process of maintaining 
legitimacy involves: 
 
1) ongoing role performance and symbolic assurances that all is well; and 
2) attempts to anticipate and prevent or forestall potential challenges to 
legitimacy. 
 
While gaining legitimacy may be difficult, once legitimacy has been conferred it is often 
taken for granted (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990).  In order to maintain legitimacy the corporation 
must be diligent and keep abreast of the changing values of its relevant publics (O’Donovan 
2002).  Furthermore, the corporation must be aware of the differences in values held by its 
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various relevant publics.  O’Donovan (2002) argues that the techniques and intensity used to 
maintain legitimacy may be dependent on the level of legitimacy the corporation already has.  
Therefore, ‘the less ‘legitimacy’ an existing organization has to begin with, the less it needs to 
maintain’ (O’Donovan 2002, p. 350). 
 
Corporations may adopt legitimating techniques to repair or defend legitimacy (O’Donovan 
2002; Ashforth & Gibbs 1990).  Corporations defend legitimacy where the existing legitimacy 
is under threat.  Unlike attempts to gain or extend legitimacy, corporations defending 
legitimacy often do so as a reactive process following a crisis or adverse publicity 
(O’Donovan 2002).  For example Patten (1992) found that US petroleum firms increased 
environmental disclosures in annual reports following the oil spill disaster by the Exxon 
Valdez tanker.  Similarly, firms that were prosecuted by State EPA’s in Australia increased 
subsequent annual report disclosures (Deegan & Rankin 1996).  It is also possible that an 
organisation may lose legitimacy even in circumstances where its operations have not altered 
(O’Donovan 2002).  O’Donovan (2002, p. 348) suggests that this can occur due to: 
 
a. changes in the composition of the entity’s relevant publics; and/or 
b. changes in the values of the entity’s relevant publics due to: 
a. changes in social awareness; 
b. pressures from regulatory or institutional sources; 
c. the influence of media; 
d. pressure from lobby groups; 
e. crises. 
 
Finally, it is possible that legitimacy may be lost where new information on the corporation is 
made available to its relevant publics (Milne & Patten 2001).  Under such circumstances the 
entity may have been operating under the same conditions for an extensive period, but its 
relevant publics were not aware or did not seek out the information.  This information may 
have been difficult to obtain in the past and may now be available publicly to the community 
through environmental disclosure system information such as the pollution emission data 
provided on the NPI or through mandatory annual report disclosures such as those required 
under s. 299(1)(f) of the Corporations Act.  Therefore, where such information is made 
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available to its relevant publics the corporation will need to adopt strategies to close any 
potential or actual legitimacy gaps. 
 
3.5.3 Corporate strategies of legitimacy 
 
Lindblom (1994) identified four legitimation strategies that corporations may adopt.   First, 
corporations that have engaged in substantive changes to environmental performance or 
activities may attempt to inform relevant publics of these changes.  Second, the corporation 
may attempt to alter the perceptions of its relevant publics, where no actual change in 
performance or activity has occurred.  Third, the corporation may attempt to divert attention 
from the problematic issue by discussing other, more favourable, issues.  Lastly, the 
corporation may try to alter societal values and norms to make them accord with those of the 
corporation.  Gray, Kouhy and Lavers (1995a, p. 65) provide a useful application of 
Lindblom’s strategies in a longitudinal study of UK firms’ social and environmental 
disclosures: 
 
A significant minority of companies found it necessary to ‘change their actual 
performance’ with respect to environmental interactions (Lindblom’s first strategy) and 
use corporate social reporting to inform their ‘relevant publics’ about this.  Similarly, 
companies environmental disclosure has also been an attempt, first, to change 
perceptions of environmental performance – to alter perceptions of whether certain 
industries were ‘dirty’ and ‘irresponsible’ (Lindblom’s second strategy) and, second, as 
Lindblom notes, to distract attention from the central environmental issues (the third 
legitimation strategy). 
 
A determination of which of Lindblom’s (1994) strategies a corporation has adopted requires 
knowledge of the actual environmental performance of the corporation.  It may be difficult for 
users to determine whether environmental disclosures in the annual report relate to real or 
substantive actions to improve environmental performance.   Earlier research identified that 
voluntary environmental disclosures in annual reports were generally positive in nature 
(Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 2002; Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; Deegan & Rankin 1996). 
Where this is the case the user will need to be aware of actual environmental performance to 
determine whether the corporation is portraying symbolic actions of environmental 
performance, attempting to alter perceptions, or distracting attention from other 
environmental issues. 
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Oliver (1991) provides a similar categorisation of legitimation strategies.  Oliver (1991, p. 
152) proposes five strategies that corporations may adopt when facing legitimacy threats: 
acquiesce, compromise, defy, manipulate, and/or avoid.  Corporations that acquiesce 
generally adopt a compliance posture.   The corporation conforms to societal values and 
norms.  A compromising strategy involves balancing the needs, norms and values of various 
stakeholder groups.  This strategy is important where the corporation has several groups of 
stakeholders with conflicting values and norms.  When a corporation adopts a defiance 
approach there is an active attempt to not comply with the values, norms and regulations with 
which it does not support or agree.  The extent of defiance depends on the risk of punishment 
for non-compliance.  Where the threat of punishment is minimal corporations may simply 
dismiss the requirements.  Where there is more at stake corporations may challenge, or even 
attack values or norms and those publics that convey them.  Manipulation strategies attempt to 
align the values of the constituents with the corporation.  Manipulation is an extremely active 
posture in that the corporation seeks to influence and even exert control over the environment 
in which it operates.  Some corporations and industry groups have adopted manipulation 
strategies when attempting to prevent the introduction of mandatory reporting requirements in 
Australia. As discussed in chapter 2, the introductory phases of the NPI and s. 299(1)(f) were 
subject to such strategies.   
 
Finally, corporations may adopt an avoidance strategy.  Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) describe 
this as a denial and/or concealment technique for legitimation.  Corporations using this 
legitimation technique ‘simply suppress information regarding activities or outcomes likely to 
undermine legitimacy’ (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990, p. 180).  An avoidance technique may also 
manifest itself as merely ignoring the issue of concern (O’Donovan 2002).  Therefore, a 
denial or avoidance technique may include providing no information on the NPI or providing 
limited or minimal information on the NPI, or emissions in annual reports. 
 
As discussed in this section, corporations adopt various techniques for extending, maintaining 
or defending legitimacy.  The techniques may be substantive or symbolic depending on the 
purpose sought and strategic posture adopted by management.  Regardless of the substantive 
or symbolic nature of the techniques, the underlying objective of all legitimising activities is 
to gain, maintain or repair legitimacy from the corporation’s relevant publics.   
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In order to achieve the objective sought, the legitimising activities of the corporation must be 
communicated or presented to society (Dowling & Pfeffer 1975).  Previous research has 
shown that the annual report is a regular means for reporting on legitimising activities – 
substantive or symbolic – and as an instrument to alter societal perceptions of the corporation 
or to alter the values and norms of society (Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000;  Brown & Deegan 
1998; Li, Richardson & Thornton 1997; Deegan & Rankin 1996; Blacconiere & Patten 1994; 
Patten 1992).  This is reflective of the perceived usefulness of the annual report for 
communicating details of the corporation’s environmental performance activities to users 
(O’Donovan 1999)50. 
 
3.6 Statement of the Research Objectives Relating to the NPI 
 
The National Pollutant Inventory provides the Australian community with information on the 
pollution emissions of entities that exceed the thresholds outlined by the inventory.  The NPI 
is an annual public disclosure of corporate pollution emissions on the Internet.   
 
The NPI not only represents a changing operating environment but, where the community is 
accessing the information, a potential legitimacy gap for corporations with emissions 
published on the NPI.  As outlined at its inception, the goals and objectives of the NPI include 
the provision of information to the community on the pollution emissions of entities operating 
within their region.  It has been proposed that an increase in emission information to the 
community will act as an impetus for industry to improve environmental performance.  
Howes (2001, p. 529) argues that the NPI compels ‘business to release information that they 
find embarrassing’.  Consequently, it may be suggested that the government is expecting the 
NPI to initially generate a legitimacy gap between the community and corporations operating 
within those communities.  That is, there may be a disparity between the emission types and 
levels of the corporation and the expectations of the society or community in which it 
operates.   
 
                                                
50 The use of legitimation strategies by corporations appears to persist despite the development of the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the ISO 14000 reporting standards for environmental management.  In a study of 
Australian companies, Raar (2002) concluded that there was an increase in environmental reporting in annual 
reports following the introduction of these guidelines; however, only a small increase in the production of 
separate environmental reports occurred.  It has also been identified that Swedish companies utilise the reporting 
guidelines as a means of gaining credibility and legitimising their activities (Hedberg & Von Malmborg 2003). 
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The literature review in chapter 2 shows that corporations may experience negative security 
market returns following environmental disasters (Blacconiere & Northcutt 1997; Blacconiere 
& Patten 1994), or the release of information relating to pollution performance information 
(Shane & Spicer 1983).  Therefore, according to governmental expectations of the NPI, 
corporations will attempt to close the legitimacy gap by improving environmental 
performance.  Thus, from a governmental perspective, the corporation’s norms and values 
relating to environmental performance will be more closely aligned with the norms and 
values, and expectations of environmental performance of the community.   
 
The existing literature has provided useful evidence that suggests corporations use 
environmental disclosures strategically under certain conditions (Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 
2002; Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; O’Donovan 1999; Deegan & Rankin 1996).  Firstly, a 
negative relationship between environmental performance and environmental disclosure in 
annual reports has been identified.  Corporations with questionable environmental 
performance have been identified as having higher levels of environmental disclosures in 
annual reports (Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen & Hughes II 2004; Li, Richardson & Thornton 1997; 
Rockness 1985).  Secondly, corporations that have been subjected to external publication of 
environmental information that could be perceived as negative have been found to disclose 
greater quantities of environmental disclosures of a positive nature in annual reports (Deegan 
& Rankin 1996).  Thirdly, corporations that have experienced a serious environmental event 
such as a spill or leak, and/or obtained negative media publicity regarding such events, have 
increased the quantity of disclosures in annual reports following the event (Deegan, Rankin & 
Tobin 2002; Brown & Deegan 1998; Deegan & Rankin 1996; Patten 1992).   
 
The strategic use of the quantity and nature of environmental disclosures in annual reports has 
been shown as potentially beneficial to the corporation (Blacconiere & Northcutt 1997; 
Blacconiere & Patten 1994; Shane & Spicer 1983; Anderson & Frankle 1980).  Increased 
environmental disclosures may reduce negative economic impacts on the corporation, 
particularly following the release of unfavourable environmental performance information.  
Often, the strategic use of environmental disclosures in annual reports has been explained 
within the theoretical perspective of legitimacy theory.  When the norms and values of the 
corporation are perceived to be different to those of the society in which the corporation 
operates a legitimacy gap may occur.  Previous research has shown that changes in 
environmental disclosures in annual reports often occur where it is known or believed that 
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environmental performance information that may be perceived as negative has been 
communicated to the corporation’s relevant publics.   
 
Therefore, the size of the legitimacy gap and the legitimation strategy adopted by the 
corporation to close that gap is dependent upon the level to which the corporation’s relevant 
publics are aware of the environmental information.  As discussed in chapter 2, an initial 
review of the NPI expressed concern at the level of knowledge of the NPI by the general 
community.  The 2005 review suggested that the NPI was used by several groups including 
community organisations, government, financial institutions, research organisations and 
individuals.  Both reviews suggested a need for additional expenditure to inform the 
community of both the existence and purpose of the NPI.   
 
An ad hoc review undertaken by the author of the number of media articles in national, state 
and regional newspapers and radio, and electronic news media identified that the information 
on the NPI has been discussed within the media51.  Table 4 identifies the number of items 
referring to the NPI during the years 1997 to 2005.  In 1998, when the NPI was established, 
there were fifteen references to the NPI in the news media.  During 2000, its first year of 
publication, there were eighteen articles. 
 
 
 
Table 4:  Number of media articles referring to the NPI for the years 1997 to 2005 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Number of 
articles on 
Factiva 
4 15 10 18 18 19 19 6 10 
 
 
In general, articles preceding publication of the first NPI database in January 2000 referred to 
the development, and impending availability, of pollution emission information.   Preceding 
the agreement for the introduction of the NPI, Williams (1998, p. 7) reported in the Courier 
Mail that:  
 
                                                
51 The review was conducted using the search term “National Pollutant Inventory” on Factiva ®. 
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Brian Littleproud, Queensland (Australia) Environment Minister, has announced that the 
state will join an Australia-wide National Pollutant Inventory to curb dangerous 
emissions by industry.  However, the move is being criticised by spokesman, James 
Whelan, of lobby group, the Queensland Conservation Council, for listing only 36 
substances, when the council has actually already identified 95 harmful pollutants. 
 
Some newspaper articles, however, focussed upon the impact of the NPI on corporate 
operations.  A report in the Financial Review (Griffin 1997, p. 19) stated:  
 
You’d expect this sort of proposal to make some parts of industry very nervous – and to 
some extent it has.  Even some multinational firms that are comfortable about reporting 
data to their local community have a few reservations about reporting nationally, 
regarding it as a much riskier proposition than soothing a few hot-under-the-collar 
locals.  
 
…So what will happen when industry unburdens?  The NPI is likely to have some 
discomforting measles for all of us.  
 
Criticisms of the proposed Inventory were included in several articles following the 
agreement by State Environment Ministers to implement the NPI.  Strong (1998, p. 8) 
reported in The Age:  
 
Five chemicals subject to strict environmental controls in the United States, including an 
acid powerful enough to melt glass, have been left off Australia’s National Pollutant 
Inventory. 
All five of these chemicals are believed to have been released into the environment by 
Melbourne factories recently.  
 
The Herald-Sun reported ‘Australian companies will not be forced to report what toxic 
pollutants they dump in sewers and landfills under the National Pollutant Inventory’ (Dent 
1998, p. 11).  The ‘gutting of the National Pollutant Inventory’ was used by the Canberra 
Times (in a 1110 word article) as an example of an ineffectual Federal/State Government 
approach to environmental matters (27 May 1998, p. 9) arguing that:  
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Many of the environmental issues of greatest concern to the Australian community are 
not included as “matters of national significance”.  Air pollution, water pollution and 
deforestation are top of the list surveyed by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in 1996, 
yet fail to appear in the priority list for national action. 
  
In discussing the NPI in 1998, the Financial Review (Jay 1998, p. 54) explained the 
motivation for its implementation: 
  
The NPI comes on top of community pressure against opening of new landfills and for 
closure of existing ones, the inability to find a politically acceptable site for a national 
high-temperature incinerator to dispose of certain difficult toxic chemicals, proposals for 
reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases and progressive tightening of controls on 
noxious and hazardous chemicals and waste products.  
 
It was also suggested in the Financial Review that the information provided on the NPI 
database may impact upon the provision of supply contracts to certain entities.  As explained 
by Jay (1999, p. 54): 
  
A National Pollutant Inventory now being put together by Commonwealth and State 
environmental agencies is steadily becoming a factor to be reckoned with by private 
business interested in sales to government departments and agencies.  Under 
Commonwealth purchasing guidelines, purchasing officers are required to take into 
account a range of policy interests, including environmental issues.  As well, several 
States have introduced purchasing policies and guidelines which specify that private 
suppliers’ environmental images and records must be taken into account. 
 
In the period immediately surrounding the first NPI Internet publication date in January 2000, 
articles appeared in the Illawarra Mercury, the West Australian (two articles), the Daily 
Telegraph, the Sydney Morning Herald, the Canberra Times (two articles), the Hobart 
Mercury, and the Australian (two articles) providing information relating to the purpose and 
location of the new NPI database.  For example, the Daily Telegraph (29 Jan. 2000, p. 14) 
reported that:  
 
Australians will have a clearer picture of pollutants being discharged in their 
neighbourhoods with the launch of a national pollutant database, the Federal 
Government said. 
  
(83) 
83
…The inventory is accessible on the Internet to show the types and amounts of 
chemicals discharged into the air, land and water.  
 
Immediately following publication of the first database, information included in the database 
was reported on by the media.  On the 29th January the Sydney Morning Herald (Woodford 
2000, p. 3) reported:  
A single Sydney factory complex is pumping more than 2.75 million kilograms of waste, 
including mercury and arsenic, into the atmosphere every year, figures released for the 
first time reveal. 
At the Matraville factory complex operated by Orica Australia Pty Ltd, more than 230 
kilograms of mercury is being released into the skies annually a figure that neither the 
company nor the Environment Protection Authority was aware of until last year. 
The new figures were released as part of the Federal Government’s establishment of the 
National Pollutant Inventory database, which requires all Australian companies 
producing more than a certain quantity of dangerous chemicals to reveal their pollution 
levels.  
 
Media reports since the first publication of the NPI have used the information on the NPI to 
discuss the environmental performance of both individual companies and industries.   
Southwell (2002) referred to the NPI in the West Australian on the specific emission 
quantities of Alcoa, discussing the potential negative effects of those emissions on human 
health.  Upon release of the NPI in 2003 the Age (Fyfe 2003, p. 4) reported: 
Electricity generation remains the state’s biggest source of industrial pollution, the 
Environment Protection Authority’s annual snapshot has found. 
In the National Pollutant Inventory, to be released today, the Latrobe Valley’s brown 
coal plants dominate the state’s top 10 industrial polluters.  But the aluminium, 
petrochemical and glass and motor car manufacturing sectors also score highly on 
chemical emissions.  
While the quantity of media articles identified in the review is not extensive, there is evidence 
that information relating to the performance of both individual entities and industries 
published on the NPI has been discussed within both the national and localised media.  In 
discussing the role of the media in the promotion of an issue to the community, Brown and 
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Deegan (1998) extended the legitimacy theory literature to include media agenda setting 
theory.  Media agenda-setting theory is explained by Ader (1995, p. 300):  
The agenda-setting hypothesis…posits a relationship between the relative emphasis 
given by the media to various topics and the degree of salience these topics have for the 
general public.  Individuals note the amount of and distribution of media coverage 
among issues, and this determines the salience of each issue for the individuals.  
According to the agenda-setting hypothesis, the media do not mirror public priorities as 
much as they influence them.  
Therefore, media agenda-setting theory suggests that media attention given to a particular 
issue can influence the public agenda (Kok, Goh & Holaday 1999).  Furthermore, the level of 
media attention provided can influence the level of public interest in the issue. Brown and 
Deegan (1998, pp. 264–265) argue:  
Increased media attention is believed to lead to increased community concern for a 
particular issue.  The media are not seen as mirroring public priorities; rather, they are 
seen as shaping them.  
Adopting Brown and Deegan’s (1998) approach, Patten (2002a) examined the environmental 
disclosures of United States corporations in 10K reports following the introduction of the 
TRI52 to determine whether it is necessary for media coverage of a particular issue to be 
extensive in order for that coverage to be considered a legitimacy threat.  He argues (2002a, p. 
153): 
  
…increased media attention can certainly lead to the potential for increased pressures 
from any of the three sources [that is, dissatisfaction of the public itself, new or proposed 
political action, and/or increased regulatory oversight], even without significant media 
exposure.  Accordingly, it may be possible to find evidence of public policy pressure 
related increases in environmental disclosure even without substantial media attention.  
 
Patten (2002a) found that there was a significant increase in environmental disclosures by 
affected firms as a result of an increase in regulatory oversight pressure even though the 
attention paid to the TRI in the media was limited.  
 
                                                
52 As discussed in chapter two, the TRI  operates in the US and is similar to the NPI. 
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It may be speculated, therefore, that similar results may occur under the Australian conditions.  
The NEPC (2002) report on the implementation of the NPI identified a lack of knowledge 
among the general public regarding the existence of, and availability of, information provided 
on the NPI; however, as noted in chapter 2, the number of unique hits to the NPI website 
increased from 1794 in the 2001/02 reporting year to 62256 in 2003/04.   In addition, 
consideration should be given to the level of media attention prior to the first publication of 
the database in 2000 and to comments made by government at its inception (the period under 
consideration in this thesis).  It is possible to suggest, therefore, that companies may have 
been uncertain as to the extent, if any, the NPI represented as a legitimacy threat prior to its 
first publication.   
 
If the corporation believes that its relevant publics have knowledge of and access to the NPI, 
the corporation may perceive a greater legitimacy threat.  On the other hand, if the corporation 
does not believe that its relevant publics have knowledge of and access to the NPI, a lesser or 
no legitimacy threat may be perceived. The existing literature suggests corporations that do 
perceive the NPI as a legitimacy threat may adopt disclosure strategies to manage that threat.   
 
Consequently, the first objectives of this research are to examine the potentially legitimising 
(and discretionary) nature of voluntary environmental disclosures by determining whether: 
 
1. a change in environmental regulation acts as an impetus to changes in voluntary 
environmental disclosure practices in annual reports of Australian companies  
 
And, for comparison with previous research, principally that undertaken by Patten (2002b), if: 
 
2. there is a relationship between the quantity of published pollution emissions on the 
NPI and the quantity of voluntary environmental disclosure in annual reports of 
Australian corporations. 
 
3.7 Proposition Development of the Research Objectives Relating to 
the NPI 
 
First, previous empirical research has identified a negative relationship between pollution 
performance ratings and the quantity of environmental disclosures in annual reports (Patten 
2002b).  Therefore, it is expected that corporations with higher quantities of pollution 
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emission data published on the NPI will disclose higher levels of voluntary environmental 
disclosures in annual reports.  Furthermore, as suggested by Patten (2002b), larger 
corporations would be expected to have greater quantities of emissions. Therefore, for 
comparison with previous research, the following research proposition may be stated: 
 
P1a. Corporations with greater quantities of published pollution emissions, adjusted by size 
of corporation, on the National Pollutant Inventory have greater quantities of total voluntary 
environmental disclosures in annual reports. 
 
Second, previous research has identified a tendency toward the provision of information 
which is mostly positive in nature (Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; Deegan & Rankin 1996).  
It has been suggested, from a legitimacy theory perspective, that this strategy is useful in 
diverting attention from the less favourable environmental performance activities of the 
corporation to those that are more favourable (Lindblom 1994).   Therefore, to allow a 
comparison with previous research the following research proposition is stated: 
 
P1b.  Corporations with greater quantities of published pollution emissions, adjusted by size 
of corporation, on the National Pollutant Inventory have greater quantities of positive 
voluntary environmental disclosures in annual reports. 
 
Third, previous research has provided evidence that corporations may use voluntary 
environmental disclosures strategically under certain conditions (Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 
2002; Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; O’Donovan 1999; Deegan & Rankin 1996).    It may 
also be speculated that a corporation perceiving a potential or actual legitimacy threat from 
the NPI may be expected to provide greater quantities of voluntary emission disclosures in 
annual reports.   Therefore, the following research proposition is stated: 
 
P1c.  Corporations with greater quantities of published pollution emissions, adjusted by size 
of corporation, on the National Pollutant Inventory have greater quantities of voluntary 
emission disclosures in annual reports. 
 
Previous research has also identified that, in communicating with its relevant publics, an 
entity may adopt either an avoidance or compliance strategy.   An avoidance strategy could 
result in the suppression of information which may affect legitimacy (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990) 
or merely ignoring the issue (O’Donovan 2002); hence the organisation may provide minimal 
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disclosures or not disclose at all.  Conversely, an organisation adopting a compliance strategy 
could attempt to communicate its conformity with social norms and values (Oliver 1991).  
Therefore, it may be speculated that corporations which perceive the introduction of the NPI 
as a potential or actual legitimacy threat, and adopt an avoidance strategy may either 
suppress/ignore the issue (or provide minimal or no disclosures); or alternatively, if adopting 
a compliance strategy, may include disclosures concerning the NPI in the annual report. 
However, in circumstances where no information is provided, such as those which may be 
adopting an avoidance strategy, it is problematic to determine from the annual report alone 
whether the corporation is purposely suppressing or ignoring the NPI, or whether the 
organisation simply does not perceive the NPI to be a legitimacy threat. Therefore, within the 
scope of this study a compliance strategy will be examined, and the following research 
proposition may be stated: 
 
P2a. There is an increase in the quantity of voluntary environmental disclosures discussing 
compliance with the NPI in annual reports during the NPI implementation period by 
corporations required to publish emission information on the NPI. 
 
Finally, Lindblom (1994) suggests that a corporation may attempt to divert attention from the 
problematic (legitimacy threatening) issue by discussing more favourable issues.  
Consequently, it may be speculated that corporations may discuss good performance in regard 
to issues relating to the NPI such as pollution/emissions controls and management.  Therefore, 
the following research proposition may be stated: 
 
P2b. There is an increase in the number of corporations providing voluntary environmental 
disclosures concerning pollution/emissions in annual reports during the implementation 
period of the NPI by corporations required to publish emission information on the NPI. 
 
3.8 Statement of the Research Objective Relating to s. 299(1)(f) of 
the Corporations Act 
 
Prior to the introduction of s. 299(1)(f) of the Corporations Law there was a notable absence 
of legislative requirements for a corporation to disclose its environmental performance, or 
any initiatives undertaken to improve such performance, in the annual report (Deegan & 
Gordon 1996).  While the corporation also operates within society under the regulations of 
the various state EPAs, much of this information remains relatively difficult for the majority 
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of potential users to access.  Furthermore, users may not be aware of the existence and/or 
availability of environmental information.   
 
It has been identified that the community, including investors, is interested in the 
environmental performance of corporations (Epstein & Freedman 1994; Lothian 1994; Tilt 
1994). It is also possible to argue that the previous lack of availability and/or accessibility of 
environmental performance information may have resulted in many corporations with poor 
environmental performance records continuing to enjoy an uninterrupted or unchanged 
provision of resources by society.  It would be presumptuous to state that the providers of 
these resources would cease to support the company if they were aware of the true extent of 
the company’s environmental performance; however, based on the research undertaken by 
Shane and Spicer (1983), Blacconiere and Patten (1994) and Blacconiere and Northcutt 
(1997), it could be suggested that companies may face a legitimacy threat from some of their 
relevant publics when environmental information that could be perceived as negative by 
stakeholders is publicly disclosed.   
 
Within a voluntary reporting framework the corporation is free to legitimise its 
environmental performance behaviour through discretionary disclosures within the annual 
report.  Previous research examining voluntary environmental disclosures in annual reports 
has identified environmental disclosures to be mostly positive (Deegan & Gordon 1996; 
Deegan & Rankin 1996; Guthrie & Parker 1990) and potentially misleading to users 
(Rockness 1985)53. These results have led to criticisms of the voluntary environmental 
disclosure system and suggestions that ‘the reliability of voluntary environmental disclosure 
can be questioned’ (Berthelot, Cormier & Magnan 2003, p. 20).  For example, Deegan and 
Gordon (1996, p. 198) argue that ‘in an unregulated environment, management will be less 
than objective in its environmental disclosure practices’.  Adopting a similar view, Deegan 
and Rankin (1996, p. 10) state: 
 
…in the absence of disclosure regulations pertaining to environmental issues, that 
Australian companies will only provide environmental information which is favourable 
to their corporate image. 
 
                                                
53
 Limited research has examined the impact of voluntary disclosures upon users of same.  While outdated, the 
Rockness study does provide empirical evidence that unregulated disclosures may potentially mislead users of 
that information. 
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Neither Deegan and Gordon (1996) nor Deegan and Rankin (1996) suggest outright that 
mandatory reporting requirements should be introduced.  It is clear, however, that the authors 
believe that ‘in the absence of disclosure regulations’ and ‘in an unregulated environment’ 
disclosure practices are questionable.  Guthrie and Parker’s (1990) comparative international 
analysis of social and environmental disclosures in corporate annual reports found that the 
US provided significantly greater quantities of ‘bad news’ information than either the UK or 
Australia.  Guthrie and Parker (1990) suggest that differences in disclosure practices between 
the three countries appear to be a result of differences in the level of government or 
accounting body regulations.  The high levels of disclosure regulation in the US resulted in 
more corporations reporting on negative events in the annual report than in Australia where 
only minimal regulations were in effect.  Considering Guthrie and Parker’s (1990) results 
and comments from Deegan and Gordon (1996) and Deegan and Rankin (1996), it could be 
speculated that mandatory disclosure requirements may be expected to result in 
environmental disclosure practices that are more reflective of actual environmental 
performance.   
 
Although mandatory annual report environmental disclosures have been required since 1 
July 1998, there is an absence of Australian empirical research examining differences in the 
disclosure practices of corporations within voluntary and mandatory environmental 
disclosure systems in the annual report.  Four studies undertaken in the US by Wiseman 
(1982), Freedman and Jaggi (1982), Freedman and Wasley (1990), and Hughes, Anderson 
and Golden (2001) provide some insight into voluntary and mandatory environmental 
disclosures and their relationship to, or indication of, corporate environmental performance. 
 
Wiseman (1982) examined voluntary environmental disclosures in the annual reports of 
twenty-six US firms across three industries for 1972, 1974 and 197654.  Wiseman (1982, p. 
53) argued that the absence of a ‘reporting system to account for corporate environmental 
performance’ led to ‘the current state of environmental reporting by corporations [remaining] 
principally voluntary’.  Using an indexing procedure to determine the quality of voluntary 
disclosures, Wiseman (1982) compared the annual report disclosures with pollution 
performance ratings provided by the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP). The disclosures 
were not found to be a true representation of the companies’ performances.  Overall the 
                                                
54
The sample differed in each year considered.  The steel and pulp and paper industries were included in 1972, 
the oil industry in 1974, and the steel industry in 1976.  
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disclosures were described as ‘incomplete’, ‘general’, and ‘questionable’ in their ‘usefulness’ 
for ‘inter-company performance comparisons’ (Wiseman 1982, p. 60).   
 
Wiseman’s (1982) analysis focussed on voluntary environmental disclosures in annual 
reports.  The study did not consider the quality or content of mandatory pollution 
information disclosures required by the United States SEC.  In 1973, the SEC insisted 
companies include information relating to pollution performance in annual reports filed with 
the SEC.  These reports are referred to as 10Ks and represent the mandatory pollution 
performance disclosures of listed corporations.  Freedman and Jaggi (1982, p. 168) explain: 
 
The underlying rationale for public disclosure of such information is that this 
information is perceived to be important for investors’ decisions since it is expected to 
aid investors in evaluating the effectiveness of a firm’s pollution abatement program and 
the risks associated with potential sanctions or fines for violating the pollution laws 
…[and] may also be useful in evaluating managerial effectiveness and a firm’s potential 
economic performance since pollution control may involve the use of better and more 
modern equipment. 
 
The focus of previous studies on voluntary annual report disclosures and the exclusion of the 
content of mandatory disclosures were noted by Freedman and Jaggi (1982).  Consequently, 
the authors examined the association between mandatory pollution disclosures in 10Ks and 
pollution performance using the CEP pollution performance index.  Freedman and Jaggi 
(1982, p. 171) were unable to identify an association between pollution performance and 
mandatory pollution disclosures and concluded ‘that pollution disclosures do not reflect 
actual pollution performance’.  While both studies used the CEP ratings as a pollution 
performance measure, Wiseman (1982) adopted a different approach to measuring the 
voluntary pollution disclosures in her study; however, the results of these two studies suggest 
that mandatory disclosures were not significantly more reflective of actual pollution 
performance than the voluntary disclosure system. 
 
In 1990, Freedman and Wasley published the results of a comparative study that specifically 
focussed on differences between voluntary disclosures made in annual reports and the 
mandatory disclosures prescribed by the SEC in 10Ks.  The authors undertook a correlational 
analysis of voluntary environmental disclosures in annual reports and environmental 
performance.  A correlational analysis of mandatory environmental disclosures in 10Ks and 
environmental performance was also undertaken.  Environmental performance was 
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operationalised using CEP ratings as in the previous two studies.  The study covered four 
industries in selective years between 1972 and 1976.  Ninety-two percent of the correlations 
between voluntary disclosures and the CEP ratings were found to be insignificant (Freedman 
& Wasley 1990, p. 188).  Similarly, 96 per cent of the correlations relating to mandatory 
disclosures in 10Ks and the CEP ratings were not significant (Freedman & Wasley 1990, p. 
190).  These results were consistent with those obtained in the studies by both Freedman and 
Jaggi (1982) and Wiseman (1982) and the authors concluded: 
 
…that neither voluntary annual report environmental disclosures, nor mandatory 10k 
environmental disclosures are indicative of actual firm environmental performance.  
These findings may suggest the potential need to regulate voluntary annual report 
disclosures made by firms, and/or the need for the SEC to improve its mandatory 
environmental disclosure requirements to make them more indicative of actual firm 
environmental performance.  
(Freedman & Wasley 1990, p. 191) 
 
More recently, Hughes, Anderson and Golden (2001) investigated whether a change in 
disclosure requirements in the mandatory section of the annual report resulted in changes in 
disclosure practices in the voluntary sections of the annual reports of fifty-one US 
manufacturing firms.  The authors adopted similar methods to those used by Wiseman 
(1982) and Freedman and Jaggi (1986) and incorporated a content evaluation based on 
whether the disclosures were quantitative, descriptive, vague or immaterial.  These 
classifications were then weighted from four to one respectively.  They identified that 
companies were more inclined to provide information of a negative nature, such as litigation 
and the impact of environmental regulations, in the mandatory sections of the annual report.  
It was also identified, that negative issues in the mandatory section were not counter-
balanced by positive55 discussion of those same issues in the voluntary section;  however, it 
was found that poor environmental performers provided greater levels of both mandatory 
disclosures (as would be expected) and voluntary disclosures.  They concluded that users of 
reports should be made aware that voluntary disclosures provide limited information on 
actual environmental performance and that the mandatory disclosures ‘seem to convey the 
most useful insight into past environmental performance’ (Hughes, Anderson & Golden 
2001, p. 238). 
 
                                                
55 The authors use the term ‘positive’ although there was no clear indication from the research method how 
‘positive’ disclosures were identified. 
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While the results of these studies suggest that mandatory disclosures may also not be 
reflective of actual environmental performance, several issues must be addressed.  Firstly, 
the content analyses methodologies used were relatively simple.  Wiseman’s index required 
the identification of disclosures regarding various themes relating to the environment and 
pollution including economic factors, litigation, pollution abatement, and other 
environmentally related information (Wiseman 1982, p. 56).  These were then weighted in 
order of preference with monetary and quantitative measures achieving the highest weighting 
of three, followed by a score of two for non-quantitative specific information, one for general 
disclosure, and zero for no disclosure (Wiseman 1982, p. 55).  Freedman and Wasley (1990) 
and Hughes, Anderson and Golden (2001) also adopted disclosure indexes similar to that 
used by Wiseman (1982).   
 
Secondly, unlike many of the Australian studies, there was no detailed consideration of the 
quantity of the disclosures included in the analysis.  Therefore, it is not possible to conclude 
whether significant differences actually existed between the quantity of mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures of the corporations.  An extensive body of research has shown that 
corporations that may be considered poor environmental performers provide greater 
quantities of environmental disclosures (Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen & Hughes II 2004; Patten 
2002b; Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; Li, Richardson & Thornton 1997; Deegan & Rankin 
1996; Patten 1992).   
 
Furthermore, unlike many of the more recent studies, particularly those undertaken in 
Australia (Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996), the studies by Freedman and 
Jaggi (1982), Wiseman (1982) and Freedman and Wasley (1990) did not include a 
consideration of the nature of the disclosure; that is, whether the corporation is reflected 
positively, negatively or otherwise by the disclosure content.  The annual report is 
considered an important tool for corporations to communicate information to users 
(O’Donovan 1999).  Therefore, the manner in which the corporation portrays its activities in 
the report is indicative of how its management is ‘selling’ it to users.  Australian research has 
shown that voluntary disclosures in annual reports are mostly positive in nature (Deegan & 
Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996).  Thus, corporations have attempted to portray 
themselves in a positive manner when discussing issues relating to the environment. 
 
Finally, pollution or environmental performance was assessed against either mandatory or 
voluntary disclosures in the Freedman and Wasley (1990) study.  No direct comparison was 
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undertaken between the voluntary and mandatory disclosures to identify differences in 
disclosure practices under the two systems.  Consequently, when combined with an absence 
of consideration of the nature and quantity of the disclosures included in the analysis, it is 
not possible to conclude whether significant differences actually existed between disclosure 
practices where voluntary and mandatory disclosures appear in the same document. 
 
Recent research has shown that, as would be expected, corporations do provide information 
regarding environmental performance following the introduction of mandatory environmental 
reporting requirements.  Bebbington (1999) identified an improvement in the quality of 
environmental reporting following the introduction of the Green Accounts Act 1995 in 
Denmark.  The Danish Environmental Protection Agency (2000, p. 6) defines quality relating 
to the content of the reports being the existence of compulsory information, important 
environmental information and good reporting.  More than 50 per cent of Danish enterprises 
complied with these quality requirements.  The report also identified the inclusion of 
‘comprehensive voluntary information’ in the green accounts along with the compulsory 
requirements (Danish Environmental Protection Agency 2000, p. 8).  A summary of the 
inclusion of both compulsory and voluntary information is provided in Table 5. 
 
 
Table 5:  Information and disclosure type included in Danish Green Accounts 1999 
 
Information  Disclosure type 
% of 
companies 
disclosing
56
 
Statement on choice of environmental 
information 
Compulsory 
73 
Statement of significant deviations from 
previous year’s accounts 
Compulsory 
27 
Information on employee involvement Compulsory 63 
Working environment related to polluting 
substances in production processes 
Compulsory 
34 
Information on external audit Compulsory/voluntary 9 
Environment policy and goals Voluntary 52 
Negative environmental aspects Voluntary 17 
Mentions complaints form neighbours Voluntary 3 
Information on industrial accidents Voluntary 13 
   (Source: Danish Environmental Protection Agency 2000, p. 8) 
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 There is no detailed explanation why non-compliance with certain requirements occurred.  It is stated, 
however, that companies that did not comply with any of the requirements would be followed-up via 
administrative procedures (Danish Environmental Protection Agency 2000). 
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Table 5 shows that enterprises were more likely to provide positive information rather than 
negative information in both the compulsory and voluntary disclosures.  Of the compulsory 
information, 73 per cent of companies provided information on their choice of environmental 
information and 63 per cent provided information on employee involvement.  Only 34 per 
cent and 27 per cent of enterprises provided disclosures on polluting substances in production 
processes and significant deviations from previous year’s accounts respectively.  In the 
voluntary disclosures 52 per cent of enterprises discussed environmental policy and goals, 
with only 17 per cent discussing negative environmental aspects, 13 per cent discussing 
industrial accidents and three per cent mentioning complaints from neighbours.  This suggests 
that even in a compulsory disclosure environment corporations remain reluctant to provide 
negative information in reports. 
 
Similarly, Frost (2001) found a significant increase in the number of corporations discussing 
requirements to comply with, and environmental performance with respect to, environmental 
regulations following the introduction of s. 299(1)(f).  As expected, an increase in the number 
of companies reporting breaches of environmental regulations in the directors’ report was 
identified, although the number was minimal.  This could certainly be due to there being no 
breaches to report for the remaining companies; however, as discussed in chapter 2, ASIC had 
expressed leniency in prosecutions for the section’s early stages and previous empirical 
evidence has shown that companies do not favour providing negative environmental 
disclosures in annual reports (Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996). 
 
Considering the Danish experience, however, the introduction of Australian mandatory 
reporting requirements may act as a stimulus to encourage companies to reduce their impact 
on society57.  This may be achieved as companies attempt to avoid the potential scrutiny of 
their operations following the disclosure of non-compliance with environmental regulations 
within the annual report as is required by s. 299(1)(f).  Inclusion of mandatory reporting 
requirements in the annual report should provide users of the annual report with a factual 
account of the entity’s compliance with environmental regulation over each reporting period.  
                                                
57 According to Bebbington (1999) managers of corporations in Denmark suggested that the Green Accounts 
Act is a stimulus for improved environmental performance.  Forty-one percent of enterprises felt that 
environmental improvements occurred following the introduction of the green accounts (Danish 
Environmental Protection Agency 2000, p. 15).  Of these, improvements occurred in the areas of energy, 
water and waste, resource consumption, wastewater and additives, and reduced emissions to air and soil 
(Danish Environmental Protection Agency 2000); however, it is premature in the life of s. 299(1)(f) and 
beyond the scope of this thesis to determine whether its impact has resulted in an improvement in 
environmental performance.   
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Therefore, disclosure of actual environmental performance in the statutory section should 
permit users to obtain a clearer picture of corporate environmental performance than under a 
voluntary system alone.   
 
While this could be the expectation of the section, some limitations are apparent.  First, s. 
299(1)(f) only requires companies to report on whether they ‘are subject to any particular 
and significant environmental regulation under a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or 
Territory’ and ‘give details of the entity’s performance in relation to environmental 
regulation’.  Hence the scope of the requirements is relatively narrow.   
 
Second, as previously discussed, Guthrie and Parker (1990, p. 172) argue that corporations 
may adopt a minimalist approach when complying with mandatory disclosure requirements.  
These concerns were confirmed in a recent complaint from the Australian Conservation 
Foundation (ACF) to ASIC for breaches of the disclosure requirements of the section by 
Energy Resources of Australia Limited (ERA) (ACF 2005).  The ACF argue that ERA did 
not comply with the requirements of the section in its 2004 annual report following several 
breaches of the Mining Management Act (NT) and charges relating to those breaches58.  The 
ACF refers to the s. 299(1)(f) disclosures made by ERA which state that: 
 
The Ranger operation has had no detrimental impact on the surrounding environment 
over its 23 years of operation. 
 
ERA operates in accordance with relevant Federal and Territory environmental 
legislation as well as site-specific environmental licences, permits and statutory 
authorisations. 
 
Under ERA’s authorisation to operate, ERA is required to report to the Minister for 
Mines and Energy (NT), the Office of the Supervising Scientist, the Commonwealth 
Department of Industry, Science and Resources of the Northern Land Council, any 
infringements of the conditions and requirements of the authorisation.  This includes any 
incident that is a divergence from strict compliance with statutory requirements, even if 
this incident has no detrimental environmental impact.   
 
                                                
58
 The breaches related to findings by the Office of the Supervising Scientist which found that workers at the 
mine had washed and consumed contaminated water, and that a vehicle deemed to be contaminated had left the 
mine site.   
  
(96) 
96
Further details of ERA’s environmental performance are included in the Environment 
Section of the Annual Report page 13. 
(ERA Annual Report 2004, p. 21) 
 
The ACF argue that ERA failed to comply with s. 299(1)(f) in not disclosing the pending 
court cases nor the breaches which occurred during the reporting period.  In addition the 
ACF refers to a disclosure in the voluntary section of the annual report under ‘Radiation 
Management’ which simply states that ‘Improving the management of radiation at Ranger 
was a focus in 2004 following a number of highly publicised breaches of ERA procedures 
resulting in the company’s prosecution under the Mining Management Act’ (ERA Annual 
Report 2004, p. 12).  Energy Resources argued that the company could face contempt of 
court charges if it published information regarding the breaches.  The ACF complained that 
pending court action should not be considered a reason to fail to comply with the 
Corporations Act (ABC News Online, April 10, 2005). 
 
Finally, the section operates within a voluntary/mandatory system in which companies are 
able to include information in the non-statutory section of the annual report which is not 
subject to reporting requirements or regulator scrutiny59, and is provided at the discretion of 
management.  As previously discussed, voluntary disclosures can be a strategic tool used by 
management to create or alter public perceptions of a company’s environmental performance 
(O’Donovan 1999).  Therefore, where a legitimacy threat is perceived, corporations may 
provide voluntary environmental disclosures in the annual report (Zeghal & Ahmed 1990) to 
divert attention away from less favourable environmental performance information 
(Lindblom 1994).  
 
Therefore, as the scope of voluntary disclosures can be much greater than those of s. 
299(1)(f), and that mandatory disclosures may be minimal, it may be speculated that 
mandatory disclosures could be overshadowed or counteracted by the voluntary disclosures 
appearing in the annual report.  This would be of particular concern considering the original 
motivation for the inclusion of the section in the Corporations Act was to provide users of 
the annual report with information for decision purposes. 
 
Consequently, the final research objective of this thesis is to examine whether: 
 
                                                
59 See section 2.8 for information on regulatory enforcement relating to s. 299(1)(f). 
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c. there are significant differences between environmental disclosure practices in the 
voluntary sections of Australian corporate annual reports for corporations reporting 
non-compliance, and those not reporting non-compliance, with environmental 
regulations in the directors’ report pursuant to the requirements of section 299(1)(f). 
 
This objective will be addressed through a comparative examination of the nature and 
quantity of voluntary environmental disclosures in annual reports of Australian corporations 
reporting non-compliance with environmental regulation and Australian corporations 
reporting no non-compliance in annual reports pursuant to the requirements of s. 299(1)(f). 
 
 
3.9 Proposition Development of the Research Objective Relating to 
s. 299(1)(f) of the Corporations Act 
 
It has been argued that the scope of mandatory annual report reporting in Australia is limited 
to the narrow requirements of s. 299(1)(f).  In contrast, the scope of voluntary reporting is 
much greater with the decision on what and how much to disclose determined by the 
corporation.  Consequently, the current voluntary/mandatory reporting system may be seen as 
rendering mandatory disclosures impotent, particularly when companies have been required to 
disclose breaches of environmental regulation as per the section.   
 
The introduction of s. 299(1)(f) provides an opportunity to examine corporate environmental 
disclosure behaviour following the introduction of the section.  Guthrie and Parker (1990) 
argued that in a mandatory disclosure environment companies would adopt a minimalist 
approach to disclosure.  The section requires an entity to ‘give details of the entity’s 
performance in relation to environmental regulation’.  The section does not specify whether 
the details relate to information about compliance with regulations or non-compliance.  The 
AIG also recommended a minimalist approach in its guidelines released in 1999.  ASIC stated 
in practice note 68 paragraph 74 that the disclosures would not need to be as detailed as those 
given to regulatory authorities but, as stated in practice note 68 paragraph 75, that companies 
should comply ‘with the spirit as well as the terms of the law’.  Consistent with the 
expectations of Guthrie and Parker (1990) and the recommendations of the AIG, Frost (2001) 
found that while an increase in the number of corporations reporting the existence of breaches 
did occur following the implementation of the section, the number of companies providing 
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specific details of those breaches was minimal.  In addition, Frost (2001, p. 16) expressed 
concern at ‘the number of firms that opted for disclosure of environmental performance issues 
within the voluntary section of the annual report’. 
 
Prior to the introduction of s. 299(1)(f), Australian companies were found to report 
significantly high levels of positive information when voluntarily providing environmental 
information in the annual report (Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996; Guthrie & 
Parker 1990) and have continued to do so following its introduction (Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 
2002; Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000).  In addition, Deegan and Rankin (1996) identified an 
increase in the quantity of disclosures following occurrences of environmental fines and 
prosecutions60.   
 
Hence, this study will examine whether differences exist between the quantity of voluntary 
environmental disclosures by companies mentioning non-compliance and companies not 
mentioning non-compliance with environmental regulations in the directors’ report.  In 
addition, an examination of differences between the quantity of positive voluntary 
environmental disclosures of companies reporting non-compliance, and those not reporting 
non-compliance, with s. 299(1)(f) will be undertaken.  As such the following research 
propositions are stated: 
 
P3a.  Australian listed corporations reporting non-compliance in accordance with the 
requirements of s. 299(1)(f) provide greater quantities of environmental disclosures in the 
voluntary section of the annual report than companies reporting no non-compliance. 
 
P3b. Australian listed corporations reporting non-compliance in accordance with the 
requirements of s. 299(1)(f) provide greater quantities of positive environmental disclosures 
in the voluntary section of the annual report than companies reporting no non-compliance. 
 
                                                
60 Frost (2001) identified an increase in total environmental disclosures and negative environmental disclosures 
in annual reports during the period immediately following the implementation of s. 299(1)(f); however, unlike 
Deegan, Rankin and Tobin (2002), Deegan, Rankin and Voght (2000), Deegan and Gordon (1996), Deegan and 
Rankin (1996) and Guthrie and Parker (1990), Frost (2001) did not differentiate between voluntary and 
mandatory environmental disclosures. 
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3.10 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter provided an overview of theoretical perspectives commonly used in the 
voluntary environmental disclosure literature and introduced the theoretical perspective to be 
utilised in this research, being legitimacy theory.  The objectives of the thesis were outlined 
and the propositions to investigate the objectives stated. 
 
Political economy theories have largely superseded the use of economics-based theories in 
explaining the environmental disclosures practices of corporations.   Economics-based 
theories such as Positive Accounting Theory focus on self-interest and wealth maximisation 
as the sole or main objective of corporate environmental disclosure behaviour (Gray, Kouhy 
& Lavers 1995b).  In contrast, political economy theories including stakeholder and 
legitimacy theory incorporate social, political and economic factors in the analyses of 
corporate annual report disclosures (Guthrie & Parker 1990).   While it has been argued that 
legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory should be seen as overlapping perspectives (Gray, 
Kouhy & Lavers 1995b) it is an assumption of this thesis that conflicts and power relations 
between different groups within society exist; however, this thesis will not attempt to 
determine which groups are corporate stakeholders nor the power relationships that exist 
within society.   
 
Legitimacy theory has emerged as the dominant explanatory theory in the voluntary 
environmental disclosure literature (Cunningham & Gadenne; 2003; Deegan 2002; Deegan, 
Rankin & Tobin 2002; Milne & Patten 2002; O’Donovan 2002; O’Dwyer 2002; Patten 
2002a; Wilmshurst & Frost 2000; O’Donovan 1999; Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & 
Rankin 1996; Patten 1992; Patten 1991; Guthrie & Parker 1989; Tinker & Neimark 1987; 
Hogner 1982).  Legitimacy theory focuses on the corporation’s relationship with society.  
Underlying legitimacy theory is the notion of the ‘social contract’ between the corporation 
and the society within which it operates (Shocker & Sethi 1974).    Where a disparity exists 
between the norms and values of the corporation and that of society a legitimacy gap may 
occur (O’Donovan 2002).  Corporations that adopt a strategic posture to address legitimacy 
may utilise legitimating techniques that may be substantive or symbolic (Ashforth & Gibbs 
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1990).  The techniques adopted depend on whether the corporation is attempting to gain, 
maintain or repair legitimacy and the strategy adopted (O’Donovan 2002; Oliver 1991; 
Ashforth & Gibbs 1990). 
 
This thesis investigates firstly, and in comparison with the research undertaken by Patten’s 
(2002b) US study, whether there is a relationship between the level of pollution emissions 
published on the NPI and the quantity of voluntary environmental disclosures, and positive 
voluntary environmental disclosures, in annual reports.  Corporations with higher levels of 
published pollution emissions could be expected to perceive the NPI as a potential or actual 
legitimacy threat.  Where a potential or actual legitimacy threat is perceived corporations may 
attempt to reduce the threat by providing environmental disclosures in the annual report 
(Zeghal & Ahmed 1990).  This approach is considered useful in altering community 
perceptions of company performance (O’Donovan 1999) and diverting attention from less 
favourable environmental performance activities (Lindblom 1994). If these strategies were 
adopted, it would be expected that corporations facing a greater legitimacy threat from the 
NPI will provide greater quantities of voluntary environmental disclosures in annual reports; 
will have greater quantities of positive voluntary environmental disclosures in annual reports; 
and, will have greater quantities of voluntary emission disclosures in annual reports.   
 
Secondly, this research will investigate the potentially legitimising (discretionary) nature of 
voluntary environmental disclosures by examining whether environmental regulation acts as 
an impetus to changes in annual report environmental disclosure practices.  Oliver (1991) 
suggests that corporations that perceive the existence of a legitimacy threat may adopt a 
“compliance” approach.  Where this approach is adopted, the corporations would convey 
compliance with the norms, values and regulations of society in the annual report.  Therefore, 
corporations would begin to provide information relating to compliance with the NPI and 
pollution management in the annual report during the implementation period of the NPI.   
 
Finally, it investigates whether Australian corporations perceive the introduction of 
mandatory annual report disclosure requirements (s. 299(1)(f) of the Corporations Act) as a 
potential legitimacy threat.  As discussed above, where a legitimacy threat is perceived, 
corporations may provide voluntary environmental disclosures in the annual report (Zeghal & 
Ahmed 1990) and divert attention away from less favourable environmental performance 
information to more favourable performance information (Lindblom 1994).  Consequently, 
corporations required to report non-compliance with environmental regulations in the 
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directors’ report pursuant to s. 299(1)(f) may provide greater quantities of voluntary 
environmental disclosures and positive voluntary environmental disclosures than those 
reporting compliance pursuant to the section.   
 
The research method utilised to achieve the objectives outlined in this chapter will be 
discussed in chapter 4.  The chapter will commence with a discussion on selection of the 
sample corporations.  This will be followed by a detailed discussion on the content analysis 
method used by this study including reliability and validity issues.  Finally, a description of 
key variables is provided. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the research design used to address the objectives and 
test the propositions stated in chapter 3; that is, to examine corporate environmental 
disclosure practices during the implementation of the National Pollutant Inventory and the 
inclusion of section 299 (1)(f) in the Australian Corporations Law.  The chapter proceeds with 
an explanation of the sample selection process.  This is followed by a brief review of 
alternative measures of environmental disclosures adopted in previous research.  A detailed 
discussion on the content analysis method utilised including the selection of the disclosure 
medium, coding system and unit of measurement, is provided.  A description of key variables 
used in the analysis is provided, and finally, the statistical techniques utilised are outlined. 
 
4.2 Sample 
 
A purposive sampling technique was used in this study.  Purposive sampling ‘selects cases 
with a specific purpose in mind’ (Neuman 2000, p. 198).  Purposive sampling is a form of 
non-probability sampling.  In contrast to probability sampling ‘in which every member of the 
population will have a known, nonzero probability of selection’ (Zikmund 1997, p. 427), 
researchers using a non-probability sampling technique do not attempt to draw a 
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representative sample from the population.  The researcher is concerned with obtaining 
knowledge about the group being studied (Neuman 2000).  As the researcher selects the 
criteria and the elements to be included in the sample, external validity may be reduced.  
External validity is related to the ability to generalise the results of a specific research project 
in a different setting with different participants (Krippendorff 1980). Due to the arbitrary 
nature of non-probability sampling techniques there are no suitable statistical methods to 
measure random sampling error (Zikmund 1997).   
 
In order for corporations to be included in the sample of this study, they were required to meet 
several criteria, primarily: 
 
1. appearing on the National Pollutant Inventory database for the 1999–2000 reporting 
year; therefore, being subject to environmental regulations per s. 299(1)(f) of the 
Corporations Act, and; 
2. being listed corporations having annual reports available on the Connect4 database for 
the financial years ending 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000. 
 
The NPI is an external disclosure source for environmental performance information of 
Australian corporations.  According to Senator Robert Hill, former Minister for the 
Environment and Heritage, the NPI ‘allows all Australians to find out what large factories are 
discharging into the environment, as well as showing what actions a factory may be taking to 
reduce its emissions of pollution’.  In addition to being ‘an invaluable environmental 
management tool for governments’ and ‘an unprecedented information resource for the 
community’, it is also expected that the NPI will be ‘an impetus for cleaner production for 
industry’ (Hill 2000).  Companies with emission disclosures on the NPI would also have 
compliance responsibilities with environmental regulations in various jurisdictions under s. 
299(1)(f) of the Corporations Act.   Therefore, the sample was used for both the propositions 
relating to the NPI and those relating to s. 299(1)(f)61. 
 
                                                
61 A larger sample of companies required to report on s. 299(1)(f) could have been identified as many companies 
are subject to the requirements of the Corporations Act; however, for the purposes of this research it was 
necessary to identify those companies that would be subject to ‘any particular and significant environmental 
regulation under a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory’ in accordance with the requirements of s. 
299(1)(f).  Those subject to the reporting requirements of the NPI were easily identifiable as satisfying these 
criteria. 
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The resultant sample comprised twenty-five62 publicly listed companies reporting on the NPI 
in the 1999–2000 reporting year63, and with annual reports appearing on the Connect4 
database64 during the implementation period of the NPI being 1997 to 2000 inclusive65.   The 
companies came from several industries including oil and gas producers, mining, packaging 
and building materials, chemical and pharmaceutical, and food, wine and retail66.  A summary 
of the number of sample corporations from each industry is provided in Table 6: 
 
Table 6:  Industry type of sample companies 
 
Industry Groups Frequency 
Building, Packaging 2 
Chemical, Fertilizer 4 
Mining, Oil, Gas 9 
Diversified Industrial 2 
Food, Wine 5 
Timber and Board 2 
Household Goods 1 
Total 25 
 
 
Restricting the sample to those with pollution emissions recorded on the NPI resulted in a 
relatively small sample; however as shown in Table 7, sample sizes in previous research 
examining environmental disclosures based on environmental or pollution based performance 
are similar.  It should be noted, however, that many studies were undertaken in the United 
                                                
62
 Initially, twenty-six firms were identified which satisfied the dual requirements for sample selection;  
however, BHP was excluded from the sample due to extensive and continual media coverage during the test 
period relating to its activities on the Ok Tedi River in Papua New Guinea. 
63 The 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 NPI reporting periods were voluntary.  The sample was drawn from the 1999-
2000 NPI year as a larger number of companies disclosed on the NPI (25 companies) than in the 1998-1999 year 
(17 companies).   
64 The Connect4 database provides complete annual reports for the Top 500 Australian publicly listed 
companies from 1992 onward.  Reports can be searched, downloaded and printed. Connect 4 also provides a 
quick link to Australian Company websites.  A cross-referencing technique was employed to identify 
corporations that appeared on both the NPI 1999/00 (updated version as at 10
th
 May 2001) and Connect4 1997 to 
2000 databases inclusive.   
 
65 The implementation period is defined in order to address objective 1 outlined in section 3.6.  The draft 
National Environment Protection Measure for the National Pollutant Inventory was released for public comment 
by the NEPC on 12 June 1997 with details on its availability promoted in state and national newspapers.  The 
revised draft NEPM was released for further comment on 8 October 1997 with the final draft measure adopted 
by the NEPC on 27 February 1998.  The period from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999 represented the first NPI 
reporting year with 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000 being the second NPI reporting year.  
 
66 The list of sample corporations is provided in Appendix C. 
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States which has a larger number of listed corporations than Australia67.  Therefore, when 
considered in comparison to other published Australian studies (for example Deegan & 
Gordon 199668; Deegan & Rankin 1996) the sample size of twenty-five was considered 
appropriate for an Australian study.  
 
Table 7:  Summary of samples/population of previous empirical studies examining 
environmental disclosure and environmental performance relationships 
 
Author/s Year Sample size Country Industry or Sample detail 
Ingram & Frazier  1980 40 United States 
electric utilities, iron and steel, pulp and 
paper, petroleum refining 
Freedman & Jaggi  1982 31 United States 
steel, oil refining, paper and pulp, 
chemicals industries 
Wiseman  1982 26 United States steel, oil, pulp and paper industries 
Rockness  1985 26 United States steel, oil, pulp and paper industries 
Belkaoui & Karpik  1989 23 United States 1973 
Freedman & Wasley  1990 50 United States 
steel, oil, paper and pulp, electric utility 
industries 
Patten  1992 21 United States petroleum industry 
Deegan & Rankin  1996 40 Australia 
20 prosecuted and 20 not prosecuted by 
EPA 
Balabanis, Phillips 
& Lyall  
1998 56 
United 
Kingdom 
20 industries on London Stock Exchange 
Deegan, Rankin & 
Voght 
2000 41 Australia 
Companies in industries affected by 
environmental and social incidents 
Patten 2002b 131 United States 
Companies with emissions published on 
the TRI 
 
 
 
                                                
67 There are approximately 1500 listed companies in Australia. 
68 Deegan and Gordon’s (1996) initial sample was 197 firms from the Australian Graduate School of 
Management annual report file for 1991.  This sample was then reduced to those firms that provided voluntary 
environmental disclosures; however, a sample of twenty-five firms was used to determine the mean of voluntary 
environmental disclosures for the years 1980, 1985, 1988 and 1991. 
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4.3 Environmental Disclosure Measurement in Previous Research 
 
A review of past research shows several methods used to operationalise environmental or 
social disclosure variables.  The majority of studies have used content analysis techniques 
based on indexing and weighting scales (Patten 2002b; Freedman & Wasley 1990; Freedman 
& Jaggi 1982; Wiseman 1982) or unitising procedures (see Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 2002; 
Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996; Hackston 
& Milne 1996; Gray, Kouhy & Lavers 1995b; Zeghal & Ahmed 1990; Guthrie & Parker 
1989; Cowen, Ferreri & Parker 1987; Trotman & Bradley 1981; Ingram & Frazier 1980). 
 
According to Abbott and Monsen (1979) the simplest form of content analysis techniques 
identifies the presence or absence of the mention of a particular phenomenon in a document.  
They argue that this basic analysis can be increased in complexity by extending the number of 
categories or events to be identified in the document.  For example, the Beresford and Ernst 
and Ernst social disclosure ratings are based on the identification of discussion of a number of 
issues in the annual report (Abbott & Monsen 1979).  For each category, the corporation 
receives a score of zero for no disclosure and a score of one for disclosure of the issue.  The 
scores are summed over all categories to give a rating for the corporation.  This approach 
remains popular in the literature.  Li, Richardson and Thornton (1997) adopted a nominal 
measurement approach in a Canadian study.  In contrast to many studies in the literature, an 
extensive range of documents was examined including annual reports, information forms, 
quarterly reports, those required by environmental disclosure regulations and press releases.  
Again, disclosure was measured as a one for disclosure of each of the stipulated 
environmental incidents or a zero for no disclosure.  Patten (2002b) adopted a similar 
approach in an examination of changes in environmental disclosures in 10Ks in the period 
surrounding the release of the 1988 TRI data.  Sample corporations were given a score of one 
for the inclusion of any or all of eight content issues being: 
 
1. discussion or mention of specific environmental regulations; 
2. discussion or mention of the firm’s processes, facilities, or product innovations 
relative to reduction of environmental degradation; 
3. statement or discussion of the company’s concern for the environment; 
4. statement or discussion of the company’s environmental compliance status; 
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5. disclosure of current or past years’ capital expenditures for pollution control or 
abatement; 
6. disclosure of projected future capital expenditures for pollution control or abatement; 
7. disclosure of current or past years’ operating costs for pollution control or abatement; 
8. disclosure of projected future operating costs for pollution control or abatement. 
 (Patten 2002b, pp. 772-773) 
 
As a result, corporations scored between zero for no disclosure and up to eight for inclusion of 
all items.  The “presence or absence” method is useful in identifying the mention of some 
environmentally related issues in the annual report; however, the method does not consider 
the quantity and quality of disclosures, and the importance of particular types of disclosures to 
users.   
 
One of the earliest studies to also consider quality of disclosures was Wiseman (1982) who 
used content analysis based on both an indexing and disclosure rating system.  As displayed 
in Table 8, eighteen items of information were included in the index from four broad 
categories – economic factors, environmental litigation, pollution abatement items and other 
environmental items.  Annual reports were examined for the existence of disclosure relating 
to the information items.  The disclosures present in the report were then quality-rated 
according to the extent of specificity in the disclosure.  Disclosures that were monetary or 
quantitative scored the highest score of three.  Information specific to the company but 
presented in non-quantitative terms scored a rating of two, with a rating of one for items 
discussed in general terms.  Freedman and Wasley (1990) and Patten (1992) also based their 
content analysis approach on that used by Wiseman (1982).  
 
Table 8:  Index and weighting scheme by Wiseman (1982) 
 
Disclosure type Weight 
Monetary or qualitative 3.0 
Non-quantitative specific 2.0 
General  1.0 
No disclosure  0.0 
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Freedman and Jaggi (1982) used an index and weighting scale in an analysis examining the 
association between corporate pollution disclosures, pollution performance, and economic 
performance.  The authors, however, focussed on pollution related information in the 
disclosure analysis and as a result the number of items identified were fewer than those 
included by Wiseman (1982).  Freedman and Jaggi (1982) categorised and weighted 
disclosure items according to the scale in Table 9. 
 
 Table 9:  Index and weighting scheme by Freedman and Jaggi (1982) 
 
Disclosure item Weights 
EPA standards for current emissions and firm’s performance 2.5 
Future capital expenditures 2.0 
Current capital expenditures 1.5 
Past capital expenditures 1.5 
Descriptive with percentage 0.5 
Descriptive 0.5 
 
 
As noted above, the authors not only distinguished between monetary disclosures and 
descriptive disclosures, but also weighted the monetary disclosures according to whether they 
related to past, current or future capital expenditures.  The inclusion of time-related categories 
is similar to the approach adopted by Ingram and Frazier (1980). 
 
While these methods appear useful in identifying the presence of items important to the 
researcher’s analysis, they do not examine the quantity of disclosures in the annual report 
relating to particular issues; that is, company A may provide one sentence whereas Company 
B may provide six sentences.  Thus, this method does not allow for differences in disclosure 
practices in terms of quantity (see section 4.4.2 for discussion on quantity of disclosure).  
Furthermore, the rating system is ‘subject to a certain degree of arbitrariness’ (Wiseman 1982, 
p. 55).  Consequently, the importance of the type of disclosure in a rating system is, to an 
extent, subjective.   
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4.4 Content Analysis 
 
Consistent with previous research, content analysis was used in this study to examine the 
environmental disclosures of the sample companies from annual reports in the associated 
periods.  Content analysis is described as ‘a research technique for making replicable and 
valid inferences from data to their context’ (Krippendorff 1980, p. 21).  Ingram and Frazier 
(1980) explain that content analysis is distinguishable from other textual analysis techniques 
as it allows the text to be reduced to a quantitative form.   
 
Krippendorff (1980) proposes several advantages of using content analysis.  Firstly, content 
analysis is a non-reactive or unobtrusive technique.  An important factor of non-reactive 
research is that the person, group or organisation being studied is not aware of that fact 
(Neuman 2000).  Instead, the object of the study behaves “naturally” and the researcher is left 
with documents, text, video or verbal communication for analysis.  Non-reactive research 
avoids the effects of non-response, interviewer and social desirability bias which may occur 
when using questionnaires or conducting interviews (Neuman 2000).  Secondly, the 
researcher can accept data in many forms (Krippendorff 1980) which is useful where the 
information sought by the researcher may exist in a variety of forms.  For example, 
corporations may release environmental information through mediums such as annual reports, 
websites, press releases, verbal statements or advertisements.  Thirdly, content analysis allows 
the researcher to investigate not only the number of times a particular phenomenon occurs but 
also allows an investigation of the underlying meaning or context of the material being 
examined (Krippendorff 1980).  The flexibility to delve deeper into the material expands the 
scope of the analysis where required; that is, the researcher can use content analysis to 
varying degrees from simply counting the occurrence of a particular word or phrase to 
seeking underlying themes and meanings within statements.  Finally, large quantities of data 
can be analysed using content analysis across a variety of mediums.  Consequently, the 
techniques for ensuring replicability in the content analysis process means that more than one 
coder can be used to analyse the material. 
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4.4.1 Disclosure medium 
 
Krippendorff (1980) suggests that the selection of documents to be used in content analysis is 
an important stage.  In previous research investigating corporate social and environmental 
disclosures, a range of disclosure mediums has been used either individually or in 
combination of several mediums.  These include annual reports (see authors below), 10-Ks69 
and environmental reports (Harte & Owen 1991; Freedman & Wasley 1990; Freedman & 
Jaggi 1982), advertisements and brochures (Zeghal & Ahmed 1990), and media reports 
(Brown & Deegan 1998).  Corporations may also disclose information on websites, CD 
ROMs and videos (Department of Environment and Heritage 2005; Zeghal & Ahmed 1990). 
 
A frequently used document in previous corporate disclosure research has been the annual 
report (Unerman 2000).  Annual reports have been used as the source of environmental 
disclosure information with or without the inclusion of other documents (see for example Al-
Tuwaijri, Christensen & Hughes II 2004; Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 2002; Deegan, Rankin & 
Voght 2000; Hai, Foo, Tan & Yap 1998; Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996; 
Gibson & Guthrie 1995; Patten 1992; Freedman & Wasley 1990; Guthrie & Parker 1989; 
Freedman & Jaggi 1988; Rockness 1985; Freedman & Jaggi 1982; Hogner 1982; Wiseman 
1982; Ingram & Frazier 1980; Ingram 1978; Belkaoui 1976).  
 
It is acknowledged that other disclosure instruments may be used by companies and that a 
minimal amount of a company’s corporate social reporting may occur in published annual 
reports (Unerman 2000); however, the annual report has been considered a useful instrument 
for the dissemination of information to stakeholders (Zeghal & Ahmed 1990).  Furthermore, 
attempting to capture all communications from an organisation in an extensive or non-
exhaustive range of documents may be problematic (Zeghal & Ahmed 1990). 
 
In addition to being a useful medium for the dissemination of information by the corporation, 
the annual report was noted in earlier research as a significant source of environmental 
information for users (Deegan & Rankin 1997; Tilt 1994). Deegan and Rankin (1997) 
surveyed users to determine whether they believed environmental information was material, if 
                                                
69
 Regulated environmental reports to be provided with annual reports filed with the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission. 
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they sought environmental information in annual reports and whether the annual report was 
the main information source for environmental information.  A questionnaire was forwarded 
to shareholders, stockbrokers/research analysts, representatives of financial institutions, 
accounting academics, and organisations that perform a review or oversight function. Overall, 
a significant proportion of respondents believed that environmental issues were material to 
decision-making.  The strongest supporters of the materiality of environmental disclosures 
were organisations conducting a review function (83 per cent) followed by shareholders (72.4 
per cent) and financial institutions (66.7 per cent) (Deegan & Rankin 1997, p. 573).  A 
significant proportion of respondents indicated that they sought environmental information 
from annual reports with review organisations (83 per cent) and shareholders (73.3 per cent) 
again providing the greatest support (Deegan & Rankin 1997, p. 573).  Furthermore, the 
respondents identified the annual report as the most significant source of environmental 
information.  Other sources of environmental information, although significantly less 
favoured than the annual report, were the separate environmental report and media sources 
(Deegan & Rankin 1997). 
 
Gray, Kouhy and Lavers (1995b, p. 82) provide an explanation for the popularity of the 
annual report as both an information source for stakeholders and as an instrument for 
management to communicate to stakeholders: 
 
The construction of the financial image of the organisation is critical in terms of how the 
organisation is seen and judged.  The social and environmental factors frequently will 
produce conflicts with the financial ambitions of the organisation and its owners.  The 
presentation, within the same document or reporting process, of the financial on the one 
hand and the social and environmental on the other, becomes an important element in 
demonstrating the extent (if at all) to which the organisation reconciles these matters. 
 
Furthermore, the annual report has been the most frequently used medium in environmental 
disclosure research.  For example, Unerman (2000, p. 668) showed that seventeen out of 
twenty-five studies examined used the annual report and accounts as the only documents 
analysed.  In addition, s. 299(1)(f) of the Corporations Act requires disclosure relating to 
environmental regulation to be provided in the directors’ report of the annual report.  
Consequently, the annual report was selected as the sole medium of environmental disclosures 
for this study.  The use of annual reports also allows the results of this study to be comparable 
with previous research in the field.   
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4.4.2 Units of analysis 
 
Content analysis is a process of turning the content of documents or other media into ‘precise, 
objective, quantitative data’ (Neuman 2000, p. 294).  In order to quantify the content of 
documents, the researcher must develop a coding system and decide on the unit of 
measurement for the analysis (Krippendorff 1980).   
 
First the researcher using content analysis must select the recording units to be coded in the 
analysis (Holsti 1969).  The recording unit is that which identifies the themes of interest to the 
researcher.  Second, the researcher must select the unit of measurement (or enumeration) with 
which to quantify the results. 
 
Several researchers have discussed the advantages and disadvantages of using specific units 
for recording and measurement (Unerman 2000; Milne & Adler 1999; Hackston & Milne 
1996; Gray, Kouhy & Lavers 1995b).  Units included in content analysis techniques of social 
disclosures used and discussed in past studies include number of words (Deegan & Gordon 
1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996; Zeghal & Ahmed 1990), number of sentences (Deegan, 
Rankin & Tobin 2002; Tilt 2001; Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; Hackston & Milne 1996; 
Ingram & Frazier 1980), number of pages (Cowen, Ferreri & Parker 1987), percentage of 
pages (Unerman 2000; Gray, Kouhy & Lavers 1995a; 1995b; Guthrie & Parker 1989) and 
percentage of total disclosure (Trotman & Bradley 1981).   
 
As discussed above, Holsti (1969) makes a clear distinction between the selection of the 
initial recording unit and the unit of enumeration (measurement) used in the content analysis 
process; however, Milne and Adler (1999) note that many studies using content analysis fail 
to distinguish between the unit used in the identification and coding stage (the initial 
recording unit) and the unit used for the quantification of those disclosures (the unit of 
measurement)70.  The researcher should select a recording and/or measurement unit consistent 
with the underlying objectives of the content analysis.  For example, words can be the most 
reliable unit of measurement for a researcher seeking the frequency with which a company 
uses the word “environment” in an annual report (Neuman 2000; Milne & Adler 1999); 
                                                
70
 This was further identified during the literature review of this thesis.  Not only do a number of authors fail to 
distinguish between recording and measurement units, it was also identified that the terminology is often used 
interchangeably. 
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however, if the researcher is using a content analysis technique to determine the underlying 
themes or direction of disclosures, attention must be paid to the meaning of the disclosures.   
Hence, for the purposes of this research, consideration was given to the most appropriate 
recording unit for the identification of themes and nature of disclosure, and the most 
appropriate measurement unit for quantifying disclosure. 
 
Sentences have been proposed as the preferred recording unit in content analysis by several 
authors (Milne & Adler 1999; Hackston & Milne 1996; Ingram & Frazier 1980).  Ingram and 
Frazier (1980) used sentences as the recording (and measurement) unit arguing that ‘a 
sentence is easily identified, is less subject to interjudge variation than phrases, clauses, or 
themes, and has been evaluated as an appropriate unit in previous research’ (p. 617).  
Hackston and Milne (1996) suggested that agreement between coders should be higher when 
using sentences as perceptions of the meaning of words may differ between coders.  Based on 
such arguments it is suggested that it is best to use sentences as the recording unit (Milne & 
Adler 1999).  Consequently, sentences were adopted as the recording unit in identifying 
themes and nature of disclosure for this research. 
 
As discussed above, an important assumption of environmental disclosure research using 
content analysis is that the quantity of disclosures on a particular theme or event is 
representative of the importance of that theme or event (Unerman 2000; Gray, Kouhy & 
Lavers 1995b; Krippendorff 1980).  Unerman (2000) argues that percentage or proportion of a 
page is the most appropriate unit of measurement for content analysis. He argues that the use 
of words and sentences excludes important information contained within photographs, graphs 
or charts.  It is also suggested that font size and typeface can be an indicator of the importance 
of an issue.  Considering the assumption that the amount of disclosure signifies the level of 
importance of an event or theme, he suggests that using measures such as words or sentences 
that ignore certain disclosures violates this assumption.  Gray, Kouhy and Lavers (1995b) 
suggest that the use of pages as the unit of measurement is easier, and consequently, yields 
greater reliability. They acknowledge, however, that in some circumstances the use of page 
measurements may result in decreased validity due to the loss of detail from using this 
measure71.   
 
                                                
71 Furthermore, the use of the Connect4 database in this research, which reduces the annual report to a 
standardised Microsoft Word document for the 1997 – 2000 years, removes graphical images including pictures, 
photographs and other formatting from the analysis. 
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Milne and Adler (1999) suggest that sentences should be the preferred unit of measurement in 
content analysis.  They argue that quantification errors are less likely to occur when using 
sentences as the number of words in a document is greater than the number of sentences 
(Milne & Adler 1999); however, Deegan and Gordon (1996) argue that words provide better 
detail than sentences when measuring the actual volume of disclosures. 
 
The number of words has been used as the unit of measurement in several studies (Deegan & 
Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996; Zeghal & Ahmed 1990).  The use of words has been 
criticised as decreasing reliability and providing meaningless results or measures, particularly 
during the coding stage (Milne & Adler 1999); however, the effect on reliability is dependent 
upon the objectives of the research and the content analysis technique adopted.  Krippendorff 
(1980, p. 61) explains that words are a ‘syntactical unit’ and subjectivity in determining their 
meaning is not required.  Also, words are the smallest and therefore the safest unit for 
quantification purposes in written documents (Krippendorff 1980).   Therefore, while 
sentences were adopted as the recording unit, the unit of measurement for this research was 
number of words. 
 
Once the recording and measurement units were defined, the information provided in the 
annual reports of the twenty-five sample companies was examined to ascertain the theme, 
nature and quantity of environmental disclosures. This integrated approach is adopted from 
the methods in previous empirical studies into social and environmental disclosures involving 
analysis of annual report and accounts information (Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & 
Rankin 1996; Gibson & Guthrie 1995; Patten 1992; Freedman & Wasley 1990; Guthrie & 
Parker 1989; Freedman & Jaggi 1982; Hogner 1982; Wiseman 1982; Ingram & Frazier 1980; 
Ingram 1978).  Milne and Adler (1999) suggest that the use of categories that include the 
dimensions of evidence and news potentially increases the understanding of disclosure 
practices.   
 
Firstly, themes were identified from the annual reports based on the propositions outlined in 
chapter 3.  The major theme categories included primary and sub-category themes being: 
 
• total voluntary environmental disclosures, including;  
  voluntary emission disclosures; and 
o voluntary NPI disclosures.   
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• mandatory environmental disclosures. 
 
Mandatory environmental disclosures (P3a and P3b) were those presented in the directors’ 
report in compliance with the requirements of s. 299(1)(f) of the Corporations Act.  Voluntary 
environmental disclosures were identified as those environmental disclosures not appearing in 
the directors’ report.  While several authors provide definitions of the nature of environmental 
disclosures (Brown & Deegan 1998; Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996), there 
are few authors who provide a definition of an “environmental” disclosure.  
 
Hackston and Milne (1996), Deegan, Rankin and Tobin (2002) and Patten (2002b) did 
provide an explanation of disclosure categories used to determine environmental performance, 
including environmental pollution.  Patten’s categories were outlined earlier in this chapter 
and were particular to US disclosure requirements.  Hackston and Milne (1996), in a New 
Zealand study, provided a detailed checklist of environmental disclosures. Deegan, Rankin 
and Tobin (2002) also adopted the Hackston and Milne (1996) guidelines in an Australian 
study which distinguished both environmental performance and pollution categories. 
Consequently, the Hackston and Milne guidelines were considered most relevant to the 
requirements of this research.  The pollution categories formed the basis to identify voluntary 
emission disclosures for P1c and P2b.  Therefore, voluntary emission disclosures were 
identified as those not appearing in the directors’ report72 or the corporate governance 
statement as per the requirements of Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Listing Rule 4.10.373 
and meeting the following criteria: 
 
• pollution control in the conduct of the business operations; capital, operating and 
research and development expenditures for pollution abatement; 
• statements indicating that the company’s operations are non-polluting or that they are 
in compliance with pollution laws and regulations (including the NPI); 
                                                
72
 See Divisions 1 and 2 of Part 2M.3 of the Corporations Act re requirements on directors’ report. Also see 
section 2.8 for details on regulatory environmental disclosure requirements per s. 299(1)(f).  It should be noted 
that corporations may also provide voluntary information in the statutory sections of the annual report; however, 
to determine what is voluntary and what is statutory disclosure in the statutory section requires a detailed 
knowledge of all statutory reporting requirements that a corporation is subject to and the corporation’s actual 
performance in relation to such reporting requirements.  This was considered beyond the scope of this thesis and, 
consequently, no attempt was made to identify voluntary disclosures which may appear in the statutory sections 
of the annual report. 
73
  The ASX released Listing Rule 4.10.3 in 1995 which required the inclusion of a separate section on corporate 
governance issues to be included in the annual report as of the 30 June 1996.  Listing Rule 4.10.3 was 
superseded by new requirements effective 1 January 2003. 
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• statements indicating that pollution from operations has been or will be reduced; 
• prevention or repair to the environment resulting from pollution, emissions to land, air 
or water; 
• conservation of natural resources such as recycling glass, metals, oil, water and paper; 
• using recycled materials; 
• efficiently using materials resources in the manufacturing process; 
• supporting anti-litter campaigns; 
• preventing waste. 
 
Voluntary NPI disclosures (P2a) were specific to this study and were identified as those 
voluntary disclosures: 
 
• directly mentioning or discussing the NPI; 
• providing discussion directly relating to the NPI such as future or current compliance 
with the NPI. 
 
Total voluntary environmental disclosures (P1a and P1b) comprised the voluntary emission 
disclosure categories in addition to the following categories derived from Hackston and Milne 
(1996): 
 
• statements relating to compliance with environmental regulations; 
• prevention of damage to the environment or repair of subsequent damage; 
• awards relating to environmental performance; 
• contributions to environmentally related organisations; 
• discussion of wildlife conservation; 
• discussion of environmental impact studies; 
• training of employees in relation to environmental management. 
 
An additional category was included for a statement or discussion of environmental policy 
(Patten 2002b). 
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Sections relating to the themes were colour-highlighted on electronic copies of the annual 
reports during the coding process to permit easy identification during the quantification 
process74.  The annual reports were then re-searched and re-read to ensure that all 
environmental disclosures were captured during the earlier search procedures. 
 
The theme categories were further classified according to the nature of the disclosure; that is, 
whether the disclosure was negative, neutral or positive in its reflection of the organisation’s 
approach to environmental issues (P1b and P3b).  The adoption of the positive/negative, and 
good news/bad news category has been used by several researchers (Gray, Kouhy & Lavers 
1995b; Hogner 1982) and particularly in Australian studies (Brown & Deegan 1998; Deegan 
& Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996; Guthrie & Parker 1989).  Deegan, Rankin and 
Tobin (2002) also include a neutral category in circumstances where it cannot be determined 
whether the disclosure is positive or negative.   
 
Brown and Deegan (1998) and Deegan, Rankin and Tobin (2002) categorise the nature of 
disclosures in accordance with the information the social or environmental disclosure refers to 
and whether the information has a positive/beneficial, negative/deleterious impact upon 
society.  That is, positive, negative or neutral refers to the nature of the activity discussed and 
its impact on society.  Alternatively, Deegan and Gordon (1996) categorise the disclosure 
according to whether the disclosure presents the company ‘as operating in harmony with the 
environment’ or ‘as operating to the detriment of the natural environment’ (Deegan & Gordon 
1996, p. 189).  This approach does not require an analysis of whether the type of issues being 
discussed are positive or negative, but rather the way the corporation portrays itself to users of 
the annual report.  The Deegan, Rankin and Tobin (2002) approach is adopted for this study.  
Therefore, the categories for nature of disclosure were: 
 
• Positive:  provides information about environmental activities which have a positive or 
beneficial impact on society; 
• Negative:  provides information about environmental activities which have a negative 
or detrimental impact on society; 
                                                
74 Two coders were employed in this research.  The author was the principal coder.  The second coder was a 
Professor in Accounting. 
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• Neutral: provides information about environmental activities which cannot be 
determined as having either a positive or negative impact on society. 
 
This approach is considered useful as companies may attempt to “gloss over” events that are 
negative and attempt to make those events appear minimal or even favourable to readers 
(Rockness 1985). 
 
Initially, the principal coder undertook test codes on sample annual reports to develop the 
coding instrument.  This process was repeated to refine the instrument and identify ambiguity 
during the process.  As sentences were defined as the recording unit, it was identified during 
the instrument refinement process that several companies disclosed both negative and positive 
information in the same sentence.  This phenomenon led to a fourth classification of 
positive/negative being included in the worksheet.   
 
Although an increase in the number of categories used in content analysis may also increase 
subjectivity and reduce reliability, it also provides the researcher with greater detail on the 
content of the material (Krippendorff 1980). Therefore, greater detail was considered 
necessary to permit a more accurate representation of disclosure practices, following the 
implementation of the NPI and the introduction of the mandatory environmental disclosure 
requirement of s. 299(1)(f). 
 
4.4.3 Reliability in content analysis 
 
In general, reliability is ‘the degree to which measures are free from error and therefore yield 
consistent results’ (Zikmund 1997).  It is necessary to ascertain the reliability of data collected 
using content analysis to ensure that results may be replicated and any inferences drawn from 
the results are valid (Milne & Adler 1999; Krippendorff 1980).  As Krippendorff explains 
(1980, p. 21): 
 
Any instrument of science is expected to be reliable.  More specifically, when other 
researchers, at different points in time and perhaps under different circumstances, apply 
the same technique to the same data, the results must be the same.  This is the 
requirement of a content analysis to be replicable. 
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Holsti (1969, p. 142) argues that a researcher using content analysis may need to determine a 
‘balance between reliability and relevance of categories and units; the co-efficient of 
reliability cannot be the sole criterion for making such decisions’.  Krippendorff (1980) 
describes three types of reliability issues to be considered in content analysis — stability, 
reproducibility and accuracy.  Each type differs in research design, the errors assessed and the 
strength as a reliability measure.   
 
Stability is defined as ‘the degree to which a process is invariant or unchanging over time’ 
(Krippendorff 1980, p. 130).  Stability, also referred to as ‘intra-observer reliability’, is the 
weakest of the reliability measures and is assessed in a test-retest design involving an 
individual coder (Neuman 2000).  Krippendorff (1980) warns that stability should not be used 
as the only indicator of the reliability of a content analysis process.   
 
Reproducibility reliability refers to the ability of different coders to reproduce the same results 
on the same data set (Krippendorff 1980).  Reproducibility identifies both intra-observer 
inconsistencies and inter-observer disagreements in the content analysis process.  
Reproducibility is evaluated using a test-test design and provides a higher level of reliability 
than stability.  For the analysis to have reproducibility the coders must be independent 
(Krippendorff 1980). 
 
The strongest type of reliability test is accuracy (Krippendorff 1980). Accuracy requires the 
comparison of coder performance or the instrument against a predetermined standard that 
should represent the expected correct performance.  Consequently, the accuracy test of 
reliability assesses ‘intra-observer inconsistencies, inter-observer disagreements, and 
systematic deviations from the standard’ (Krippendorff 1980, p. 131). 
 
Holsti (1969) suggests several approaches for increasing reliability in category-based content 
analysis.  First, the researcher can rigidly define the content analysis categories using 
exhaustive definitions; however, this effectively narrows the method to be a simple search for 
specific words and symbols.  Second, he suggests (1969, p. 137) that ‘requiring judges to 
make fine discriminations between subcategories often results in a high incidence of 
disagreement’.  In such circumstances Holsti suggests that if the distinctions between the 
subcategories ‘are not of major theoretical significance’ the aggregation of some 
subcategories may increase reliability.  Thirdly, the use of dichotomous decision methods and 
more than one coder increases reliability. 
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To enhance the reliability of the coding instrument, a second coder was employed to 
independently undertake a proportion of the content analysis task, with a view to later 
examining the amount of inter-coder agreement.  Consequently, reproducibility was targeted 
as the required level of reliability.  Initially, the two coders coded the annual reports from 
1997 to 2000 of four of the sample companies (a total of sixteen test-coded annual reports) 
separately.  Following the initial sample coding the coders discussed any differences in 
coding results.  The coding instrument and instructions were refined until a high level of 
agreement was achieved75. This approach is a better indication of the reliability of the data 
than a pre-test/post-test as ‘it is sensitive to more than the internal noise or inconsistencies of 
one coder’ (Krippendorff 1980, p. 130).   
 
Milne and Adler (1999) reported inconsistencies in both the methodologies used by 
researchers to determine the level of reliability in content analyses and the reporting of 
reliability issues when discussing empirical research.  The degree to which reliability issues 
have been considered in the literature is varied.  For example, Gray, Kouhy and Lavers 
(1995b, p. 86) state that reliability was determined ‘intuitively rather than claiming any 
statistical legitimation, to be within quite acceptable bounds’.  While Gray, Kouhy and Lavers 
(1995b) discuss the instrument development process in detail, many early studies provide 
minimal information on issues to address reliability.  Freedman and Jaggi (1982) do not 
provide any discourse addressing reliability.  In a later study, Freedman and Wasley (1990) 
mention the use of multiple coders but again do not mention any issues regarding reliability or 
why multiple coders were used.  Other authors mention the use of multiple coders to reduce 
‘arbitrariness’ (Patten 1992, 1991; Wiseman 1982); however, the extent to which reliability 
measures are reported in some earlier studies is reflected in Patten (1991, p. 302) who states 
that ‘the independent reviewer and myself addressed and reconciled any differences’.  Deegan 
and Rankin (1996) and Deegan and Gordon (1996) discuss the limitations of content analysis 
being, primarily, the ‘necessary element of subjectivity involved in determining what 
constitutes a particular type of disclosure’ and that ‘the significance of a disclosure can be 
meaningfully represented by the quantity of disclosures’ (Deegan & Gordon 1996, p. 189).  In 
contrast, Hackston and Milne (1996) discussed in detail issues relating to reliability and the 
use of statistical reliability measures including Scotts pi and Krippendorff’s alpha.  Milne and 
Adler’s (1999) criticisms of researchers’ failure to report on reliability issues and reliability 
measures in the literature have resulted in an increase in reliability measures being used and 
                                                
75 Further detail and reliability tests are presented later in this section. 
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discussed in research.  Recent studies now report both issues relating to reliability in content 
analysis and the use of statistical measures of reliability (Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 2002; Tilt 
2001).  
 
There are several methods for determining the level of reliability in content analysis research 
(Milne & Adler 1999; Krippendorff 1980; Holsti 1969); however, no one method is declared 
as the perfect reliability measure for all situations.  Milne and Adler (1999) argue that the 
researcher must consider the reliability measure most suited to the research. 
 
Correlational coefficients are not considered useful measures of reliability as ‘identical 
frequency tabulations do not necessarily indicate a high level of agreement’ (Holsti 1969, p. 
139).  As such, while the coders may report similar numbers of sentences identified in each 
category, reliability coefficients do not report agreement on individual sentences within the 
document.  It is therefore necessary that each coding decision by each coder for each sentence 
be identified.  Milne and Adler (1999, p. 242) explain: 
 
[Calculation of] any of the measures of reliability requires the total number of coding 
decisions each coder makes, and the coding outcome of every one of those coding 
decisions be known.  This applies not only to the sentences that each coder decides are 
social and environmental disclosures, but also to those that they decide are not social and 
environmental disclosures…Coding reliability requires that the same sentences are 
coded in the same way by each and every coder. 
 
Two measures of reliability were utilised in this study – the coefficient of reliability and 
Scott’s pi.  Holsti describes the basic content analysis reliability coefficient as being (1969, p. 
140) ‘the ratio of coding agreements to the total number of coding decisions’.  The formula is 
stated as follows: 
 
Coefficient of reliability = 2M/(N1 + N2)  
 
M is the number of coding decisions that the coders agree upon and N1 and N2 represent the 
total number of coding decisions made by each of the judges.  Calculation of the coefficient of 
reliability for the sixteen76 test-coded annual reports resulted in a result of 98.2 per cent 
agreement (rounded); however, this method does not take into account the number of coding 
                                                
76 Four companies with annual reports from each of the years 1997 to 2000 inclusive. 
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agreements occurring as a result of chance (Holsti 1969).  Krippendorff (1980, p. 133) 
explains that: 
 
Reliability is expressed as a function of the agreement achieved among coders regarding 
the assignment of units to categories.  If agreement among coders is not better than 
chance, which might be observed when coders do not care to examine the units or 
instead throw a die to decide on category assignments, reliability is absent. Whether 
reliability takes the form of stability, reproducibility, or accuracy, it always boils down 
to measuring the agreement achieved among observers, coders, or judges regarding how 
they independently process scientific information. 
 
Holsti (1969) argues that as the number of categories in the analysis increases the possibility 
of agreement by chance alone decreases.  Scott’s pi corrects for both the number of categories 
used and the probable frequency that each category will be used.  Scott’s pi takes into account 
the possibility of chance and may be used for nominal, ordinal, interval or ratio scale data. 
 
Scott’s pi = (% of observed agreement - % expected agreement)/(1 - % of 
expected agreement) 
 
The percentage of observed agreement is equal to the coefficient of reliability.  Expected 
agreement is equal to the sum of the squared proportions with which items are assigned to 
each category in the content analysis process.  The average expected agreement of the two 
coders was calculated as 89.6 per cent rounded.  Overall, 5885 sentences were coded from the 
sixteen test annual reports.  The coders disagreed on the coding of 79 sentences and the 
inclusion of 27 sentences.  Therefore, reliability using Scott’s pi was calculated at 82.6 per 
cent above chance. Acceptable levels of reliability are considered to be 80 per cent above 
chance (Hackston & Milne 1996, p. 87). 
 
4.5 Variable Measurement 
 
Several variables were operationalised in this research to test the propositions identified in 
chapter 3.  Descriptions of those variables are summarised in the following section. 
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4.5.1 Mandatory disclosures  
 
Environmental disclosures appearing in the statutory directors’ report of the annual report 
were classified as mandatory disclosures for the purposes of this study (descriptive statistics 
relating to P3a and P3b)77.  That is, those in compliance with the requirements of section 299 
(1)(f) of the Corporations Act which states that the company’s directors’ report for the 
financial year must: 
 
‘if the entity’s operations are subject to any particular and significant environmental 
regulation under a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory – give details of 
the entity’s performance in relation to environmental regulation’ 
 
4.5.2 Voluntary environmental disclosures/voluntary emission 
disclosures/voluntary NPI Disclosures 
 
For the purposes of this study (P1a, P1b, P1c, P2a, P2b, P3a and P3b), voluntary 
environmental/emission/NPI disclosures are those not appearing in the statutory directors’ 
report as required by s. 299 (1)(f) of the Corporations Act and excepting those in the corporate 
governance statement as per the requirements of ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3.  Ullmann (1985, p. 
554) argues that ‘differentiation is needed between mandated and voluntary social 
performance activities’ to improve the methodological process in social performance, social 
disclosure and economic performance research; however, only a limited number of studies 
make this distinction.  Wiseman (1982, p. 31) describes voluntary environmental disclosures 
as those existing in the absence of ‘a measurement and reporting system to account for 
corporate environmental performance’.   
 
Freedman and Wasley (1990) examined both voluntary and mandatory environmental 
disclosures.  They suggest that disclosures in 10k reports are mandatory being regulated by 
the SEC.  On the other hand, they classify disclosures in company annual reports as being 
                                                
77
 It should be noted that corporations may also provide voluntary environmental disclosures in the directors’ 
report; however, to determine what is voluntary and what is statutory disclosure pertaining to s. 299(1)(f) 
requires a detailed knowledge of actual performance in relation to the reporting requirement, and the 
corporation’s interpretation of the section.  This was considered beyond the scope of this thesis and, 
consequently, no attempt was made to identify voluntary disclosures which may appear in the statutory sections 
of the annual report. 
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voluntary (that is, unregulated).  In an Australian study, prior to the amendment of the 
Corporations Law to include s. 299(1)(f), Deegan and Gordon (1996) described 
environmental disclosures as voluntary in the absence of mandatory or professional 
requirements for firms to disclose environmental initiatives.  Therefore, the voluntary 
environmental disclosure variable was operationalised in a manner consistent with 
descriptions provided by Wiseman (1982), Freedman and Wasley (1990), and Deegan and 
Gordon (1996).   
 
4.5.3 Information content of NPI/pollution emission disclosures 
 
It is acknowledged that quantity of disclosures is a measure of the importance of an issue to 
an organisation (Krippendorff 1980).  Consequently, several researchers have used changes in 
the quantity of environmental disclosures over a given period as being representative of the 
desire of corporations to legitimate environmental performance to users of the annual report 
(Brown & Deegan 1998; Deegan & Rankin 1996; Patten 1992).  It may be argued, however, 
that a change in the quantity of environmental disclosures alone may not be the only 
indication of a phenomenon that a corporation perceives to be a threat to legitimacy.  For the 
purposes of this study, it was also considered necessary to examine the information content of 
disclosures relating both directly and/or indirectly to the expected legitimacy threat, that is, 
the NPI.  While the more detailed content analysis technique described above forms a major 
analysis of this study, a nominal yes/no measure was also used to identify the existence of 
particular disclosures in the annual report (P2b and descriptive purposes).  These included: 
 
§ discuss/mention emissions for each year; 
§ provide a table of emissions for each year; 
§ mention the NPI for each year; 
§ describe the NPI for each year; 
§ mention NPI available on the web for each year; 
§ state URL of the NPI for each year. 
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4.5.4 NPI pollution emission quantities  
 
Early empirical studies utilised pollution performance rankings provided by the Council on 
Economic Priorities (Freedman & Wasley 1990; Freedman & Jaggi 1982; Wiseman 1982; 
Ingram & Frazier 1980) obtaining inconsistent results. 
 
Ullmann (1985, p. 555) suggested the use of ‘physical pollution data filed with EPA’ as a 
methodological improvement for studies examining corporate social performance.  Patten 
(2002b, p. 766) operationalised environmental performance using the United States Toxic 
Release Inventory (TRI) data.  He argues that TRI data provides more meaningful results as: 
 
1. it represents reported emissions of chemicals by the corporations themselves; 
2. the same/similar measures are required for all TRI reporting entities; and 
3. it allows access to a diverse sample of firms. 
 
For the purposes of this research, consideration was initially given to a measure in which the 
quantities of reportable substances were adjusted using the NPI substance rating system to 
represent the health and environmental impact of each.  Operationalisation of the variable in 
this manner was determined to be inappropriate, however, based on four factors.    
 
First, the substance rating system adopted by the NPI was not considered to be a precise 
indicator of the substances potential hazardous effects. The NPI utilised a rating system in 
which substances were scored based on human health, environment and exposure effects, with 
each provided a score ranging from zero to three with zero being lowest toxicity and three 
being highest toxicity.  The health and environment scores were summed and then multiplied 
by the exposure effect score to determine an overall NPI risk score (NEPC 1999, p. 24).  The 
NEPC (1999, p. 5) warned that ‘the risks posed by particular substances to health and 
environment are extremely complex phenomena, difficult to characterise with any real 
accuracy in a simple uni-dimensional measure, and because of this the scores must be 
regarded as being orders of magnitude, or at best as being semi-quantitative’.  They further 
warn that the scores were rounded to a single decimal place ‘in order not to give an 
impression of precision which would belie the semi-quantitative nature of the scoring and 
combining process’ (1999, p. 24). 
  
(126) 
126
 
Second, the NPI is considered to be, primarily, a provider of quantity of emissions.  As 
explained by Sullivan (1999, pp. 368-369):  
 
It is important to recognise that the NPI is an emissions database, not an environmental or 
public health effects database (nor was it ever intended that this be the case).  That is, the 
primary purpose of the NPI is to provide information on the quantities of pollutants emitted to 
the environment.  The provision of information on quantities released to the environment does 
not provide a complete characterisation of the effects of the substances released or the 
consequences of variations in emissions (for example, peak versus average values). 
 
Third, the limitation of the NPI to provide an accurate context for the emissions data was an 
initial concern by companies that feared ‘the public will use the information irresponsibly’ 
(Fayers 1998, p. 80).  This issue was restated in submissions to the 2002 NEPC review of the 
NPI in which industry expressed concerns that the quantities of emissions reported on the 
database were not being presented with sufficient contextual data to allow their emissions to 
be ‘seen in the broader environmental context’ (NEPC 2002, p. 13). 
 
Problems with the interpretation of the emission information (that is, in linking the 
quantitative with the contextual information) were also identified by Howes (2001).  Howes 
conducted a survey and focus group study of 33 second-year university students enrolled in an 
environmental policy program to determine their response to, and ability to use, the NPI and 
TRI.  In asking subjects to rate the NPI website on its ‘provision of adequate information for 
interpreting the numbers in the emission reports’ (Howes 2001, p. 540), it was found that 
while 22 per cent believed that the TRI provided sufficient contextual information only 3 per 
cent suggested that the NPI did so, with 67 per cent disagreeing that this information was 
adequate on the NPI (Howes 2001, p. 546).  This was further identified in focus groups in 
which (Howes 2001, p. 547): 
 
One of the major concerns expressed in both the surveys and focus groups was that it was 
very difficult to relate the figures available to actual on-the-ground exposure.  Further, 
respondents found it impossible to get a clear understanding of the health risk entailed in 
living in an area.   
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Therefore while subjects in the study were able to easily access and view quantities of 
emissions, there was limited understanding of the contextual information provided on the NPI 
in relation to the environmental impact of same.   
 
Fourth, it should be noted that the final list of 90 reportable substances (and then 36 
substances for the initial three reporting periods including those considered in this research) 
was determined from approximately 400 substances based on those with the greatest NPI risk 
score.  Hence the list of 36 substances on which the NPI emission quantity variable is 
operationalised represents those which are considered to be of the highest NPI risk score, with 
minimal differences between toxicity ratings, and were stated to be ‘almost all substances 
about which there have been major concerns in recent years’ (NEPC 1999, p. 25). 
 
Finally, as discussed in section 3.5, societal expectations of corporate behaviour, as embodied 
in the social contract, are both implicit and explicit (Deegan 2006).  Howes (2001, p. 530) 
states, in relation to the emissions published on the NPI, that corporations ‘may legally use 
and release these chemicals’ and that ‘the only sanction available under such programs is the 
adverse reaction of the public’.  Therefore, while it remains legal for corporations to release 
emissions, the NPI’s objective is to encourage corporations to reduce emissions through 
publication of the types and amounts of emissions being released and a potential or actual 
threat of subsequent community pressure (Howes 2001; Hill 2000).    
 
Consequently, this thesis argues that the greater the quantity of pollution emissions disclosed 
on the public database, the greater the public perception of the company as a poorer 
environmental performer to the user of the database (see for example discussion on Patten 
2002b, chapter 2).  Taking this and the four factors discussed above into consideration, 
operationalisation of the variable was based upon the method adopted by Patten (2002b, p. 
769) who operationalised environmental performance as ‘the company-specific amount of 
toxics released into the environment, as reported in the 1988 TRI listing of the top 500 
companies, divided by the company’s 1988 revenue level’.  This study does not, however, 
propose that the quantity of emissions is an accurate measure or representation of 
environmental performance and operationalisation of the emissions variable as a simple 
quantification of emissions is acknowledged as a limitation of this research.   
 
 
The summarised NPI databases for the 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 reporting years were 
reduced to include only those pollution emissions from the sample companies and their 
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controlled entities.  The emissions for the parent entity and its controlled entities were 
summed to provide a single pollution emission quantity in kilograms per company.  
Consistent with Patten (2002b) the total emission data for each company was used in this 
research. The pollution emission data disclosed on the NPI is collected and reported to the 
reporting jurisdiction78 by the company.  Also, data in the first three years of reporting was 
expected to be incomplete to allow for adoption of the NPI process in the implementation 
period.  These limitations are also recognised in this study.   
 
The original databases obtained from the NPI for 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 contained 9769 
and 19988 lines of data respectively (Environment Australia 2000).  The data was received 
from 1200 facilities in 1998/1999 and 1937 facilities in 1999/2000 (Hill 2001).  To ensure a 
useful representation of the corporations’ total emissions on the NPI, emissions from 
controlled entities of the sample corporations were included in the parent entity’s total 
emissions.  Controlled entities were identified from the notes to the financial statements in the 
companies’ annual reports for the financial years 1999 and 2000.  The complete lists of 
controlled entities obtained from the annual reports were copied into a single word processing 
document for each of the years 1999 and 2000.  The controlled entities were then cross-
referenced with all entities appearing on the NPI databases for the corresponding year using 
the Excel ‘find’ function.  Where there was uncertainty caused by minor differences in names 
provided on the NPI and those of the controlled entities, the entire annual report was searched 
for reference to the uncertain relationship.  This was a particular problem in the 1998/1999 
NPI reporting year as data was incomplete (Environment Australia 2000) and facility names 
were sometimes provided instead of the facility’s registered names.  Where uncertainty still 
remained company websites were examined, or the company was contacted for confirmation 
of the relationship.   
 
An additional column was added to the NPI database in which the parent entity of the cross-
referenced controlled entity was recorded when a match was identified.  Entities that were not 
identified as the sample corporations or controlled entities of those corporations were 
subsequently removed from the NPI database.   
 
                                                
78 The reporting jurisdiction is the relevant State, Territory or Commonwealth environmental protection 
authority. 
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In order to ensure comparability with the research undertaken by Patten (2002b), an additional 
variable was computed which adjusted the NPI pollution emission quantities for firm size.  
Patten (2002a, p. 164)79 explains: 
 
…because larger firms, ceteris paribus, would be expected to have larger amounts of 
pollutants released than smaller firms, it is necessary to adjust the TRI release amounts 
for firm size to obtain a meaningful measure of pollution performance.   
 
Therefore, consistent with Patten’s (2002a, 2002b) method, firm size was measured according 
to annual sales revenue levels.   During the analyses, size-adjusted NPI pollution emission 
quantities were used. 
 
4.5.5 Reported non-compliance with environmental regulations 
 
Propositions 3a and 3b required the determination of sample corporations reporting 
compliance or non-compliance with environmental regulations pursuant to s. 299(1)(f).    
Therefore, mandatory environmental disclosures were reviewed for statements regarding 
either compliance or non-compliance with environmental regulations in the directors’ report80.  
A nominal yes/no variable was developed81.   
 
4.6 Statistical Analyses 
 
The determination of the correct statistical test to be undertaken in a given situation is 
determined by a number of factors, primarily the scale of measurement and normality of the 
data to be analysed (Zikmund 1997).  Parametric statistics are appropriate where interval or 
ratio scaled data is used and data is normally distributed (Bluman 2001).  Furthermore 
parametric tests of significance are not as reliable where the sample size is less than thirty 
(Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black 1998, p. 73).  In contrast, the use of non-parametric 
                                                
79
 Patten (2002a) and (2002b) used the same TRI data. 
80 It was beyond the scope of this thesis to determine if the individual company’s disclosures relating to 
compliance/non-compliance with environmental regulations were factual.   See for example discussion in 3.8 
regarding Australian Conservation Foundation complaint to ASIC regarding possible breaches of s. 299(1)(f) 
requirements by ERA Limited. 
81 In addition, for descriptive purposes, the voluntary environmental disclosures were also reviewed to identify 
those corporations reporting non-compliance with environmental regulation in the voluntary section.  
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statistics is appropriate where data are measured on a nominal or ordinal scale, or for ratio or 
interval scaled data, where the assumption of normality is not assumed (Zikmund 1997).  
Several variables used in the analysis in this research were measured on a nominal scale being 
the ‘reported non-compliance with environmental regulation’ variables for each of the years 
1998, 1999 and 2000, and ‘discuss/mention emissions’ variables for the years 1997 through 
2000 inclusive.  The remainder of the variables in the analyses were ratio scaled.  
 
Probability plots suggested that the ratio scaled data was not normally distributed so formal 
tests of normality were required82.  The most commonly used formal tests of normality are the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic and the Shapiro-Wilks test (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black 
1998).  The Shapiro-Wilks test is preferred where the sample size is less than thirty (Coakes 
& Steed 1999) and was used to ascertain the normality or otherwise of the ratio scaled 
variables in the study83.  As shown in Appendix E all of the ratio scaled variables used in the 
analyses in this study violate the assumption of normality (p < .05). 
 
While it has been argued that some parametric tests are robust to violations of normality 
(Bryman & Cramer 1997), it is generally suggested that non-parametric tests be used when 
the sample size is not large and/or the scores are not normally distributed (Pagano 2001; 
Zikmund 1997).  Consequently, this study used non-parametric tests or distribution-free tests 
that make ‘no assumptions about the specific shape of the population from which a sample is 
drawn’ (Weiers 1998, p. 543).   
 
Correlation analysis is used to determine the direction, strength and significance of a 
relationship between two variables (Sekaran 1992).  The characteristics of relationships 
between the quantity of voluntary environmental disclosure variable and the level of size-
adjusted NPI emissions (P1a), the quantity of positive voluntary environmental disclosure 
variable and the level of size-adjusted NPI emissions (P1b), and the quantity of voluntary 
emission disclosure variable and the level of size-adjusted NPI emissions (P1c), were tested 
using the Spearman coefficient of rank correlation (Spearman rho).  The Spearman rho is a 
non-parametric statistical test used to measure the strength and direction of a relationship 
between two variables at least of the ordinal scale (Weiers 1998).  
 
                                                
82 See Appendix D. 
83 Normality test statistics are displayed in Appendix E. 
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The Friedman two-way analysis of variance test is a non-parametric test that may be used as 
an alternative to the repeated measures analysis of variance test (ANOVA) where the data in 
the analysis are not normally distributed with equal variances (Weiers 1998).  Unlike the 
ANOVA, which is concerned with means, the Friedman test uses the median (Weiers 1998). 
The Friedman test ‘ranks the scores for each of the cases and then calculates the mean rank 
score for each sample’ (Bryman & Cramer 1997, p. 139).  The Friedman test was used to test 
proposition 2a.   
 
The Cochran Q test was used for testing proposition 2b.  The Cochran Q is a non-parametric 
test used where there are more than two related samples and when variables are measured on 
a nominal scale (Sekaran 1992).   
 
Propositions 3a and 3b were tested using the Mann-Whitney U test.  While the Kilmogorov-
Smirnov statistic is more powerful than the Mann-Whitney test (Sekaran 1992), the number of 
cases (those reporting non-compliance versus those reporting compliance with environmental 
regulations) in the analyses were insufficient and the latter test was required.   
 
4.7 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter outlined the research design used to test the propositions developed in chapters 2 
and 3.  A purposive sampling technique was adopted and the sample comprised twenty-five 
Australian corporations (and their associated controlled entities) appearing on the National 
Pollutant Inventory of 1999/2000 and appearing on the Connect4 database for the years 1997 
to 2000 inclusive.  In reference to the objectives of the NPI discussed in chapter 2, it was 
proposed that corporations with emissions published on the National Pollutant Inventory may 
face a potential legitimacy threat from their relevant publics.   These entities would also be 
subject to the requirements of s. 299(1)(f). 
 
A content analysis of annual reports for the period 1997 to 2000 inclusive was undertaken.  
Annual reports were selected as the disclosure medium to provide consistency and 
comparability with previous research, in particular Australian research (Deegan, Rankin & 
Tobin 2002; Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996; Gibson & Guthrie 1995; 
Guthrie & Parker 1989).  Furthermore, the annual report is considered an important source of 
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environmental information (Deegan & Rankin 1997; Tilt 1994) and is the medium in which 
disclosures pertaining to s. 299(1)(f) of the Corporations Act are disclosed.   
 
Sentences were used as the recording unit in the content analysis process to determine and 
maintain meaning as suggested by Milne and Adler (1999).  Words were used as the unit of 
measurement as it has been argued that words provide better detail when measuring the 
volume of disclosure (Deegan & Gordon 1996; Krippendorff 1980).   
 
Disclosures were distinguished as voluntary and mandatory environmental disclosures in 
accordance with the disclosure requirements in the Corporations Act 2001.  Mandatory 
disclosures are defined as environmental disclosures in the directors’ report pertaining to s. 
299(1)(f).  Voluntary disclosures are those not required by regulation or legislation and 
exclude those appearing in the corporate governance section of the annual report per the 
requirements of (now superseded) Listing Rule 4.10.3.  Voluntary environmental disclosures 
were inclusive of the sub-categories voluntary pollution emission disclosures and voluntary 
NPI disclosures (P1a, P1b, P1c and P2a).  Nominal variables were also used for the 
identification of particular themes and details relating to pollution emissions and the NPI for 
proposition 2b. 
 
NPI emission quantities were determined from the details provided on the NPI databases for 
the 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 NPI reporting years.  The data was reduced to include only 
those corporations that are listed entities and had annual reports on the Connect4 database for 
the years 1997 through 2000 inclusive.  In order to capture all emissions of a particular entity, 
controlled entities were identified and emissions of the parent and controlled entity summed.  
In order to allow comparison with the work by Patten (2002a, 2002b), the emission quantities 
were adjusted for firm size.  Also consistent with Patten, sales revenue was used as the proxy 
for firm size. 
 
In order to test propositions 3a and 3b, a nominal variable was developed to identify 
companies reporting non-compliance or compliance with environmental regulation pursuant 
to the requirements of s. 299(1)(f).  The location of the non-compliance disclosure was also 
noted for descriptive purposes; that is whether it was disclosed in the voluntary or mandatory 
section of the annual report. 
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Several statistical tests were used in the research.  As the majority of the variables violated the 
assumption of normality, and the sample size was relatively small, non-parametric statistics 
were necessary.  Consequently, techniques used in the analyses of the propositions and the 
descriptive analyses included Spearman rho, Friedman tests, Cochran Q and Mann-Whitney U 
tests. 
 
The following chapter provides the data analysis, results and discussion relating to the 
research objectives and propositions outlined in chapter 3 using the method outlined in this 
chapter.  Chapter 5 proceeds with a descriptive analysis of the companies included in the 
sample.  The research propositions are then tested with descriptive analysis and discussion 
accompanying the presentation of results for each proposition.  Chapter 5 concludes with 
discussion of the research findings. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
DATA ANALYSIS, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present and discuss the results of addressing the objectives of 
this thesis outlined in chapter 3. 
 
First, to examine the potentially legitimising (and discretionary) nature of voluntary 
environmental disclosures by determining whether: 
 
a. a change in environmental regulation acts as an impetus to changes in voluntary 
environmental disclosure practices in annual reports of Australian companies. 
 
And, for comparison with previous research, principally that undertaken by Patten (2002b), 
if: 
 
b.  there is a relationship between the level of published pollution emissions on the 
NPI and the quantity of voluntary environmental disclosure in annual reports of 
Australian corporations. 
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Second, to examine, following the introduction of s. 299(1)(f) of the Corporations Act, 
whether: 
 
c. there are significant differences between environmental disclosure practices in the 
voluntary sections of Australian corporate annual reports for corporations reporting 
non-compliance, and those not reporting non-compliance, with environmental 
regulations in the directors’ report pursuant to the requirements of section 299(1)(f). 
 
The chapter proceeds with a brief descriptive discussion of the size of the sample 
corporations, determined by sales revenue, during the study period.  Analysis of the research 
propositions relating to the NPI and s. 299(1)(f) respectively is then provided with a summary 
of results concluding each section.  The chapter concludes with a detailed discussion of the 
research findings. 
 
5.2 Size of Sample Corporations 
 
As discussed in chapter 4, the sample comprised twenty-five corporations from a diverse 
range of industries reporting on the NPI in the 1999/2000 reporting year.  Seventeen of the 
sample corporations also reported on the NPI database in the 1998/1999 reporting year, which 
was the first NPI reporting year.  As discussed in 4.5.4, consistent with the method adopted by 
Patten (2002a, 2002b) sales revenue is used to size-adjust the NPI emissions for propositions 
1a, 1b and 1c.  The sales revenue of the sample corporations for the years 1998 to 2000 is 
displayed in Table 10 which demonstrates variations in revenue levels both within and 
between the sample corporations.  
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Table 10:  Sales revenue for sample corporations 1998 – 2000 
 
Company ID Sales revenue 1998 
‘000 $ 
Sales revenue 1999 
‘000 $ 
Sales revenue 2000 
‘000 $ 
AMC      6 056 100 6 048 800 5 737 200 
ANE      221 873 221 081 238 864 
APY      219 339 229 692 199 352 
BRL      463 624 515 430 627 434 
CAA      750 110 743 430 768 131 
CNG      61 649 62 484 61 199 
CPB      174 920 271 736 198 755 
CSL      353 491 413 471 450 598 
CSR      6 334 800 6 506 800 6 419 000 
CTR      101 094 115 622 165 141 
EML      2 331 894 2 233 300 2 102 400 
GNS      97 005 101 377 151 741 
HIL      348 761 377 783 435 399 
ICT      954 673 1 002 574 949 111 
NCM      256 499 457 369 697 487 
NDY      1 483 800 1 356 100 1 323 600 
NFD      1 082 564 1 123 858 1 096 870 
OCA      57 988 51 451 74 250 
PDP      5 983 500 5 680 000 5 725 800 
RSG      201 052 148 255 186 220 
STO      769 400 944 500 1 497 100 
WEG      1 357 553 1 403 517 1 556 174 
WJM      209 358 198 681 203 897 
WMT      82 794 329 607 359 685 
WOW      16 841 900 18 465 100 20 019 900 
 
 
A summary of the minimum and maximum sales revenues between the sample corporations is 
displayed in Table 11.  Indicative of the need to size-adjust emission quantities suggested by 
Patten (2002a, 2002b), the minimum and maximum sales revenues in 1998 were $57.988 
million and $16 841.9 million respectively; in 1999, $51.451 million and $18 465.1 million; 
and, in 2000, $61.199 million and $20 019.9 million.  
 
 
Table 11:  Minimum and maximum consolidated entity sales revenue for sample corporations 
1998 – 2000 
 
 Minimum 
‘000 $ 
Maximum 
‘000 $ 
Sales revenue consolidated entity 1998 57 988 16 841 900 
Sales revenue consolidated entity 1999 51 451 18 465 100 
Sales revenue consolidated entity 2000 61 199 20 019  900 
 
  
(137) 
137
 
5.3 Proposition Testing 
 
5.3.1 Results of the propositions relating to the NPI 
 
P1a. Corporations with greater quantities of published pollution emissions, adjusted by size 
of corporation, on the National Pollutant Inventory have greater quantities of total voluntary 
environmental disclosures in annual reports. 
 
As discussed in section 3.5.2 entities adopt a number of strategies depending upon whether 
they are attempting to gain, maintain or repair legitimacy.  Those attempting to gain 
legitimacy may adopt proactive and intense tactics as it is assumed that management would 
have advance knowledge of a possible legitimacy threat (O’Donovan 2002).  Ashforth and 
Gibbs (1990, p. 183) suggest that entities maintaining legitimacy will attempt ‘to anticipate 
and prevent or forestall potential challenges to legitimacy’.  In maintaining legitimacy an 
organisation will need, as part of the process, to possibly anticipate legitimacy threats 
(O’Donovan 2002; Suchman 1995).  In contrast, it is suggested that those organisations 
attempting to repair legitimacy tend to do so as a reactive process (O’Donovan 2002). 
 
Therefore, it may be argued that organisations will provide disclosures as a legitimating tactic 
in anticipation of and/or as a reaction to a potential legitimacy threat.  Consequently, in testing 
propositions 1a, 1b and 1c, size-adjusted NPI emission levels were compared with the 
relevant annual report disclosures for both the year preceding the NPI reporting year 
(anticipatory disclosures) and the corresponding NPI reporting year (reactive disclosures).   
 
The first NPI reporting year covered emissions for the period 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999 and 
the second NPI reporting year covered emissions for the period 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000.  
Consequently, for the purpose of this research correlation analysis was used to determine if 
there was a relationship between 1998/1999 NPI emissions and disclosures in the 1998 
(anticipatory) and 1999 (reactive) annual reports, and between the 1999/2000 NPI emissions 
and disclosures in the 1999 (anticipatory) and 2000 (reactive) annual reports. 
 
The mean and sum of words for voluntary environmental disclosures during the 
implementation period is displayed in Table 12.  An increase in the quantity of voluntary 
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environmental disclosures in annual reports is noted during the test period84.  The sample 
corporations included 7359 words in 1997, 6513 in 1998, followed by an increase in the 
number of words in 1999 and 2000 to 9555 and 10 630 words respectively.  Mean words 
increased from 294.36 in 1997 to 425.2 in 2000.  
 
 Table 12:  Mean and sum of words for voluntary environmental disclosures 1997 – 2000 
 
Year of voluntary 
environmental disclosure 
Mean words Sum words 
1997 294.36 7359.00 
1998 260.52 6513.00 
1999 382.20 9555.00 
2000 425.20 10630.00 
 
 
The non-parametric Spearman’s rank-order (rho) correlation was used in testing proposition 
1a as the variables were not normally distributed and therefore violated the assumptions of the 
Pearson product-moment correlation (Sheskin 2000).  Table 13 displays the Spearman 
correlation coefficients for the size-adjusted 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 NPI emissions and the 
voluntary environmental disclosures from the preceding and corresponding years’ annual 
reports.   
 
Table 13:  Spearman rho correlations between voluntary environmental disclosure words 1998 
– 2000 and size-adjusted NPI emission levels for the 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 NPI reporting 
years 
 
 
 Disclosure Variable  Size Adjusted NPI Emissions KG  
  1998-1999 1999–2000 
Correlation co-efficient .503* 
Sig. (1-tailed) .020 
Voluntary 
environmental 
disclosure words 
1998 
N 17 
N/A 
Correlation co-efficient .381 .568** 
Sig. (1-tailed) .066 .002 
Voluntary 
environmental 
disclosure words 
1999 
N 17 25 
                                                
84
 Descriptive analyses presented with propositions 1a, 1b and 1c are inclusive of the 1997 reporting year in 
order to also provide supporting discussion for propositions 2a and 2b which consider the implementation period 
of the NPI being 1997 to 2000. 
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Correlation co-efficient .389* 
Sig. (1-tailed) .027 
Voluntary 
environmental 
disclosure words 
2000 N 
N/A 
25 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (one-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (one-tailed) 
 
 
Overall, the results show significant positive correlations at both p < .01 and p < .05 between 
the size-adjusted NPI published emission levels 1998/1999 and the voluntary environmental 
disclosure words 1998 (r = .503; p = .020), and between the 1999/2000 NPI emissions and the 
voluntary environmental disclosure words for both 1999 (r = .568; p = .002) and 2000 (r = 
.389; p = .027).   
 
Thus, the results of the correlation analysis indicate a predominantly positive relationship 
between the quantities of published pollution emissions, adjusted by size of corporation, on 
the NPI and the quantity of total voluntary environmental disclosures in annual reports as 
suggested in proposition 1a.  
 
P1b.  Corporations with greater quantities of published pollution emissions, adjusted by size 
of corporation, on the National Pollutant Inventory have greater quantities of positive 
voluntary environmental disclosures in annual reports. 
 
While proposition 1a tested the quantity of voluntary environmental disclosures, this 
proposition tests the nature of voluntary environmental disclosures during the period.   
 
Table 14 displays the mean voluntary environmental disclosure words, the mean positive 
voluntary environmental disclosure words and the mean proportion of positive voluntary 
environmental disclosure words for the years 1997 through 2000.  Mean quantity of positive 
voluntary environmental disclosures were 269.64 words in 1997, reducing to 219.68 in 1998, 
and then increasing to 344.28 and 390.56 words in 1999 and 2000 respectively.  The quantity 
of positive disclosures was greater than the negative, neutral and combined positive/negative 
disclosures in each year with positive proportion of voluntary environmental disclosure being 
.9425 in 1997, .8564 in 1998, .9068 in 1999 and .9332 in 2000.   
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Table 14:  Mean voluntary environmental disclosure, mean positive voluntary environmental 
disclosure and mean proportions of positive voluntary environmental disclosures (words) 
1997 – 2000 
 
Disclosure year 
Mean 
total voluntary 
environmental 
disclosure words 
Mean 
positive voluntary 
environmental 
disclosure words 
Mean 
proportion of positive 
voluntary environmental 
disclosure words 
1997 294.36 269.64 .9425 
1998 260.52 219.68 .8564 
1999 382.20 344.28 .9068 
2000 425.20 390.56 .9332 
 
 
Table 15:  Spearman rho correlation for positive voluntary environmental disclosure words 
1998 to 2000 and size adjusted emission levels for the 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 NPI 
reporting years 
 
 
Size Adjusted NPI 
Emissions KG 
Positive voluntary environmental 
disclosure variable in words by 
year 
1998–1999 1999–2000 
Correlation co-efficient .553* 
Sig. (1-tailed) .011 
1998 
N 17 
 
Correlation co-efficient .378 .577** 
Sig. (1-tailed) .067 .001 
1999 
N 17 25 
Correlation co-efficient .388* 
Sig. (1-tailed) .028 
2000 
N 
 
25 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (one-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (one-tailed) 
 
Proposition 1b was examined by conducting a Spearman rho correlation between the size-
adjusted NPI emission levels for 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 variables, and the positive 
voluntary environmental disclosure words variables for the years 1998 through 2000.  
Consistent with the findings relating to proposition 1a, the results (Table 15) show significant 
positive correlations at both p < .01 and p < .05 between the size-adjusted NPI published 
emission levels 1998/1999 and the positive voluntary environmental disclosure words 1998 (r 
= .553; p = .011), and between the 1999/2000 NPI emissions and the voluntary environmental 
disclosures words for both 1999 (r = .577; p = .001) and 2000 (r = .388; p = .028).   
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Therefore, the results of the correlation analysis indicate predominantly that corporations with 
greater quantities of published pollution emissions, adjusted by size of corporation, on the 
National Pollutant Inventory have greater quantities of positive voluntary environmental 
disclosures in annual reports as suggested in proposition 1b.  
 
P1c.  Corporations with greater quantities of published pollution emissions, adjusted by size 
of corporation, on the National Pollutant Inventory have greater quantities of voluntary 
emission disclosures in annual reports.  
 
Similar to proposition 1a, proposition 1c tests the quantity of disclosures made by the sample 
corporations; however, in contrast to proposition 1a which tested all voluntary environmental 
disclosures, this proposition considers voluntary emission disclosures only.   
 
The mean and sum of words for voluntary emission disclosures for the years 1997 through 
2000 are displayed in Table 16.  Mean voluntary emission disclosure words ranged from 
74.16 in 1997, 58.56 in 1998, and increasing to 69.68 and 90.08 in 1999 and 2000 
respectively.  The sum of words for the sample corporations increased from 1854 in 1997 to 
2252 in 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16:  Mean and sum of words for voluntary emission disclosures 1997 – 2000 
 
Disclosure variable Mean words Sum words 
Voluntary emission disclosure words 1997 74.16 1854 
Voluntary emission disclosure words 1998 58.56 1464 
Voluntary emission disclosure words 1999 69.68 1742 
Voluntary emission disclosure words 2000 90.08 2252 
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Table 17:  Spearman rho correlations between voluntary emission disclosures 1998 – 2000 
and size-adjusted emissions for 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 NPI reporting periods 
 
Disclosure 
Variable 
 Size Adjusted NPI 
Emissions KG 1998–
1999 
Size Adjusted NPI 
Emissions KG 1999–
2000 
 
Correlation co-efficient .499* 
Sig. (1-tailed) .021 
Voluntary 
emission 
disclosure 
words 1998 N 17 
 
Correlation co-efficient .437* .406* 
Sig. (1-tailed) .040 .044 
Voluntary 
emission 
disclosure 
words 1999 N 17 25 
Correlation co-efficient .375* 
Sig. (1-tailed) .032 
Voluntary 
emission 
disclosure 
words 2000 N 
 
25 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (one-tailed) 
 
 
In examining proposition 1c Spearman rho correlations were undertaken between the quantity 
of voluntary emission disclosures in the preceding and corresponding annual report years 
from 1998 to 2000 and the size-adjusted emission levels for the 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 
NPI reporting periods.  Results are shown in Table 17 and indicate significant positive 
relationships (p < .05) between the quantities of voluntary emission disclosures in the 1998 
(preceding) and 1999 (corresponding) annual reports and the size adjusted NPI emission 
levels for the 1998/1999 NPI reporting year (r = .499, p = .021 for 1998 and r = .437, p = .040 
for 1999).  Significant relationships were also identified between the quantity of emission 
disclosures in the 1999 (preceding) and 2000 (corresponding) annual reports and the adjusted 
levels of emissions for the 1999/2000 NPI reporting year (r = .406, p = .044 for 1999 and r = 
.375, p = .032 for 2000).  This result is consistent with the results in propositions 1a and 1b 
which identified higher quantities of voluntary environmental disclosures and positive 
voluntary environmental disclosures for corporations with higher levels of emissions on the 
NPI. 
 
Therefore, a significant positive relationship was identified over all of the test years between 
quantities of published pollution emissions, adjusted by size of corporation, on the National 
Pollutant Inventory and quantities of voluntary emission disclosures in annual reports 
consistent with the relationship suggested in proposition 1c. 
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P2a. There is an increase in the quantity of voluntary environmental disclosures discussing 
compliance with the NPI in annual reports during the NPI implementation period by 
corporations required to publish emission information on the NPI. 
 
P2b. There is an increase in the number of corporations providing voluntary environmental 
disclosures concerning pollution/emissions in annual reports during the implementation 
period of the NPI by corporations required to publish emission information on the NPI. 
 
 
In light of comments made during the development of the NPI, the publication of such 
environmental performance information may act as ‘an impetus for cleaner production for 
industry’ (Environment Australia 2000). Regardless of whether such changes in 
environmental performance are real or attempts to appear consistent with social values, the 
communication of information to relevant publics is essential.  Therefore, changes in the 
content of disclosures during this period may be indicative of an increase in environmental 
regulation being an impetus to changes in environmental disclosure practices and considered 
legitimating tactics adopted by the corporations examined. Consequently this research also 
considers what is being disclosed as opposed to simply how much is being disclosed.  Hence, 
propositions 2a and 2b test changes in the content of voluntary environmental disclosures 
during the implementation period of the NPI.   
 
For the purposes of examining propositions 2a and 2b, the implementation period includes the 
1997 annual report disclosures as well as the years examined earlier in this section.  The 1997 
year was included as the period from 1 July 1996 to 30 June 1997 represented the initial 
stages of the NPI and the draft NEPM for the NPI was released for public comment by the 
NEPC on 12 June 1997 with details on its availability promoted in state and national 
newspapers (NEPC 2002)85.   
 
Table 18 provides a summary of the level of detail provided by disclosing corporations 
regarding the NPI86. Of those corporations that mentioned the NPI by name in the annual 
                                                
85 See 4.2 for further details on the NPI implementation period. 
86 Corporations which included discussion on the NPI in the 1998 year were solely from the mining, oil and gas 
industry.  By 1999 corporations in the chemical and fertilizer industries also included discussion on the NPI, and 
by 2000 corporations in the food and wine industry also included discussion on the NPI. 
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report, four provided a description of what it was in 1999 and three in 2000.  Only one 
corporation mentioned that the NPI was available on the Internet in the 1999 and 2000 
financial reporting years.  No corporation disclosed the URL of the NPI in the annual reports 
of any of the test years.  Examples of disclosures relating to the NPI and pollution emissions 
are presented in Appendix F.  
  
Table 18:  Level of detail provided on the NPI 
 
Type of Disclosure 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Mention NPI 1 1 4 7 
Describe NPI 0 0 4 3 
Mention NPI available on Internet 0 0 1 1 
State the URL of the NPI 0 0 0 0 
 
 
A Friedman test was conducted to test proposition 2a regarding changes in the quantity of NPI 
disclosures during the test period.  The results of the Friedman test are shown in Table 19. 
The results indicate that there was a significant increase in voluntary disclosures mentioning 
the NPI during the test period (N = 25, χ2 = 8.773, df = 3, Asymp. Sig. = .032).  Therefore, the 
sample corporations did begin including references to the NPI in annual reports during that 
time.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 19:  Friedman test of changes in quantity of voluntary words regarding the NPI in 
annual reports from 1997 – 2000 
 
Disclosure Variables Mean Rank 
Voluntary words NPI 1997 2.32 
Voluntary words NPI 1998 2.30 
Voluntary words NPI 1999 2.62 
Voluntary words NPI 2000 2.76 
Friedman Test Statistics  
N 25 
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Chi-Square 8.773 
Df 3 
Asymp. Sig .032 
 
 
Considering the findings from the Friedman test, proposition 2a suggesting that there is an 
increase in the quantity of voluntary environmental disclosures directly mentioning 
compliance with the NPI in annual reports during the NPI implementation period by 
corporations required to publish emission information on the NPI is supported.  
 
Proposition 2a tested if corporations with emissions reported on the NPI changed their 
voluntary disclosure practices to include discussion regarding the NPI.  In testing proposition 
2b the analyses of changes in disclosure practices is extended by examining voluntary 
disclosures relating to pollution/emissions.  
 
Table 20:  Number of sample corporations disclosing emissions/pollution related information 
in annual reports (voluntary and mandatory sections) for the years 1997 – 2000 
 
Type of disclosure relating to the NPI 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Discuss/mention emissions (total voluntary and mandatory sections) 12 15 21 23 
Discuss/mention emissions (total voluntary section)* 11 12 12 16 
Discuss/mention emissions (voluntary section only) 11 10 8 10 
Discuss/mention emissions (mandatory section only) 1 3 10 7 
Discuss/mention emissions (both mandatory and voluntary sections) 0 2 3 6 
*  These companies disclosed emission information in the voluntary section with some also disclosing in the 
mandatory section for that year. 
 
 
Table 20 displays the number of sample corporations disclosing emission information, and the 
location of those disclosures, in the annual reports during the test period.  In 1997, only 
twelve companies discussed or mentioned emissions in the annual report; however, in 1999 
twenty-one of the twenty-five sample corporations were discussing or mentioning emissions 
with twenty-three of the twenty-five corporations doing so in 2000 in either the mandatory or 
voluntary sections or both.  Of these, eleven in 1997, twelve in 1998 and 1999, and sixteen in 
2000, disclosed information in the voluntary sections of the annual report.  The increase in the 
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number of corporations discussing/mentioning emissions in the 1999 and 2000 annual reports 
coincides with the first publication of the NPI database on the 31st January 200087. 
 
Table 21:  Cochran Q test for changes in number of companies’ voluntarily 
discussing/mentioning emissions in 1997 and 2000 
 
Frequencies 
 Mention emissions 
Disclosure Variables Yes No 
Voluntary mention emissions 1997 11 14 
Voluntary mention emissions 1998 12 13 
Voluntary mention emissions 1999 12 13 
Voluntary mention emissions 2000 16 9 
 
Test statistics – Cochran Q Test 
N 25 
Cochran’s Q 11.800 
Df 3 
Asymp. Sig  .008 
 
 
The change in the number of corporations discussing/mentioning emissions during the 
implementation period was statistically analysed using a Cochran Q test to examine 
proposition 2b.  The results (see Table 21) show that the number of corporations voluntarily 
providing emission disclosures increased significantly between the 1997 reporting year and 
the 2000 reporting year (Q = 11.800, Asymp. Sig. = .008). 
 
Therefore proposition 2b suggesting that there is an increase in the number of corporations 
providing voluntary environmental disclosures concerning pollution/emissions in annual 
reports during the implementation period of the NPI by corporations required to publish 
emission information on the NPI is supported.  A discussion of the voluntary emission and 
NPI disclosures is provided in Appendix F. 
 
                                                
87  As shown in table 20, a number of corporations provided information in the mandatory sections of the annual 
report (one in 1997, three in 1998, ten in 1999 and seven in 2000) or in both mandatory and voluntary sections 
(two in 1998, three in 1999 and six in 2000).  It should be noted that this coincides with the introduction of s. 
299(1)(f) of the Corporations Act and disclosures in the mandatory section would be considered compliance with 
the requirements of the section. 
  
(147) 
147
5.3.2 Summary of results for NPI propositions 
 
In summarising the results from testing the propositions relating to the NPI and the 
supplementary descriptive analyses it was found that: 
• mean voluntary environmental disclosures increased during the period (descriptive); 
• corporations with greater quantities of emissions, adjusted by size of the corporation, 
published on the NPI have predominantly significantly greater quantities of voluntary 
environmental disclosures in the annual report (P1a); 
• voluntary environmental disclosures in the annual report during the implementation 
period were predominantly positive in nature (descriptive); 
• corporations with greater quantities of emissions, adjusted by size of the corporation, 
published on the NPI have predominantly significantly greater quantities of positive 
voluntary environmental disclosures in the annual report (P1b); 
• mean voluntary emission disclosures increased during the period (descriptive); 
• corporations with greater quantities of emissions, adjusted by size of the corporation, 
published on the NPI had significantly greater quantities of voluntary emission disclosures 
in the annual report (P1c); 
• there was a significant increase in the quantity of voluntary disclosures in the annual 
report relating directly to the NPI during the implementation period (P2a); 
• the level of detailed information provided about the NPI was minimal (descriptive); and 
• there was a significant increase in the number of corporations voluntarily discussing 
pollution emissions in the annual report during the implementation period (P2b).  
 
 
5.3.3 Results of the propositions relating to s. 299(1)(f) 
 
Pursuant with s. 299(1)(f) becoming effective in 1998, Table 22 shows the increase in the 
mean quantity of mandatory environmental disclosures from 37.96 words in 1998 to 166.20 
words in 2000.  Seven of the sample corporations included environmental information in the 
directors’ report in the 1998 reporting year, increasing to twenty-four in 1999 and all sample 
corporations disclosed in 200088.  The low number of corporations reporting in 1998 could be 
                                                
88 As discussed in 4.6 it is beyond the scope of this thesis to determine whether the companies have complied in 
full with the requirements of s. 299(1)(f); that is, whether all breaches of environmental regulation have been 
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reflective of ASIC's submission to the PJSC in which they suggested that ASIC would take ‘a 
rather light handed approach to the matter to begin with’. 
 
Table 22:  Mean and sum of words disclosed on s. 299(1)(f) 1998 – 2000 
 
Year of disclosure per s. 
299(1)(f) 
Mean words Sum words 
Number of 
corporations 
complying 
1998 37.96 949 7 
1999 157.44 3936 24 
2000 166.20 4155 25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 23:  Descriptive statistics of environmental disclosure variables for voluntary and 
mandatory environmental disclosures in company annual reports 
 
Environmental disclosure variable  N Minimum Maximum  Sum  Mean 
Voluntary environmental disclosure 
words 1998 
25 .00 1260.00 6513.00 260.52 
Voluntary environmental disclosure 
words 1999 
25 .00 1856.00 9555.00 382.20 
                                                                                                                                                   
disclosed.  Consideration is only given to whether environmental information has been included in the directors’ 
report consistent with the requirements of the section. 
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Voluntary environmental disclosure 
words 2000 
25 .00 1358.00 10630.00 425.20 
Mandatory environmental disclosure 
words 1998 
25 .00 248.00 949.00 37.96 
Mandatory environmental disclosure 
words 1999 
25 .00 440.00 3936.00 157.44 
Mandatory environmental disclosure 
words 2000 
25 14 538.00 4155.00 166.20 
 
 
During the test period, the sample corporations consistently provided greater quantities of 
voluntary environmental disclosures than mandatory disclosures89.  Table 23 shows the 
minimum, maximum, sum and mean quantities of both voluntary and mandatory disclosures 
during the test period.   Mean voluntary environmental disclosures for the years 1998, 1999 
and 2000 were 260.52, 382.20 and 425.20 words respectively whereas mean mandatory 
disclosures were 37.96, 157.44 and 166.20 respectively.   Mean proportions of positive 
environmental disclosures in the voluntary sections of the annual reports are displayed in 
Table 24 and range from .8564 in 1998, .9068 in 1999, and .9332 in 2000.  In contrast, the 
proportions of positive environmental disclosures in the mandatory sections were .6400 in 
1998, .5009 in 1999, and .6043 in 2000.  The difference in quantity of disclosures and 
quantities of proportions of positive disclosures between the two sections of the annual report 
may be considered reflective of the narrow scope of s.299(1)(f) and the broad scope of the 
voluntary disclosure sections. 
 
 
Table 24:  Means of proportion of positive disclosure variables for voluntary and mandatory 
environmental disclosures in company annual reports 1998 – 2000 
 
Proportion of positive disclosure variables in words N Mean 
Positive proportion voluntary environmental disclosure words 1998 17 .8564 
Positive proportion mandatory environmental disclosure words 1998 7 .6400 
Positive proportion voluntary environmental disclosure words 1999 15 .9068 
Positive proportion mandatory environmental disclosure words 1999 24 .5009 
                                                
89
 As discussed in 4.5.1, voluntary environmental disclosures may also appear in the directors’ report.  
Consequently, the quantity of mandatory disclosures may be overstated, and voluntary disclosures understated, 
in this study.  
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Positive proportion voluntary environmental disclosure words 2000 20 .9332 
Positive proportion mandatory environmental disclosure words 2000 25 .6043 
 
 
P3a.  Australian listed corporations reporting non-compliance in accordance with the 
requirements of s. 299(1)(f) provide greater quantities of environmental disclosures in the 
voluntary section of the annual report than companies reporting no non-compliance. 
 
P3b. Australian listed corporations reporting non-compliance in accordance with the 
requirements of s. 299(1)(f) provide greater quantities of positive environmental disclosures 
in the voluntary section of the annual report than companies reporting no non-compliance. 
 
Details of the number of sample corporations reporting on compliance or non-compliance 
with environmental regulations, both per the requirements of s. 299(1)(f) (requiring disclosure 
in the directors’ report) and in the voluntary sections of the annual report are displayed in 
Table 25.  In 1998 three corporations disclosed breaches of environmental regulations in the 
directors’ report, and six in both the 1999 and 2000 reporting years.  Four reported that they 
had complied with environmental regulations in the 1998 reporting year and eighteen in both 
1999 and 2000.  In 1997, the year preceding the first s. 299(1)(f) reporting year, three of the 
sample corporations disclosed breaches with environmental regulations in the voluntary 
sections of the annual report; however, in 1998 seven corporations reported breaches of 
environmental regulation in the voluntary section of the annual report with two of those 
corporations also reporting breaches in the directors’ report, two reporting no breaches had 
occurred in the directors’ report and three not making any s. 299(1)(f) disclosures in the 
directors’ report90.  In 1999 four of the five, and in 2000 three of the four, corporations that 
reported non-compliance in the voluntary section of the annual report had reported 
compliance with environmental regulations in the directors’ report.  This could be due, 
however, to the interpretation of what is a ‘significant environmental regulation’ in s. 
299(1)(f) and that only details relating to the entity’s performance under significant 
environmental regulation must be disclosed91.   
                                                
90 As previously stated, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to determine whether sample corporations complied 
with the requirements of the section.   
91 Although it should also be noted, as discussed in chapter 3, that in 2005 Energy Resources of Australia 
Limited (ERA) was the subject of a complaint for breaching s. 299(1)(f) by the ACF to ASIC.  The complaint 
related to the fact that ERA had reported compliance with environmental regulations (that is, no breaches 
occurred) in the directors’ report while reporting non-compliance in the voluntary section of the annual report.  
The ACF argued that the breaches reported in the voluntary section should have been reported in the directors’ 
report under the requirements of s. 299(1)(f). 
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Table 25:  Number of corporations reporting compliance status with environmental 
regulations in the mandatory and voluntary sections of the annual report 
 
Disclosure 
Year 
Reported non-
compliance with 
environmental 
regulation per s. 
299(1)(f) in 
directors’ report 
Reported did 
comply with 
environmental 
regulation per s. 
299(1)(f) in 
directors’ report 
Yes, reported 
non-
compliance in 
the voluntary 
section of the 
annual report 
Reported 
non-
compliance 
in voluntary 
section and 
directors’ 
report 
Only 
reported 
non-
compliance 
in voluntary 
section, 
reported 
compliance 
in directors’ 
report 
1997 N/A N/A 3 N/A N/A 
1998 3 4 7 2 2** 
1999 6 18 5 1 4 
2000* 6 18 4 1 3 
*  Western Metals Limited provided disclosures in the directors’ report but did not state whether the company 
had any breaches of environmental regulation 
** Three companies did not make any disclosures in the directors’ report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 26:  Mann-Whitney U test results examining differences in the quantity of voluntary 
environmental disclosures between corporations reporting non-compliance with 
environmental regulation in the directors’ report and those reporting compliance with 
environmental regulation in the directors’ report per s.299(1)(f) 
 
 Reported non-
compliance? 
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Yes 3 3.33 10.00 Voluntary environmental 
disclosures words 1998 No 4 4.50 18.00 
Yes 6 13.75 82.50 
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Voluntary environmental 
disclosures words 1999 
Yes 6 13.75 82.50 
Voluntary environmental 
disclosures words 1999 
No 
18 12.08 217.50 
Yes 6 10.83 65.00 
No 18 13.06 235.00 
 
 Voluntary 
environmental 
disclosures words 1998 
Voluntary 
environmental 
disclosures words 1999 
Voluntary 
environmental 
disclosures words 2000 
Mann-Whitney U 4.000 46.500 44.000 
Wilcoxon W 10.00 217.500 65.000 
Z -.707 -.519 -.670 
Asymp. 
Sig.(2-tailed) 
.480 .604 .503 
Exact  
Sig. (1-tailed) 
.629
a
 .626
a
 .537
a
 
a  Not corrected for ties 
 
 
The results, both ranks and test statistics, of the Mann-Whitney U test for proposition 3a are 
displayed in Table 26.  No significant difference in the quantity of voluntary environmental 
disclosures was identified for corporations reporting breaches in the mandatory sections of the 
annual report and those reporting no breaches (Z = -.707, Asymp. Sig. = .480 in 1998; Z = -
.519, Asymp. Sig. = .604 in 1999; Z = -.670, Asymp. Sig. = .503 in 2000).  The results 
suggest that corporations who have reported breaches under the requirement of s. 299(1)(f) 
have no greater propensity to provide larger quantities of voluntary environmental disclosures 
than those reporting no breaches.   
 
Therefore, proposition 3a suggesting that Australian listed corporations reporting non-
compliance in accordance with the requirements of s. 299(1)(f) provide greater quantities of 
environmental disclosures in the voluntary section of the annual report than companies 
reporting no non-compliance is not supported. 
 
Table 27:  Mann-Whitney U test results examining differences in the quantity of positive 
voluntary environmental disclosures between corporations reporting non-compliance and 
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those reporting compliance with environmental regulation in the directors’ report per 
s.299(1)(f) 
 
 Reported 
 non-compliance? 
N Mean Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
Yes 3 3.67 11.00 Positive voluntary environmental 
disclosures words 1998 No 4 4.25 17.00 
Yes 6 13.75 82.50 Positive voluntary environmental 
disclosures words 1999 No 18 12.08 217.50 
Yes 6 10.83 65.00 Positive voluntary environmental 
disclosures words 2000 No 18 13.06 235.00 
 
 Positive voluntary 
environmental 
disclosures words 1998 
Positive voluntary 
environmental 
disclosures words 1999 
Positive voluntary 
environmental 
disclosures words 2000 
Mann-Whitney U 5.000 46.500 44.000 
Wilcoxon W 11.000 217.500 65.000 
Z -.354 -.519 -.670 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.724 .604 .503 
Exact Sig. (1-tailed) .857a .626a .537a 
a  Not corrected for ties 
 
 
The Mann-Whitney U test was also conducted to examine whether corporations reporting 
non-compliance pursuant with s. 299(1)(f) had a propensity to provide greater quantities of 
positive voluntary environmental disclosures than corporations not reporting non-compliance 
(P3b).   As shown in Table 27 the results are not significant (Z = -.354, Asymp. Sig. = .724 in 
1998; Z = -.519, Asymp. Sig. = .604 in 1999; Z = -.670, Asymp. Sig. = .503 in 2000).  
Therefore, there are no significant differences between the quantity of positive voluntary 
disclosures in the annual reports of corporations that reported non-compliance in the 
mandatory sections of the annual report and those that did not report non-compliance.  That is, 
corporations required to report breaches with environmental regulation in the mandatory 
section of the annual report did not provide greater quantities of positive voluntary disclosures 
than those not reporting breaches. 
 
Consequently, proposition 3b which stated that Australian listed corporations reporting non-
compliance in accordance with the requirements of s. 299(1)(f) provide greater quantities of 
positive environmental disclosures in the voluntary section of the annual report than 
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companies reporting no non-compliance is not supported. A discussion of the mandatory 
environmental disclosures is provided in Appendix G. 
 
 
5.3.4 Summary of results relating to s. 299(1)(f) propositions 
 
In summarising the results of testing the propositions, and supplemental descriptive analyses, 
relating to s. 299(1)(f) of the Corporations Act it was found that: 
 
• corporations that reported non-compliance in the directors’ report pursuant to the 
requirements of s. 299(1)(f) did not provide significantly greater quantities of 
voluntary environmental disclosures (P3a); 
• corporations that reported non-compliance in the directors’ report pursuant to the 
requirements of s. 299(1)(f) did not provide significantly greater quantities of positive 
voluntary disclosures (P3b); 
• the sample corporations provided greater quantities of voluntary environmental 
disclosures than mandatory environmental disclosures during the test period 
(descriptive);   
• the proportion of positive voluntary environmental disclosures was greater than the 
proportion of positive mandatory environmental disclosures during the test period 
(descriptive). 
 
5.4 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter provided the results of testing the propositions stated in chapter 3 to address the 
objectives of the thesis.  Discussion on the findings of the propositions relating to the NPI and 
s. 299(1)(f) is now provided in sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 respectively. 
 
5.4.1 Discussion of analyses for propositions relating to the NPI 
 
Propositions 1a, 1b, and 1c tested the relationship between the quantity of size-adjusted NPI 
emissions and the quantity of voluntary environmental disclosures, positive voluntary 
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environmental disclosures and voluntary emission disclosures respectively. In testing 
proposition 1a, it was determined that there was a predominantly significant positive 
relationship between the level of publicly disclosed pollution emissions of corporations on the 
NPI and the level of voluntary environmental disclosures made in company annual reports for 
the twenty-five sample companies.  A significant positive relationship was identified between 
the quantity of 1998 (preceding year) annual report voluntary environmental disclosures and 
the 1998/1999 size-adjusted NPI emissions and the 1999 (preceding year) and 2000 
(corresponding year) annual report voluntary environmental disclosures and the 1999/2000 
size-adjusted NPI emissions.  The results are consistent with previous literature that has 
identified greater levels of environmental disclosures in annual reports for corporations that 
have, or may be perceived to have, a greater impact on the environment (Al-Tuwaijri, 
Christensen & Hughes II 2004; Brown & Deegan 1998; Li, Richardson & Thornton 1997; 
Deegan & Rankin 1996; Patten 1992).   
 
In particular, this result is consistent with Patten’s (2002b) United States study which 
examined relationships between the quantity of emission data on the TRI and environmental 
disclosures in US company annual reports.  The similar results obtained between this 
research, using Australian pollution emission data, and that conducted by Patten, may provide 
support for his argument that pollution emission information is a useful measure of 
environmental performance92.  The similarities between the NPI and TRI93 allow greater 
comparability between studies undertaken in different countries, particularly when the OECD 
has recommended that member countries adopt such inventories. As explained by Patten 
(2002b, p. 772): 
 
The finding that worse environmental performance is associated with greater 
environmental disclosure supports arguments that the level of social disclosure is a 
function of the exposure a company faces to the social/political environment. 
 
Therefore, the greater the environmental impact of the sample corporations (as measured by 
the quantity of emissions) the greater the level of legitimating tactics (in this case the level of 
voluntary environmental disclosures in the annual report) used to reduce or minimise any 
potential legitimacy threat as suggested by Zeghal and Ahmed (1990).  As the extent of 
                                                
92 Although this thesis does not claim to be using the NPI as an environmental performance measure but rather 
that the publication of pollution emission data may affect corporate legitimacy. 
93 The NPI, although not as extensive as the TRI, is broadly based on the TRI.  See chapter 3 for further 
information on the development of the NPI. 
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voluntary environmental disclosures is determined by management, legitimacy theory may be 
considered a useful explanatory theory regarding the voluntary environmental 
disclosure/environmental performance relationship. 
 
The descriptive analyses relating to proposition 1a identified an increase in the quantity of 
voluntary environmental disclosures during the four-year test period.  This suggests, for the 
sample corporations, that the steady increase in Australian voluntary environmental 
disclosures in annual reports noted by previous researchers over the past few decades (Deegan 
& Gordon 1996; Trotman & Bradley 1981; Trotman 1979) has continued. 
 
In testing proposition 1b, a significant positive relationship was identified between the 
quantity of 1998 (preceding year) annual report positive voluntary environmental disclosures 
and the 1998/1999 size-adjusted NPI emissions and the 1999 (preceding year) and 2000 
(corresponding year) annual report positive voluntary environmental disclosures and the 
1999/2000 size-adjusted NPI emissions.  This finding was consistent with Australian research 
undertaken by Deegan, Rankin and Voght (2000), Deegan and Gordon (1996), Deegan and 
Rankin (1996) and Guthrie and Parker (1990) who identified a propensity toward positive 
voluntary disclosures in Australian company annual reports.  It is suggested that diverting 
attention to positive environmental performance activities is a useful legitimating strategy 
(Lindblom 1994). 
 
Proposition 1c tested the relationship between the quantity of voluntary emission disclosures 
and the size-adjusted NPI emissions of the sample corporations.  The statistical analyses 
identified significant positive correlations for both the preceding (anticipatory) and 
corresponding (reactive) annual report disclosures for both the 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 NPI 
reporting years.  This finding is consistent with the findings from proposition 1a and is 
suggestive of strategies which may be used to prevent challenges to legitimacy (O’Donovan 
2002; Ashforth & Gibbs 1990) and/or to repair legitimacy (O’Donovan 2002).  The result 
highlights the potentially strategic nature of voluntary disclosures in that the sample 
corporations with greater quantities of emissions disclosed on the NPI were also the 
corporations with the greater quantities of voluntary emission disclosures in annual reports.  
The descriptive statistics also identified an increase in the overall quantity of voluntary 
emission disclosures in annual reports made by the sample corporations between 1997 and 
2000. 
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Propositions 2a and 2b tested changes in the content of voluntary environmental disclosures 
during the implementation period of the NPI.  An examination of the content of disclosures, 
and possible changes therein, was undertaken to further consider the discretionary nature of 
voluntary disclosures in annual reports.  Furthermore, it would provide empirical evidence as 
to whether changes in environmental regulation acts as an impetus to changes in voluntary 
environmental disclosure practices.   
 
As a consequence of the expectation of the NPI to improve community right-to-know and 
result in greater pressure on corporations to improve environmental performance, it was 
argued that the introduction of the NPI may be perceived as a potential legitimacy threat for 
corporations published on the database.  Consistent with legitimacy theory, if a potential 
legitimacy threat was perceived, the corporations may respond by increasing the quantity of 
voluntary disclosures discussing, or relating to compliance with, the NPI in the annual report 
during the implementation period.  Proposition 2a tested changes in the quantity of voluntary 
disclosures on the NPI between 1997 and 2000.  A significant increase in the quantity of 
voluntary NPI disclosures was identified over the four year period.  This result was consistent 
with that of Patten (2002b) who found that the publication of pollution emission data on the 
US TRI was deemed to be a legitimacy threat to US corporations subject to its reporting 
requirements.  This may also suggest that several of the sample corporations adopted Oliver’s 
(1991) compliance approach by attempting to portray compliance with the regulations of the 
society in which they operate.   
 
Descriptive discussion of the NPI disclosures (see Appendix F), however, identified that 
while an increase in the quantity of disclosures had occurred, the level of detail provided 
about the NPI in annual reports was minimal.   It was also noted that the sample corporations 
tended to discuss positive aspects of pollution/emission management, and that discussion on 
the NPI was often preceded and/or followed by favourable aspects of the corporation’s 
operations, therefore limiting the extent of information provided to readers regarding a source 
of information about the corporation’s environmental performance.  Ashworth and Gibbs 
(1990) suggest that the suppression of detailed information may reduce the potential 
development of a legitimacy gap. 
 
Proposition 2b tested changes in the number of corporations making NPI related disclosures; 
that is disclosures relating to emissions in the annual report.  A significant increase was 
identified with 11 corporations voluntarily providing emission disclosures in the 1997 annual 
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report, 12 in the 1998 and 1999 annual reports, and 16 providing disclosures in the 2000 
annual report.   
 
Therefore, considering the findings of propositions 2a and 2b it may be suggested that a 
change in environmental regulation may act as an impetus to changes in voluntary 
environmental disclosure practices in annual reports of Australian companies.   
 
5.4.2 Discussion of analyses for propositions relating to s. 299(1)(f) 
 
Prior to the introduction of s. 299(1)(f) researchers questioned the reliability (Deegan & 
Rankin 1996), usefulness (Tilt 1994) and credibility (Deegan & Gordon 1996) of voluntary 
environmental disclosures in annual reports.  As discussed earlier, voluntary environmental 
disclosures were predominantly positive in nature, containing little negative information 
(Deegan & Rankin 1996). Based on such results, it has been argued that the strategic use of 
voluntary disclosures by companies is indicative of a need for mandatory reporting 
requirements.  As stated by Deegan, Rankin and Voght (2000, p. 127): 
 
Arguably, stakeholders have a ‘right to know’ about the social and environmental 
implications of an organization’s operations at all times—not just when management has 
been ‘shocked’ into action by ‘legitimacy threatening’ events.  Regulation might be 
necessary to ensure that this ‘right to know’ is satisfied.   
 
The amendment of the Australian Corporations Law to include s. 299 (1)(f) has provided an 
opportunity to examine environmental disclosures within both a voluntary and mandatory 
disclosure framework.  Propositions 3a and 3b tested whether corporations required to report 
non-compliance with environmental regulation in the mandatory section of the annual report 
had a greater propensity to disclose higher quantities of voluntary environmental disclosures 
and/or positive voluntary environmental disclosures, than corporations reporting no non-
compliance.  Utilising a legitimacy theory perspective, and considering the findings of 
previous research (Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; Brown & Deegan 1998; Deegan & Rankin 
1996), it would be expected that those corporations required to disclose non-compliance with 
environmental regulations in the directors’ report pursuant to s. 299(1)(f) would be faced with 
an increased legitimacy threat as compared to those reporting no non-compliance.   
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Proposition 3a tested whether the sample corporations reporting non-compliance had a greater 
propensity to disclose larger quantities of voluntary environmental disclosures than those 
reporting compliance.  No significant differences in quantity of disclosure were identified 
between the two groups which is inconsistent with the findings of previous research by 
Deegan, Rankin and Voght (2000) and Deegan and Rankin (1996). This result was also 
inconsistent with the findings of propositions 1a and 1c which found greater quantities of 
voluntary environmental and emission disclosures for corporations with greater levels of 
emissions published on the NPI. 
 
The findings from proposition 3b were also inconsistent with the results of previous research.  
Proposition 3b tested whether sample corporations reporting non-compliance provided greater 
quantities of positive environmental disclosures than those reporting no non-compliance.  The 
results identified no significant difference in the quantities of positive disclosures between the 
two groups.  This finding was surprising considering the previous empirical research which 
found that Australian corporations disclose higher quantities of positive disclosures following 
negative media coverage of environmental breaches (Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000) and 
prosecutions by environmental protection agencies for breaches of environmental regulation 
(Deegan & Rankin 1996).  The findings from propositions 3a and 3b suggest that the 
requirement to disclose non-compliance with environmental regulations pursuant to s. 
299(1)(f) may not have been considered a threat to the legitimacy of affected corporations.   
 
It was identified in the descriptive discussion, however, that the sample corporations did 
provide greater quantities of voluntary environmental disclosures than mandatory 
environmental disclosures during the test period.  This result is not surprising considering the 
narrow scope of s. 299(1)(f) and the discretionary nature of voluntary environmental 
disclosures as noted in the findings from the propositions relating to the NPI.  It is also 
consistent with the findings of Guthrie and Parker (1990) who undertook an international 
comparative analysis of voluntary and mandatory disclosure practices.  They argued that 
corporations appeared to respond to disclosure regulation by opting to ‘disclose such 
information only to the minimum degree required to subdue the calls for further disclosure or 
regulation’ (1990, p. 172). 
 
Another possible explanation for the findings of the descriptive analyses relating to s. 
299(1)(f) was the AIGs (1999) recommendation for companies to disclose the majority of 
information regarding environmental performance in the voluntary section of the annual 
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report.  The AIG (1999) suggested that providing excessive information in the directors’ 
report could detract from the importance of other information in the annual report and that the 
information required for s. 299(1)(f) would be less detailed and more generalised than that 
provided in the voluntary sections.  Several companies referred readers of the mandatory 
disclosure section to voluntary disclosures elsewhere in the annual report or to other sources 
of voluntary disclosures such as company websites and stand-alone reports for further 
information on environmental performance. 
 
In considering the overall findings of this chapter, voluntary environmental disclosures can be 
considered highly discretionary and may be influenced by changes to environmental 
regulation such as the NPI.  It was noted that during the test period, there was a positive 
relationship between the quantity of published emissions on the NPI, and the quantity of 
voluntary environmental, positive voluntary environmental and emission disclosures in the 
annual report.  There was also a significant increase in the quantity of voluntary disclosures 
mentioning the NPI and a significant increase in the number of corporations voluntarily 
discussing emissions in the annual report. The results of testing propositions 2a and 2b 
relating to the NPI and emissions provide support for Oliver’s (1991) compliance approach to 
organisational legitimacy.  Therefore, it would appear that voluntary disclosures may indeed 
be considered a useful tool for management to change societal perceptions of the 
corporation’s environmental performance as identified by O’Donovan (1999).    
 
It does not appear from the findings of propositions 3a and 3b that corporations reporting 
breaches with environmental regulation in compliance with s. 299(1)(f) have a greater 
propensity to utilise voluntary environmental disclosures than those reporting compliance 
under the section; however, overall, the sample corporations did provide significantly greater 
quantities of voluntary environmental disclosures than mandatory disclosures.  In addition the 
proportions of positive disclosures were greater in the voluntary sections than the mandatory 
sections of the annual reports.  Consequently, if the discretionary nature of the voluntary 
environmental disclosure is taken into account (i.e. managements ability to alter the content 
and quantity of disclosures), then the limited scope of s. 299(1)(f) may reduce its usefulness in 
providing a more balanced view of corporate environmental performance. 
 
The following chapter provides a summary of the research presented in this thesis.  Chapter 6 
proceeds with a restatement of the research objectives developed in chapter 3.  The research 
findings are then discussed within the context of the objectives.  The implications of the 
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research are then discussed, followed by a summary of the main limitations of the research 
method.  Finally, future research opportunities are proposed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a summary of the research in terms of the objectives stated in sections 
3.6 and 3.8.  First, the objectives are restated.  This is followed by a summary of the research 
results and the theoretical, practical and research method implications of the findings.  A 
summary of the limitations discussed in chapter 4 is then provided.  Finally, opportunities for 
subsequent research are considered. 
 
6.2 Research Objectives 
 
The first objective of this research was to examine the potentially legitimising (and 
discretionary) nature of voluntary environmental disclosures by determining whether: 
 
1. a change in environmental regulation acts as an impetus to changes in voluntary 
environmental disclosure practices in annual reports of Australian companies;  
 
and, for comparison with previous research such as that undertaken by Patten (2002b) if: 
 
2. there is a relationship between the quantity of published pollution emissions on the 
NPI and the quantity of voluntary environmental disclosure in annual reports of 
Australian corporations. 
 
The final research objective investigated the potentially legitimising nature of voluntary 
environmental disclosures in a combined voluntary/mandatory disclosure system by 
examining whether: 
 
3. there are significant differences between environmental disclosure practices in the 
voluntary sections of Australian corporate annual reports for corporations reporting 
non-compliance, and those not reporting non-compliance, with environmental 
regulations in the directors’ report pursuant to the requirements of section 299(1)(f). 
 
Objectives 1 and 2 were addressed by testing five propositions.  The initial three propositions 
examined whether corporations with greater quantities of published pollution emissions 
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(adjusted by size of the corporations) on the 1998/99 and 1999/00 NPI databases had greater 
quantities of total voluntary environmental disclosures (P1a); had greater quantities of 
positive voluntary environmental disclosures (P1b); and/or, had greater quantities of voluntary 
emission disclosures (P1c) in annual reports for the preceding and corresponding years 
(ranging from 1998 to 2000).  The remaining two propositions examined whether 
corporations increased the quantity of voluntary environmental disclosures in the annual 
report discussing compliance with the NPI (P2a); and/or disclosures concerning pollution 
emissions (P2b) during the implementation period of the NPI (1997 to 2000). 
 
The formulation of objective 1 stemmed from findings in the existing literature relating to 
voluntary environmental disclosure practices in Australian annual reports.  As discussed in 
chapter 2, previous research has identified that Australian corporations increase the quantity 
of voluntary environmental disclosures following negative environmental events and adverse 
media attention relating to these and other events (Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 2002; Deegan, 
Rankin & Voght 2000; Brown & Deegan 1998; Deegan & Rankin 1996).  Furthermore, 
voluntary environmental disclosures tend to be mostly of a positive nature (Deegan, Rankin & 
Tobin 2002; Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 
1996).  Evidence from several US studies suggests that, in similar circumstances, such 
disclosures may have potential economic benefits to the corporation (Freedman & Patten 
2004; Blacconiere & Northcutt 1997; Blacconiere & Patten 1994).  In addition, Australian 
managers also perceive voluntary environmental disclosures as potentially useful in altering 
perceptions of company performance (O’Donovan 1999).  
 
The existing Australian literature provides some evidence of the strategic nature of voluntary 
environmental disclosures by considering the timing, quantity and nature of such disclosures 
(Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 2002; Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; Brown & Deegan 1998; 
Deegan & Rankin 1996; Guthrie & Parker 1989).  Limited evidence, however, has 
investigated the impact of a particular event on the content of disclosures.  The first primary 
contribution of this thesis to the literature was an examination of whether corporations altered 
the content of voluntary environmental disclosures in response to a potential or actual 
legitimacy threat in the form of a new environmental regulation which is not directly 
applicable to the annual report, in this case the NPI.   
 
The review of literature from objective 1 also led to the identification of objective 2.  As 
discussed in earlier chapters and above, companies with what is sometimes deemed “poor” 
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environmental performance have a propensity to disclose greater quantities of voluntary 
environmental disclosures (Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen & Hughes II 2004; Li, Richardson & 
Thornton 1997; Deegan & Rankin 1996).   In particular, Patten (2002b) examined the 
relationship between the quantity of environmental disclosures in US 10k reports and levels of 
emissions reported on the TRI (the US equivalent of the NPI).  Objective 2, therefore, 
provided the second contribution of this thesis by extending the research undertaken by Patten 
(2002b) to also include the relationship between size-adjusted quantity of emissions and the 
quantity of positive voluntary environmental and voluntary emission disclosures respectively.     
 
Objective 3 was addressed through a comparative examination of the quantity (P3a) and 
nature (P3b) of voluntary environmental disclosures in annual reports of Australian 
corporations reporting non-compliance with environmental regulation and Australian 
corporations reporting no non-compliance in annual reports pursuant to the requirements of s. 
299(1)(f) of the Corporations Act. 
 
Objective 3 stemmed from suggestions by previous researchers that voluntary environmental 
disclosures in annual reports may lack credibility (Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 
1996), be misleading (Deegan & Rankin 1996) and provide limited useful information to 
users (Hughes, Anderson & Golden 2001; Tilt 1994).  Such concerns led, to some extent, to 
the amendment to the Corporations Law in 1998 to include s. 299(1)(f), a mandatory 
environmental disclosure requirement.  While the amendment was considered a positive step 
to improving the provision of environmental performance information to users, this thesis 
questioned the potential for the mandatory disclosures to be overshadowed or counteracted by 
the voluntary disclosures appearing in the same document.  Hence, objective 3 provided the 
final primary contribution of this thesis by undertaking a comparative examination of the 
quantity and nature of voluntary environmental disclosures in annual reports of corporations 
reporting compliance and non-compliance with environmental regulations pursuant to the 
requirements of s. 299(1)(f). 
 
6.3 Summary of Results 
 
6.3.1 Objectives 1 and 2 
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The results of this thesis presented in section 5.3.1 suggest that there is a positive relationship 
between the level of publicly disclosed pollution emissions of companies and the level of 
voluntary environmental disclosures made in company annual reports for the twenty-five 
sample companies.  It provides support for previous research that has identified a significantly 
high level of voluntary environmental disclosures among companies that have experienced 
negative environmental events or the publication of environmental information that may be 
perceived as negative (Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; Li, Richardson & Thornton 1997; 
Deegan & Rankin 1996; Patten 1992).  Furthermore, the results are consistent with those 
obtained by Patten (2002b) who identified a significant relationship between pollution 
emission levels on the TRI and environmental disclosures by US firms.  This research 
identified that corporations with greater levels of emissions provided greater levels of 
voluntary emission disclosures in annual reports.   
 
Also consistent with previous research (Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; Deegan & Gordon 
1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996; Guthrie & Parker 1990) it was found that, in general, 
corporations with greater quantities of emissions (or what may be perceived as being poorer 
environmental performance) tended to have a greater propensity to provide positive voluntary 
environmental disclosures than those with lower emission levels.   
 
In addition, there was a significant increase in the quantity of disclosures discussing, or 
mentioning compliance with, the NPI during the implementation period and in the number of 
corporations voluntarily providing emission disclosures in the annual report.  Therefore, this 
research has identified that a change in environmental regulation may act as an impetus to 
changes in voluntary environmental disclosure practices.  As discussed in 5.4.1 this provides 
support of the strategic nature of voluntary disclosures and that the NPI may have been 
perceived as a legitimacy threat by those companies.   
 
6.3.2 Objective 3 
 
The descriptive analysis accompanying the findings relating to objective 3, presented in 
section 5.3.4, identified the quantity of voluntary environmental disclosures as being greater 
than the quantity of mandatory environmental disclosures94 in 1998, 1999 and 2000.  The 
                                                
94
 As stated in 4.5.1 voluntary environmental disclosures may also be provided alongside mandatory 
environmental disclosures in the directors’ report.   It was problematic, and beyond the scope of this study, to 
identify what is strictly a mandatory environmental disclosure and what is a voluntary environmental disclosure 
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findings from the descriptive analysis were consistent with expectations based on the limited 
scope of the section and those proposed by Guthrie and Parker (1990) of companies adopting 
a minimalist approach to mandatory disclosure reporting and appear to suggest that 
companies followed the AIG (1999) recommendations on compliance being: 
 
• limiting mandatory disclosure to one or two pages; 
• keeping voluntary and mandatory disclosures separate in the annual report95; 
• not providing excessive information in the mandatory section so as not to detract from 
other information in the annual report; 
• providing less detailed information in the mandatory section than that provided in the 
voluntary section. 
 
The descriptive analysis also identified that the proportion of positive environmental 
disclosures was greater in the voluntary section than the mandatory section for all years 
examined.  It could be argued that this finding was expected as the section compels disclosure 
of negative information if breaches have occurred.  Guthrie and Parker (1990, p. 170) 
suggested that ‘corporate “bad news” disclosures appear to be made at the instigation of 
government or private (accounting profession) regulation’; however, the wording of s. 
299(1)(f) also compels corporations who have not breached environmental regulation to 
disclose that no breaches have occurred, hence providing an opportunity for the provision of 
positive information on environmental performance in the directors’ report.   
 
The results in addressing objective 3 identified no significant difference in the quantity of 
voluntary environmental disclosures for corporations reporting non-compliance with 
environmental regulations (pursuant to the requirements of s. 299(1)(f)) than those not 
reporting non-compliance.  This was inconsistent with previous Australian research which 
had identified a propensity for larger quantities of voluntary environmental disclosures by 
companies following adverse media attention (Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000) and fines and 
prosecutions by environmental protection authorities (Deegan & Rankin 1996).  Also 
inconsistent with previous research (Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; Deegan & Rankin 1996) 
was the finding that the companies reporting non-compliance did not have significantly 
                                                                                                                                                   
within the directors’ report without full details of the corporation’s actual environmental performance and 
interpretation of s. 299(1)(f).  Therefore, the quantity of mandatory environmental disclosures may in fact be 
understated in this study. 
95 Several companies did, however, refer the reader of the directors’ report to the voluntary environmental 
disclosure section for more information on company performance. 
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greater quantities of positive voluntary environmental disclosures than those not reporting 
non-compliance.   
 
The findings of this study also appear inconsistent with the exploratory study undertaken by 
Frost (2001).  Frost did identify a significant increase in total environmental disclosures and 
negative environmental disclosures in the annual report for companies that reported breaches 
pursuant to the requirements of the section.  A significant, although less pronounced, increase 
in total environmental disclosures was also identified for companies not reporting breaches; 
however, unlike previous research (as discussed in sections 2.8 and 3.9) and the approach 
used in this study, total environmental disclosures, s. 299(1)(f) disclosures and negative 
environmental  disclosures in Frost’s study were the sum of voluntary and mandatory 
disclosures with no differentiation between the locations of disclosures within the annual 
report.   
 
6.4 Implications of the Research  
 
6.4.1 Theoretical implications 
 
In general, this study has provided inconsistent support for previous research which suggests 
that legitimacy theory is a useful explanatory theory for the voluntary environmental 
disclosure practices of corporations (Hedberg & Von Malmborg 2003; O’Dwyer 2003; Brown 
& Deegan 1998; O’Donovan 1999; Neu, Warsame & Pedwell 1998; Deegan & Gordon 1996; 
Deegan & Rankin 1996; Patten 1991; Guthrie & Parker 1989).   The findings from testing 
proposition 1a found a predominantly positive relationship between the level of size-adjusted 
emissions and the quantity of voluntary environmental disclosures in the annual report for the 
1998 (anticipatory) annual report disclosures and the 1998/99 NPI emission quantities, and 
both the 1999 (anticipatory) and 2000 (reactive) annual report disclosures and the 1999/2000 
NPI emission quantities.  This is consistent with previous research which has suggested that 
companies with “poorer” environmental performance face a potentially greater threat to 
organisational legitimacy and, as such, are more likely to utilise voluntary environmental 
disclosures as a legitimating strategy than those facing a lesser legitimacy threat (Al-Tuwaijri, 
Christensen & Hughes 2004; Patten 2002b; Li, Richardson & Thornton 1997; Deegan & 
Rankin 1996).   
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Similarly, the findings from testing proposition 1b identified a predominantly significant 
positive relationship between the quantities of positive voluntary environmental disclosures in 
the annual report and the levels of size-adjusted NPI emissions.  The descriptive discussion 
also noted a propensity for greater proportions of positive voluntary environmental 
disclosures than negative or neutral disclosures.  This finding was consistent with suggestions 
by Lindblom (1994) that organisations may use legitimating strategies in which attention is 
diverted from less favourable environmental performance activities to those that are more 
favourable.  
 
More specifically, the findings from testing proposition 1c identified a significant positive 
relationship between the level of size-adjusted emissions and the quantity of voluntary 
emission disclosures made by the sample companies.  The descriptive discussion also noted 
an increase in the overall quantity of voluntary emission disclosures between 1998 and 2000.  
This suggests that the legitimating strategies adopted by the sample corporations are, at least, 
symbolic and attempting to portray the organisation as being ‘consistent with social values 
and expectations’ (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990).  Furthermore, in testing proposition 1c, 
significant positive relationships were identified for the quantity of voluntary emissions 
disclosures in both the preceding (anticipatory) and corresponding (reactive) years’ annual 
reports and the size-adjusted levels of emissions for the 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 NPI 
reporting years.  Therefore, the use of voluntary emission disclosures may be seen as a 
proactive tactic under a circumstance where management had advance knowledge of the NPI 
as a potential legitimacy threat (O’Donovan 2002; Suchman 1995) and/or as a reactive 
process in order to repair legitimacy (O’Donovan 2002). 
 
The results from testing propositions 2a and 2b suggest that several of the corporations did 
perceive the NPI to be an issue to be included in the annual report and have adopted 
legitimating strategies in response to the real or perceived threat of the NPI.  Consequently, 
this thesis provided support for the suggestion that environmental regulation such as the NPI 
may act as an impetus for changes in the environmental disclosure practices of companies.  
This is consistent with legitimacy theory and that the types of disclosures made by Australian 
companies are also, to an extent, reflective of the regulatory environment in which those 
companies operate as suggested by Holland and Yee (2003) in their examination of US and 
UK companies. 
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While it is not possible from this study to determine the actual motivation of the companies to 
disclose information relating to the NPI, some possible reasons can be speculated from the 
existing literature on legitimacy theory.  The sample corporations could be argued to have 
adopted a compliance approach in that they communicated compliance with the NPI or 
provided emissions information to readers of the annual report.  The compliance approach is a 
legitimating strategy used when corporations attempt to portray a compliance with the 
regulations, norms and values of the society in which they operate (Oliver 1991).  It may also 
be suggested that the corporations may be disclosing in order to expose their association with 
Environment Australia and the NPI in an attempt to gain legitimacy as a consequence of that 
alliance.  This may also be consistent with the results of O’Donovan (2002) who found that 
corporate executives would disclose information in the annual report to share the blame of 
their activities with government or regulatory authorities.  As suggested by Ullmann (1985) 
under some circumstances it may be beneficial for the corporation to be seen by stakeholders 
as bound by government regulations in order to show that expenditure on socially responsible 
activities is not a voluntary or frivolous activity of management. 
 
Descriptive examination of the information content of the NPI disclosures (see Table 18 and 
Appendix F) showed that few companies provided readers with details on the location or 
availability of the data provided by the NPI.  In particular it appeared that companies that did 
mention the NPI generally avoided providing readers with information regarding this source 
of pollution emission information.   Hence it may be suggested that these companies were 
adopting both a compliance and avoidance approach; that is, they are demonstrating 
compliance with the requirements of the NPI but limiting the information provided.  As stated 
by O’Donovan (2002, p. 359) this could be expected in a case where ‘the general public did 
not know the issue in the case and it is logical to think that the corporation would wish to 
restrict the public’s knowledge of this event as long as it could’.  This argument is plausible 
considering there was concern in regards to the level of knowledge of the NPI among the 
general community during its early stages. 
 
While an increase in the number of corporations mentioning the NPI did occur, the majority 
of the sample did not mention the NPI directly in the annual report.  These corporations and 
those that provided no NPI related disclosures would appear to be adopting an avoidance 
strategy in which the issue is ignored (O’Donovan 1999).  It could also be argued that the 
non-disclosure organisations simply did not perceive the NPI to be a threat or that the threat 
was only minimal (O’Donovan 2002). 
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While the findings in addressing the objectives relating to the NPI generally provided support 
for legitimacy theory, this was not the case from the findings in addressing objective 3.  In 
addressing objective 3 it was found that companies required to report non-compliance with 
environmental regulations pursuant to the requirements of s. 299(1)(f) did not have a 
propensity toward either greater levels of voluntary disclosures nor greater quantities of 
positive disclosures than those not reporting non-compliance.  These results were somewhat 
surprising as previous research had identified both increased disclosure levels and quantities 
of positive disclosures for companies that had experienced a negative environmental event or 
media attention relating to a negative environmental event (Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000; 
Deegan & Rankin 1996).   
 
The findings from testing propositions 3a and 3b appear to suggest that sample corporations 
reporting non-compliance under s. 299(1)(f) did not perceive reporting negative information 
under this requirement as an increasing threat to legitimacy.   Alternatively, as the sample 
corporations were also subject to the NPI as a potential legitimacy threat during the test period 
(and the findings of this study suggest that the NPI may have been considered an actual 
legitimacy threat) it may be proposed that when faced with both the NPI and s. 299(1)(f) as 
simultaneous legitimacy threats, the NPI was considered a greater threat.  As such, the sample 
corporations may have responded primarily to the threat from the NPI and not to the potential 
threat from s. 299(1)(f). While this appears to be in contradiction to the concerns raised by 
industry groups and corporations when the section was initially amended to the Corporations 
Law it is, however, consistent with the limitations faced by the section since its inception.  
First, ASIC indicated in its submission to the PJSC (Commonwealth of Australia 1999) that it 
would take ‘a rather light handed approach to [the section] to begin with’.  Second, the section 
was recommended for repeal by the PJSC in 1999 and in the exposure draft for the 
Corporations Amendment Bill 2002.  Furthermore, the Australian Conservation Foundation 
has suggested that various incidences of non-compliance with the section have occurred since 
its initial introduction and that enforcement of the requirements by ASIC has remained lax 
(ACF 2005).  Taking into account these issues, and those discussed in section 6.4.2, it would 
not be surprising for corporations to not consider s. 299(1)(f) as a legitimacy threat or as a 
lesser threat than others such as the NPI. 
 
6.4.2 Practical implications 
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This study identified that a change in environmental regulation did result in a change in the 
content of voluntary environmental disclosures in the annual report during the test period with 
a significant increase in the quantity of disclosures discussing the NPI and in the number of 
corporations making voluntary emission disclosures.  The research also identified a positive 
relationship between the quantity of voluntary emission disclosures in the annual report and 
the quantity of emissions published on the NPI.   This finding is similar to that of Hogner 
(1982), Guthrie and Parker (1989) and Deegan, Rankin and Tobin (2002) and suggests that 
voluntary environmental disclosures may be reflective of changes to the operating 
environment of an entity.  Therefore, it may be suggested that voluntary disclosures, although 
discretionary, may provide some indication of the entity’s actual environmental activities.  
These findings may provide some support for industry arguments to maintain the existence of 
a voluntary disclosure system. 
 
It was posited in section 3.8 of this thesis that the broad scope of voluntary disclosures and the 
limited scope of s. 299(1)(f), together with expectations that mandatory disclosure may be 
minimal (Guthrie & Parker 1990), could result in mandatory annual report disclosures being 
overshadowed or counteracted by voluntary annual report disclosures.  The finding that 
corporations reporting non-compliance pursuant to s. 299(1)(f) had no greater propensity for 
higher quantities of voluntary environmental disclosures (P3a) or positive voluntary 
environmental disclosures (P3b) may suggest that the potential effect of voluntary disclosures 
is no greater than for those corporations reporting no non-compliance.  As discussed in 
section 6.4.1, however, these findings may simply be reflective of the limitations encountered 
by the section since its inception and, as a consequence of those limitations, a perception that 
it did not represent a legitimacy threat.   
 
If this is the case, and considering the findings relating to the discretionary nature of voluntary 
environmental disclosures identified in testing the propositions relating to the NPI (and the 
descriptive findings presented with propositions 3a and 3b), then questions could be raised as 
to whether the section is able to produce the outcomes which were proposed at its inception.  
That is, can its limited scope provide an assurance that information on the environmental 
performance of Australian corporations in annual reports offers users a more balanced view of 
actual environmental performance?  Similar concerns were recently expressed in submissions 
to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities (PJCCS) enquiry into 
corporate responsibility.  The Australian Conservation Foundation stated that ‘[s. 299(1)(f)] is 
so ridden with qualifications that most companies provide no meaningful information, even 
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when they have breached environmental laws’ (PJCCS 2006, p. 137).  The Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission also criticised the scope of the section suggesting that 
‘the provision did not encourage more of the resources sector to report more broadly on 
sustainability issues’ (PJCCS 2006, p. 137).   
 
Consistent with the findings of Frost’s (2001) exploratory study, differences in mandatory 
disclosure practices of the sample corporations were also noted in this research.  This may 
impact upon comparability of reporting, a qualitative characteristic of the Australian financial 
reporting framework (AASB Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial 
Statements, para. 39), between and within corporations.  Therefore, while previous authors 
have expressed concern regarding the discretionary nature of voluntary environmental 
disclosures in annual reports, it would appear that existing mandatory environmental 
disclosure practices are also the subject of management discretion.  Descriptive discussion in 
Appendix G identified that the approaches adopted in compliance with s. 299(1)(f) varied 
between sample corporations.  As discussed in section 5.3.3, companies reported non-
compliance with environmental regulation in either the directors’ report, the voluntary section 
of the annual report, or both.   Other differences in mandatory disclosure approaches may be 
due to the company’s interpretation of the requirements of the section.  There appeared to be 
differences in the interpretation of what a significant environmental regulation was; what, 
where and when details of environmental performance should be included; and, whether 
environmental performance was determined by “materiality”.  The latter is of particular 
interest as it was specifically addressed in Practice Note 68 paragraph 74 (b) (issued by ASIC 
following the initial amendment) which states that the information to be provided is not 
limited to that which is considered material under accounting conventions.  This point was 
also raised recently by the Australian Conservation Foundation which stated that ‘companies 
also commonly read a ‘materiality’ qualification into the clause, which eviscerates it’ (PJCCS 
2006, p. 137).   
 
Overall, taking into account the discretionary nature of both the voluntary and mandatory 
environmental disclosures in annual reports, and that s. 299(1)(f) has sufficient limitations to 
suggest it is not a threat to corporate legitimacy (and perhaps not taken seriously by 
corporations), concern remains as to the quality of the Australian annual report environmental 
reporting system.  This issue does require further consideration as: 
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• socially responsible investment has increased substantially in Australia since 2001 
(Ethical Investment Association 2004);  
• Australian companies continue to lag behind many other countries in corporate 
responsibility reporting (Department of the Environment and Heritage 2005); and 
• the only Australian mandatory environmental disclosure requirements are s. 299(1)(f) 
and s. 1013D of the Corporations Act. 
. 
6.5 Limitations of this study 
 
The limitations of this study were outlined in detail in chapter 4.  The major limitations are 
now summarised.   
 
Sample selection was based on a purposive sampling technique.  Purposive sampling is a form 
of non-probability sampling which affects the external validity or generalisability of the 
research project (Neuman 2000).  The sample size was limited due to the availability of 
Australian listed corporations that satisfied the requirements to appear both on the NPI in the 
1999/2000 reporting year and appear on the Connect4 database of annual reports for the 
financial reporting periods ending 1997 – 2000.  This resulted in a sample size of twenty-five 
corporations.  Therefore, conclusions drawn from the results of this study relate to the sample 
corporations examined and may not reflect the results obtained from the population. 
 
The small sample size, inclusion of non-interval or ratio scaled variables and non-normal 
distribution of the majority of variables used in the analysis necessitated the use of non-
parametric statistical analysis techniques (Bluman 2001; Pagano 2001; Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham & Black 1998) which are less powerful than parametric tests (Coakes & Steed 1999).  
Furthermore, the data is based on annual report disclosures from 1997 to 2000 and changes in 
disclosure practices may have occurred since that time.   
 
As discussed in chapter 4, the use of NPI emission levels in isolation is not a reliable measure 
of environmental performance.  The quantification of emissions does not take into account 
differences in the impacts of different substances on human health or the environment.  This 
approach was necessary, however, due to a number of factors.  First, problems were identified 
in attempting to provide an accurate toxicity measure (as discussed in section 4.5.4).  Second, 
as stated by Sullivan (1999, p. 368) ‘the primary purpose of the NPI is to provide information 
  
(174) 
174
on the quantities of pollutants emitted to the environment’ and it is ‘not an environmental or 
public health effects database (nor was it ever intended that this be the case)’.  Third, there is 
evidence that the contextual information provided on the NPI website was insufficient and 
inadequate (NEPC 2002; Howes 2001).  Fourth, the 36 reportable substances for the two NPI 
reporting periods used in this research were determined from approximately 400 substances.  
The list of 36 substances on which the NPI emission quantity variable was operationalised 
were those considered to be of the highest NPI risk score and were ‘almost all substances 
about which there have been major concerns in recent years’ (NEPC 1999, p. 25) resulting in 
minimal differences in toxicity levels between the substances.  Finally, it was argued that for 
the purposes of this research the quantity of pollution emissions disclosed on the NPI may 
affect the perception of users of that database, being that the greater the quantity published the 
greater the possible perception of the corporation being a poorer environmental performer.  
The use of the NPI also permitted comparisons to be undertaken with the research by Patten 
(2002b) who operationalised environmental performance as the sum of company-specific US 
TRI emission quantities adjusted by sales-revenue levels. 
 
In order to address the requirements of objective 3, the annual report was used as the sole 
disclosure medium in this research as s. 299(1)(f) requires disclosure relating to 
environmental regulation to be provided in the directors’ report of the annual report.  The use 
of the annual report as the sole disclosure medium of environmental information has been 
criticised for ignoring other disclosure instruments that a corporation may use to communicate 
to users (Unerman 2000); however, it is noted in the research literature that the annual report 
is a useful instrument for the dissemination of information to stakeholders (Zeghal & Ahmed 
1990) and an important source of information to users (Deegan & Rankin 1997; Tilt 1994).  It 
is also suggested that attempting to capture all communications in a wide range of disclosure 
mediums may be problematic (Zeghal & Ahmed 1990).  The majority of previous studies in 
the environmental disclosure area have focussed on disclosures in annual reports (Unerman 
2000) particularly Australian studies (Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 2002; Deegan, Rankin & 
Voght 2000; Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 1996; Gibson & Guthrie 1995; 
Guthrie & Parker 1989); therefore, the use of annual reports as a disclosure medium also 
maintained comparability with the existing research. 
 
The category-based content analysis method adopted in this research can result in reduced 
reliability (Krippendorf 1980).  In order to increase the level of reliability a second coder was 
employed (Holsti 1969).  As a consequence reproducibility reliability was targeted to identify 
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inconsistencies between the results of the two coders.  Acceptable levels of reliability were 
determined using both the coefficient of reliability and Scott’s pi.  
 
Words were used as the unit of measurement in this research as the objective of the unit of 
measurement was to determine quantities of disclosures within and between the sample 
companies.  Use of words has been criticised for decreasing reliability, providing meaningless 
results and excluding information such as that provided in images (Unerman 2000; Milne & 
Adler 1999).  An important assumption of content analysis (and environmental disclosure 
research), however, has been that the quantity of disclosures is representative of the 
importance of the issue being examined (Unerman 2000; Gray, Kouhy & Lavers 1995b; 
Krippendorff 1980).  Therefore, words may be considered to provide greater detail than other 
units of measurement such as pages, paragraphs or sentences as suggested by Deegan and 
Gordon (1996); however, in order to maintain meaning, sentences were used as the recording 
unit for this research in identifying themes and nature of disclosure.  The use of sentences has 
also been criticised for excluding information in images and ignoring the importance of 
typeface and font size (Unerman 2000).  Sentences have, however, been proposed as the 
preferred recording unit by a number of authors (Milne & Adler 1999; Hackston & Milne 
1996; Ingram & Frazier 1980) who suggest that they are less subject to interjudge variation 
(Ingram & Frazier 1980) and result in higher levels of agreement between multiple coders 
(Hackston & Milne 1996). 
 
 
6.6 Future Research  
 
The similar findings of this study using NPI data and those of Patten (2002b) using TRI data 
may be useful in future studies.  The use of pollution emission information may allow 
increased comparability of environmental disclosure practices and performance on an 
international basis as the OECD recommended that all member countries adopt a publicly 
available pollutant release and transfer register system in 1996. The NPI is based on both the 
OECD recommendations and the TRI. Similar inventories operate in the UK and Canada.  
The international availability of similar measures of environmental performance also 
addresses early concerns raised by Ullmann (1985) who suggested that different measures of 
environmental performance had resulted in inconsistent results between earlier studies. 
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The finding that voluntary disclosures are highly discretionary compared to the limited scope 
of mandatory disclosures also needs consideration.  Previous research examining voluntary 
environmental disclosures questioned the reliability (Berthelot, Cormier & Magnan 2003), 
objectivity (Deegan & Gordon 1996), credibility (Deegan & Gordon 1996; Deegan & Rankin 
1996) and usefulness to users (Hughes, Anderson & Golden 2001; Tilt 1994) of those 
disclosures.  In contrast to previous research, this study found that companies required to 
disclose non-compliance with environmental regulations pursuant to s. 299(1)(f) had no 
greater propensity to provide greater quantities of voluntary environmental disclosures or 
positive voluntary environmental disclosures than those not reporting non-compliance.  Future 
research examining the perceptions of corporate environmental performance by users of the 
annual report, as compared to actual performance, could be undertaken.  This could provide 
empirical evidence of the effect of the voluntary disclosure system on user decision making. 
 
This study examined mandatory disclosures during the early stages of s.299(1)(f), and while it 
remained subject to repeal.  A review of mandatory disclosures in more recent times would be 
useful to determine whether disclosure practices have altered as reporting in compliance with 
the section has become established.  Also, given the findings relating to the strategic nature of 
voluntary disclosures, a detailed content analysis of voluntary environmental disclosures 
relating to non-compliance items reported in the directors’ report should be undertaken.  This 
would provide a greater understanding of the potential for voluntary environmental 
disclosures to limit the usefulness of mandatory disclosures. 
 
As stated in 6.4.1 the sample corporations subject to the requirements of s. 299(1)(f) were 
subject to the NPI as a potential legitimacy threat simultaneously.  Consequently, it was 
suggested that the insignificant findings relating to objective 3 (in contrast to the significant 
findings relating to objectives 1 and 2) may have been a result of the NPI being considered a 
greater threat than s. 299(1)(f) by the sample corporations.  Therefore, it is possible that using 
a different sample of corporations not subject to other legitimacy threats such as the NPI may 
result in different findings to those in this study. 
 
Future research could also examine whether a mandatory disclosure system may provide more 
reliable environmental performance information than a voluntary disclosure system.  A 
comparison of the perceptions of environmental performance by users of mandatory 
disclosures and voluntary disclosures in the annual report would provide a better 
understanding of the usefulness of mandatory disclosure requirements to stakeholders who 
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rely on the annual report for making decisions regarding resource allocation to entities.  Users 
perceptions of environmental performance, based on disclosures in each section of the annual 
report, could then be compared with a measure of actual environmental performance such as 
ratings provided by the Australian Conservation Foundation’s Perceptions report (2001) or 
more recently those provided by Reputex (see discussion in section 2.7).  This would assist in 
the determination of the reliability of disclosures under each system to users.  It would also 
provide further guidance to policy makers regarding the need, or otherwise, for improvements 
to mandatory disclosure requirements and/or restrictions on voluntary environmental 
disclosure practices. 
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Appendix A:  Australian Environmental Groups 
 
 
 
The Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) has worked in cooperation with 
government, industry and the community since the 1960’s.  Over the past thirty-five years the 
ACF has successfully been involved in the prevention of mining and exploration in sensitive 
areas including Antarctica (1989) and the Great Barrier Reef (1981), the development of 
national parks such as South West National Park (1968) and Kakadu (1974), and influencing 
government to sign the World Heritage Convention (1974) and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
(1995).  The ACF includes business and corporations as an important target area of their 
campaigns (Australian Conservation Foundation 2002).  The ACF is a participant in the 
Age/Sydney Morning Herald Good Reputation Index which is an assessment of the top 100 
Australian companies and their performance over a range of social, environmental and 
economic performance areas.  The Index was first published in 2000 and the ACF contributes 
by providing an annual Perception Report on the environmental performance of the 
companies considered (Australian Conservation Foundation 2001). 
 
Greenpeace Australia was founded in 1977 while bringing action against a whaling station 
located in Western Australia and was incorporated in 1987 
(http://www.greenpeace.org.au/aboutus/index.html).  In 1998 Greenpeace Pacific and 
Greenpeace Australian combined to become Greenpeace Australia Pacific.  Unlike other 
environmental organisations, a major feature of Greenpeace’s activities and mission is a 
confrontational approach to expand the knowledge of environmental issues internationally.  
Greenpeace has been notable in its protests against pollution, nuclear waste, the protection of 
habitat and endangered species, and attention-grabbing techniques including scaling the walls 
of the Australian Prime Minister’s residence, Kirribilli House in 1997.   
 
The Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) is an apolitical organisation established 
internationally in 1961.  The WWF has been operating in Australia since 1978 and 
collaborates with business, community and the government to achieve its goals.  As with 
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many environmental groups operating in the 1990’s and 2000’s, the WWF deems  a 
collaborative approach more useful than the traditional confrontational approach.  The WWF 
produces an Annual Scorecard on Mining Company Environmental Reports prepared by 
signatories to the Australian Minerals Industry Code for Environmental Management.  The 
Code is voluntary and outlines key principles including reporting obligations.  However, it is 
indicative of the changing attitudes of industries with high environmental impacts. 
 
The Total Environment Centre (TEC) was established in 1972 and has been involved in 
over 100 campaigns since its inception.  TEC is a non-profit organization registered under the 
New South Wales Charities Act funded from donations, trusts and independent projects. 
(www.tec.org.au/) accessed 17/07/2006.  The TEC acts as a support base for 
environmentalists and community groups in undertaking campaign activities for 
environmental issues and has been involved in lobbying at local, state and federal levels. 
 
The National Toxics Network (NTN) is primarily focused in the areas of pollution reduction, 
environmental health and justice.  The NTN provides support to non-government 
organizations in areas relating to chemical and toxic issues, including hazardous waste 
management, at the national and international level.  Committee members also sit on a 
number of national advisory bodies.  (www.oztoxics.org) accessed 17/07/2006 
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Appendix B:  NPI Reportable Substance List - Initial Three 
Reporting Periods 
 
 
 
 
Substance 
CASR 
No. 
Threshold 
Category 
Threshold 
Acetone 67-64-1 1 10 tonnes per year 
Arsenic & compounds 7440-38-
2 
1 
10 tonnes per year 
Arsenic & compounds  
2b 
2,000 tonnes per year, 
or 60,000 megawatt 
hours, or rated at 20 megawatts 
Benzene 71-43-2 1 10 tonnes per year 
Butadiene (vinyl 
ethylene) 
106-99-0 
1 
10 tonnes per year 
Cadmium & compounds 7440-43-
9 
1 
10 tonnes per year 
Cadmium & compounds  
2b 
2,000 tonnes per year, 
or 60,000 megawatt 
hours, or rated at 20 megawatts 
Carbon monoxide 630-08-0 1 10 tonnes per year 
Carbon monoxide  
2a 
400 tonnes per year, or 
1 tonne per hour 
Chromium (VI) 
compounds 
7440-47-
3 
1 
10 tonnes per year 
Chromium (VI) 
compounds 
 
2b 
2,000 tonnes per year, 
or 60,000 megawatt 
hours, or rated at 20 megawatts 
Cobalt & compounds 7440-48-
4 
1 
10 tonnes per year 
Cyanide (inorganic) 
compounds 
N/A 
1 
10 tonnes per year 
Dibromoethane 106-93-4 1 10 tonnes per year 
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Dichloromethane 75-09-2 1 10 tonnes per year 
Ethoxyethanol 110-80-5 1 10 tonnes per year 
Ethoxyethanol acetate 111-15-9 1 10 tonnes per year 
Ethylene glycol (1,2-
ethanediol) 
107-21-1 
1 
10 tonnes per year 
Fluoride compounds N/A 1 10 tonnes per year 
Fluoride compounds  
2a 
400 tonnes per year, or 
1 tonne per hour 
Glutaraldehyde 111-30-8 1 10 tonnes per year 
Lead & compounds 7439-92-
1 
1 
10 tonnes per year 
Lead & compounds  
2b 
2,000 tonnes per year, 
or 60,000 megawatt 
hours, or rated at 20 megawatts 
Mercury & compounds 7439-97-
6 
1 
10 tonnes per year 
Mercury & compounds  
2b 
2,000 tonnes per year, 
or 60,000 megawatt 
hours, or rated at 20 megawatts 
Methanol 67-56-1 1 10 tonnes per year 
Methyl ethyl ketone 78-93-3 1 10 tonnes per year 
Methyl isobutyl ketone 108-10-1 1 10 tonnes per year 
Methyl methacrylate 80-62-6 1 10 tonnes per year 
Nickel carbonyl 13463-
39-3 
1 
10 tonnes per year 
Nickel carbonyl  
2b 
2,000 tonnes per year, 
or 60,000 megawatt 
hours, or rated at 20 megawatts 
Nickel subsulfide 12035-
72-2 
1 
10 tonnes per year 
Nickel subsulfide  
2b 
2,000 tonnes per year, 
or 60,000 megawatt 
hours, or rated at 20 megawatts 
Oxides of Nitrogen N/A 
2a 
400 tonnes per year, or 
1 tonne per hour 
Particulate Matter 10.0 
um (PM10) 
N/A 
2a 
400 tonnes per year, or 
1 tonne per hour 
Polycyclic aromatic N/A 2a 400 tonnes per year, or 
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hydrocarbons 1 tonne per hour 
Sulfur dioxide 7446-09-
5 
1 
10 tonnes per year 
Sulfur dioxide  
2a 
400 tonnes per year, or 
1 tonne per hour 
Sulfuric acid 7664-93-
9 
1 
10 tonnes per year 
Tetrachloroethylene 127-18-4 1 10 tonnes per year 
Toluene 
(methylbenzene) 
108-88-3 
1 
10 tonnes per year 
Toluene-2,4- 
diisocyanate 
584-84-9 
1 
10 tonnes per year 
Total nitrogen N/A 3 15 tonnes per year 
Total phosphorus N/A 3 3 tonnes per year 
Trichloroethylene 79-01-6 1 10 tonnes per year 
Xylenes (individual or 
mixed isomers) 
1330-20-
7 
1 
10 tonnes per year 
(Adapted from Department of Environment and Heritage 
http://www.npi.gov.au/about/list_of_subst.html) 
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Appendix C:  Listing of Sample Companies 
 
 
 
1 AMC Amcor Limited 
2 ANE Auspine Limited 
3 APY Asia Pacific Specialty Chemicals Limited 
4 BRL BRL Hardy Limited 
5 CAA Capral Aluminium Limited 
6 CNG Central Norseman Gold Limited 
7 CPB Campbell Brothers Limited 
8 CSL CSL Limited 
9 CSR CSR Limited 
10 CTR Centaur Limited 
11 EML Email Limited 
12 GNS Gunns Limited 
13 HIL Hills Industries Limited 
14 ICT Incitec Limited 
15 NCM Newcrest Mining Limited 
16 NDY Normandy Mining Limited 
17 NFD National Foods Limited 
18 OCA Oil Company of Australia Limited 
19 PDP Pacific Dunlop Limited 
20 RSG Resolute Limited 
21 STO Santos Limited 
22 WEG George Weston Foods Limited 
23 WJM Joe White Maltings 
24 WMT Western Metals Limited 
25 WOW Woolworths Limited 
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Appendix D:  Tests of Normality - Stem and Leaf Plots 
 
 
 
Voluntary environmental disclosures words 1997 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
    12.00        0 .  000000223448 
     4.00        1 .  0123 
     1.00        2 .  6 
      .00        3 . 
     2.00        4 .  29 
     2.00        5 .  23 
     2.00        6 .  77 
     2.00 Extremes    (>=1443) 
 
 Stem width:    100.00 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
 
 
Voluntary environmental disclosures words 1998 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
    13.00        0 .  0000000013569 
     3.00        1 .  246 
      .00        2 . 
     2.00        3 .  22 
     1.00        4 .  6 
     1.00        5 .  4 
     2.00        6 .  36 
     1.00        7 .  0 
     1.00        8 .  7 
     1.00 Extremes    (>=1260) 
 
 Stem width:    100.00 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
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Voluntary environmental disclosures words 1999 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
    13.00        0 .  0000000000001 
     2.00        0 .  22 
     2.00        0 .  45 
     2.00        0 .  67 
     4.00        0 .  8899 
     1.00        1 .  1 
      .00        1 . 
      .00        1 . 
      .00        1 . 
     1.00        1 .  8 
 
 Stem width:   1000.00 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
 
 
Voluntary environmental disclosures words 2000 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
    10.00        0 .  0000000111 
     4.00        0 .  2333 
     3.00        0 .  444 
     3.00        0 .  666 
     2.00        0 .  88 
     1.00        1 .  1 
     2.00        1 .  33 
 
 Stem width:   1000.00 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
 
 
Positive voluntary environmental disclosures words 1997 
 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
    12.00        0 .  000000223448 
     4.00        1 .  0013 
     1.00        2 .  4 
     1.00        3 .  5 
     1.00        4 .  1 
     4.00        5 .  0258 
     2.00 Extremes    (>=1426) 
 
 Stem width:    100.00 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
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Positive voluntary environmental disclosures words 1998 
 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
    13.00        0 .  0000000001356 
     3.00        1 .  226 
     1.00        2 .  8 
     1.00        3 .  2 
     3.00        4 .  458 
     2.00        5 .  24 
      .00        6 . 
     1.00        7 .  0 
     1.00 Extremes    (>=1144) 
 
 Stem width:    100.00 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive voluntary environmental disclosures words 1999 
 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
    14.00        0 .  00000000000011 
     2.00        0 .  22 
     1.00        0 .  4 
     5.00        0 .  67777 
     2.00        0 .  89 
      .00        1 . 
      .00        1 . 
      .00        1 . 
     1.00        1 .  7 
 
 Stem width:   1000.00 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
 
 
 
Positive voluntary environmental disclosures words 2000 
 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
    10.00        0 .  0000000111 
     5.00        0 .  23333 
     4.00        0 .  4455 
     2.00        0 .  67 
     1.00        0 .  8 
     2.00        1 .  01 
     1.00        1 .  3 
 
 Stem width:   1000.00 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
 
 
 
 
  
(199) 
199
 
 
Size adjusted NPI emissions (kilograms) 1998-1999 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
    15.00        0 .  000000000000002 
     2.00        0 .  57 
     4.00        1 .  1122 
     1.00        1 .  5 
     1.00        2 .  4 
     2.00 Extremes    (>=5.2) 
 
 Stem width:      1.00 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
 
 
Size adjusted NPI emissions (kilograms) 1999-2000 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
    14.00        0 .  00000000001111 
     2.00        0 .  33 
     3.00        0 .  445 
     1.00        0 .  7 
      .00        0 . 
      .00        1 . 
     1.00        1 .  3 
     4.00 Extremes    (>=21) 
 
 Stem width:     10.00 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
 
 
Voluntary emission disclosures words 1997 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
    14.00        0 .  00000000000000 
     3.00        0 .  333 
      .00        0 . 
     2.00        0 .  77 
      .00        0 . 
      .00        1 . 
     2.00        1 .  22 
     1.00        1 .  5 
     3.00 Extremes    (>=211) 
 
 Stem width:    100.00 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
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Voluntary emission disclosures words 1998 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
    15.00        0 .  000000000000001 
      .00        0 . 
     2.00        0 .  55 
     1.00        0 .  6 
     1.00        0 .  8 
      .00        1 . 
     1.00        1 .  2 
     1.00        1 .  4 
     3.00        1 .  777 
     1.00 Extremes    (>=405) 
 
 Stem width:    100.00 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
 
 
Voluntary emission disclosures words 1999 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
    15.00        0 .  000000000000000 
     1.00        0 .  3 
      .00        0 . 
     3.00        0 .  666 
      .00        0 . 
     1.00        1 .  1 
     5.00 Extremes    (>=195) 
 
 Stem width:    100.00 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
 
 
Voluntary emission disclosures words 2000 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
    12.00        0 .  000000000013 
     3.00        0 .  589 
     4.00        1 .  0134 
     1.00        1 .  9 
     2.00        2 .  00 
     2.00        2 .  56 
     1.00        3 .  4 
 
 Stem width:    100.00 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
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Voluntary words NPI 1997 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
     3.00        0 .  000 
      .00        0 . 
      .00        1 . 
      .00        1 . 
      .00        2 . 
      .00        2 . 
     1.00        3 .  4 
 
 Stem width:        10 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
 
 
Voluntary words NPI 1998 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
     3.00        0 .  000 
      .00        0 . 
      .00        0 . 
      .00        0 . 
      .00        0 . 
      .00        1 . 
      .00        1 . 
      .00        1 . 
      .00        1 . 
     1.00        1 .  9 
 
 Stem width:        10 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
 
 
Voluntary words NPI 1999 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
    21.00        0 .  000000000000000000000 
     4.00 Extremes    (>=41) 
 
 Stem width:        10 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
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Voluntary words NPI 2000 
 
 Frequency    Stem &  Leaf 
 
     3.00        0 .  000 
      .00        1 . 
      .00        2 . 
      .00        3 . 
      .00        4 . 
      .00        5 . 
      .00        6 . 
     1.00        7 .  3 
 
 Stem width:        10 
 Each leaf:       1 case(s) 
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Appendix E:  Tests of Normality - Shapiro-Wilks Statistic 
 
 
 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Disclosure variable 
Statistic Df Sig. 
Voluntary environmental disclosures words1997 .703 25 .010 
Voluntary environmental disclosures words 1998 .783 25 .010 
Voluntary environmental disclosures words 1999 .792 25 .010 
Voluntary environmental disclosures words 2000 .877 25 .010 
Size adjusted NPI emissions (kilograms) 1998-1999 .616 25 .000 
Size adjusted NPI emissions (kilograms) 1999-2000 .644 25 .000 
Positive voluntary environmental disclosure words 1997 .686 25 .000 
Positive voluntary environmental disclosure words 1998 .774 25 .000 
Positive voluntary environmental disclosure words 1999 .768 25 .000 
Positive voluntary environmental disclosure words 2000 .881 25 .000 
Voluntary emission disclosures words 1997 .599 25 .000 
Voluntary emission disclosures words 1998 .672 25 .000 
Voluntary emission disclosures words 1999 .666 25 .000 
Voluntary emission disclosures words 2000 .837 25 .001 
Voluntary words NPI 1997 .206 25 .010 
Voluntary words NPI 1998 .206 25 .010 
Voluntary words NPI 1999 .460 25 .010 
Voluntary words NPI 2000 .631 25 .010 
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Appendix F:  Descriptive Discussion of NPI Disclosures 
 
 
During the four-year period only three companies provided a table of emissions in the annual 
report.  One mining company included a table for the years 1997–1999 inclusive.  The table 
included seven environmental statistics including carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide 
emissions.  The same statistics were used each year and each table included changes in five 
reporting periods.  In 1999 the company’s carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide emissions per 
tonne increased from the 1998 figures.  No table was provided in the 2000 report (the first 
year of publication of the NPI database). 
Two other companies, one from the mining industry in 1999 and the other from the chemical 
industry in 2000, provided tables of emission related information in their annual reports.  The 
company which provided a table in 1999 included two emission/pollutant related indicators 
both of which showed a favourable reduction over several years.  There is no explanation, 
however, as to why the water pollutants indicator only covers the years 1997 to 1999, whereas 
the greenhouse emissions indicator includes the year 1990, and then all years from 1993 to 
1999 inclusive.  Of the nine indicators used in the table overall96, seven suggest a favourable 
result for the company. 
The company which included a table in 2000 included two indicators: “liquid effluent —
pollutant liquid” which reduced from 374 tonnes in 1996 to 185 tonnes in 2000; and “waste to 
landfill” which reduced from 1928 tonnes in 1996 to 213 tonnes in 2000.  The company’s 
decision to only focus on these indicators is not explained although the two indicators chosen 
are favourable to the company’s image.  Differences in what each company has chosen to 
include in the annual report make comparability between companies difficult.  
 
                                                
96 The table includes lost time due to injuries, waste and resource consumption indicators. 
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Incitec Limited was the only company to mention the NPI in the 1997 annual report97.   This 
was the only year the NPI was mentioned by Incitec.  The company stated that:  
  
On the positive side, we successfully embraced a wide range of regulatory initiatives 
into our management and cost structure, the National Pollutant Inventory, Hazardous 
Substance Regulations and new Queensland legislation being just three examples.  
 
In 1999 Amcor Limited included in its voluntary environment section of the company annual 
report a description of the NPI, including a reference to it being located on the Internet:  
 
Preparations are complete for complying with the company’s obligations under 
Australia’s National Pollutant Inventory (NPI).  The NPI is an internet database being 
cooperatively implemented by the Commonwealth, State and Territory governments.  It 
is designed to provide the community, industry and government with information on the 
types and amounts of certain chemicals being emitted to the environment.  
  
Pollution emissions for Amcor Limited were also published on the NPI in the 1999 year.  
Amcor Limited did not make reference to the NPI in any of the other reporting years.  
  
Newcrest Limited discussed the NPI in both the 1999 and 2000 annual reports.  In 1999 
Newcrest described the NPI as: 
[the] National Pollutant Inventory (NPI) measure came into effect on 1 July 1998.  The 
NPI is Australia’s national database of pollutant emissions.  Newcrest is now liable to 
estimate and report the emissions of 36 designated substances where these exceeded 
predefined thresholds.  Newcrest has been working with environmental consultants to 
determine our commitments under the NPI measure. 
 
In 2000 Newcrest removed the definition of the NPI and referred only to compliance stating: 
 
Newcrest submitted data to the National Pollutant Inventory (NPI) on those of the 36 
designated substances that exceed predefined thresholds.  We worked with industry 
bodies to address specific concerns relating to the estimation of cyanide and particulate 
emissions. 
 
                                                
97 Incitec Ltd mentioned the NPI in the annual report even though the first NPI database was not published until 
January 2000. 
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Capral Limited increased the quantity of voluntary environmental disclosures extensively 
between 1997 and 1999 but reduced the quantity in the 2000 annual report.  Voluntary 
environmental disclosures in 1997 numbered 124 words and referred to smelter emissions, in 
particular those relating to its Kurri Kurri Smelter, which was the subject of EPA court action 
in early 1998, greenhouse gas reductions and the ‘Company’s mass emissions’ taskforce’.  In 
1998, corresponding with Capral’s first reporting year on the NPI, the number of voluntary 
environmental disclosures increased to 543 words.  Again, the majority of disclosures refer to 
emissions and the company’s handling of those emissions.  Mention of the NPI is limited to 
‘We are also establishing guidelines for reporting of releases to air in line with the National 
Pollutant Inventory development.’  In 1999, 410 words are disclosed voluntarily with most 
referring to emissions.  The company includes a table in the annual report that shows levels of 
water consumption, water pollutants, non-hazardous waste, recycled waste and greenhouse 
emissions.  In 2000 the quantity of voluntary environmental disclosures is reduced to 153 
words.  Discussion still focuses on environmental performance relating to emissions. 
 
The Smelter’s environmental performance during the year was also good.  Fluoride 
emission levels were consistently below licence conditions.  As well, a quantity of 
accumulated carbon dust was collected and disposed of at Coopers Mills in Victoria, a 
process that required rigorous environmental approvals from regulators in both New 
South Wales and Victoria. 
 
In 1999 CSL disclosed information on the NPI for the first time in its voluntary sections of 
the annual report.  In describing the NPI CSL stated that: 
 
The Australian National Pollutant Inventory, coordinated by the Federal Government, 
requires all major manufacturing operations to report on atmospheric emissions for 
certain specified chemicals.  In this regard, CSL’s only requirement is to report on 
combustion products from our natural gas boilers. 
 
Disclosure in the 2000 annual report was similar except the last sentence was slightly 
modified to read ‘CSL reports on combustion products from our natural gas boilers, our only 
requirement in this regard’. 
 
Normandy Limited preceded its discussion on the NPI in the 1999 annual report with a 
discussion on its involvement in the Greenhouse Challenge programme.  Describing the 
company as ‘a participant in this voluntary programme’ it states: 
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…participation in the Greenhouse Challenge will result in the reduction of its energy 
consumption and greenhouse gas emissions by more than 15 percent…Australia’s 
Greenhouse Challenge programme is recognised as one of the most successful voluntary 
programmes in the world. 
 
Normandy Limited’s discussion on the NPI states: 
 
Normandy has committed to the National Pollutant Inventory, a Federal Government 
initiative to provide Australians with information about emission levels.  Subsequently, 
the Company will be required to report emissions.  Systems for reporting are being 
developed.  It is envisaged the inventory will assist Normandy to identify pollutant 
emissions and set reduction targets. 
 
This statement is followed by a section discussing the funding of research programmes into 
improvements in the use of and disposal of pollutants in the environment. 
 
In the Normandy 2000 annual report the discussion includes a reference to the availability of 
the NPI on the internet: 
 
Normandy reports emissions to the National Pollutant Inventory (NPI), a public, internet 
based database established to provide information about the types and amounts of 
substances emitted [sic] to the environment.  Normandy believes the NPI will assist it to 
continue to be a responsible operator, accountable to local communities. 
 
The discussion in the 2000 annual report is immediately followed by sections on the 
Greenhouse Challenge, and new initiatives in tailings risk assessment and sodium cyanide 
management. 
 
CSR Limited directs the reader of the 2000 annual report to its own emission data on the CSR 
website.  The paragraph on the NPI is immediately preceded by a paragraph outlining the 
environmental awards the company has received.   
 
INTERNET SITE CSR’s internet site now has an environment section, which includes a range 
of emission data that we report to the Australian Federal Government’s National Pollutant 
Inventory.  The address is www.csr.com.au/environment 
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This is followed by a brief account of environmental incidents and a list of environmental 
performance targets for the future.  The website includes a section on the NPI which outlines 
the emissions of each of its operating companies, details of the products manufactured, 
number of employees at each site, mandatory requirements such as licensing by the EPA, and 
a section on pollution control/management for each site (CSR Limited 2003).  There is no link 
provided to the official Environment Australia NPI website.  
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Appendix G:  Descriptive Discussion of s. 299(1)(f) 
Disclosures 
 
 
The approach adopted in reporting pursuant with the requirements of s. 299(1)(f) differed 
between the sample corporations.  As displayed in Table 28 a number of companies reported 
non-compliance with environmental regulations or breaches of environmental regulation in: 
 
• the directors’ report; 
• the directors’ report and the voluntary section of the annual report; or 
• the voluntary sections of the annual report but not in the directors’ report.   
 
Reporting non-compliance in the voluntary sections as opposed to the directors’ report may be 
due to a number of factors including the timing of the breach, interpretation of “significant”, 
and the appropriate location of the details on breaches of regulation by the companies.   
 
Centaur Limited provided environmental disclosures in both the directors’ and voluntary 
sections of the 1999 annual report but only disclosed incidents of non-compliance in the 
voluntary section: 
 
During 1998/1999, environmental data was recorded and reported (internally and 
externally to Statutory Authorities as required) on environmental incidents and 
compliance.  The number of outstanding incidents of non-compliance recorded at Mt 
Pleasant increased as environmental reporting was standardised.  Measures to rectify 
outstanding incidents of non-compliance have been agreed with the relevant Authorities 
and time frames set for remedial action.  Progress is monitored and reported on a 
continuing basis. 
 
The voluntary disclosure was included within discussion on positive aspects of the company’s 
environmental performance and activities to improve performance.  Mandatory disclosure, 
however, was limited to a statement of compliance.  The company appeared to interpret s. 
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299(f)(f) as a requirement to only disclose those breaches that were current at balance date in 
the directors’ report as opposed to those which occurred throughout the reporting period: 
 
The Company has provided in the Environment and Community section of this Annual 
Report a detailed report on the Company's Environmental and Land Management 
policies and practices.  In accordance with Section 299(1) of the Corporations Law, the 
Company reports that it has complied with all environmental requirements of the 
licences and work approvals held and, at the date of this Report [emphasis added], is 
not in any breach of any environmental law relating to its operations. 
 
As with several other companies who opted for standardised reporting from year to year, 
Centaur provided the same statement in the directors’ report in 2000. 
 
Some companies such as Newcrest Mining Limited appeared to interpret “significant” as 
“material”.  While Newcrest’s s. 299(1)(f) disclosure in 1999 was quite detailed, including a 
table of incidents at different levels, the disclosure concludes with ‘the Directors are not 
aware of any environmental matter which would have a materially adverse impact on the 
overall business of the Consolidated Entity’. 
 
Another disclosure approach was reporting breaches in both the voluntary and mandatory 
sections of the annual report with supporting information provided with the voluntary 
disclosures.  Incitec Limited provides the following in the 2000 directors’ report: 
 
Thirteen company sites, including all major locations, are covered by environmental 
licences issued under relevant State legislation.  Licences impose conditions on the 
operations of facilities, including limits on emissions to atmosphere, liquid emissions, 
noise and dust. 
 
The company operates a comprehensive testing and reporting regime to monitor 
compliance with licence requirements, which embraces an extensive range of licence 
condition parameters.  Over a year, approximately 13,000 individual monitoring tests are 
undertaken and during 2000, compliance performance was 99.8%. 
 
During the year the company was fined $25,000 by the New South Wales Land and 
Environment Court in connection with an accidental release of nitric acid at its 
Kooragang Island site in March 1999.  The company was also fined $25,000 in relation 
to a prosecution commenced in the prior financial year in connection with an accidental 
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release of ammonia from the Kooragong Island site.  The company has taken corrective 
action to ensure neither incident is repeated. 
 
The same information is provided in the voluntary section of the annual report, although the 
disclosure is dissected by the following positive details: 
 
Some of the highlights of the company's environmental performance during the year 
were: 
 
v  winning the 2000 Plastics and Chemicals Industries Association Environment Award; 
v  increased focus on community involvement and awareness, with major sites at Gibson 
Island and Brendale in Queensland and Kooragang Island in New South Wales 
establishing community involvement programs that are recognised by community 
groups as being innovative and open, and are a key element in improving the 
relationship of trust in each of the communities in which Incitec operates; 
v  entering into a Co-operative Agreement with the Australian Greenhouse Office to 
participate in the Commonwealth's Greenhouse Challenge Program; 
v  entering into a Healthy Waterways Agreement with the Brisbane City Council and 
reducing waste water discharge from the company's Gibson Island site into the 
Brisbane River by more than 90%; 
v  achieving ISO 14001 (Environmental Management Systems) certification of the 
company's logistics operations in North Queensland, becoming the only fertilizer 
company in Australia to obtain such certification; 
v  continued research into environmental issues such as greenhouse gas emissions, water 
management and energy use to facilitate the continued improvement of the company's 
environmental performance. 
 
There also appears some confusion as to whether referring the reader to the voluntary section 
of the annual report is sufficient for compliance.  For example the CSR 1999 annual report 
includes in its voluntary disclosures a section titled “Environmental incidents” which 
discusses breaches of environmental regulation and refers to the material effect of breaches.  
Within this section it is stated that: 
 
CSR's 644 operating sites are subject to many environmental laws and regulations and 
must comply with numerous environmental licence requirements.  We believe that we 
are in substantial compliance with these. 
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However, we dealt with 217 environmental incidents last year, compared with 369 the 
previous year. We now report environmental incidents based on five levels: 1 minor, 2 
significant, 3 serious, 4 severe and 5 extreme.  The incidents in the past year were mostly 
level 1 or level 2 breaches of compliance, but included 36 level 3 breaches: 22 in 
Australia and 14 in the USA.  There were no level 4 or 5 incidents. 
 
The pie chart (opposite) shows the nature of level 3 breaches.  Relevant environmental 
authorities were notified of all of these incidents.  The main issues the group faces 
include process and storm water management, boiler stack emissions, dust and noise 
control, spills of liquids, as well as some contamination issues on sites, especially those 
bought more than a decade ago. 
 
The CSR Group is not aware of any environmental issues which would have a material 
adverse impact on our business as a whole. 
 
The discussion is immediately followed by another voluntary section on environmental 
protection.  In contrast, CSR’s compliance with s. 299(1)(f) comprises a single sentence and is 
provided in the directors’ report under the heading of “environmental performance” and 
simply states that ‘the CSR Group's performance in relation to environmental regulation is 
reviewed on pages 26 and 27’.  Therefore, referring users back to the voluntary environmental 
disclosures including both non-compliance and environmental protection sections. 
 
 
  
 
